

new POLITICS

AMERICAN SOCIALISM & THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Robert Alexander ■ Julius Jacobson ■ Sidney Lens
Mulford Sibley ■ Norman Thomas ■ William A. Williams
Douglas Jay, M.P.—A BRITISH VIEW OF THE COLD WAR

Debate: The Common Market

Michael Barratt Brown ■ Eric Heffer

An Exchange: Negroes and the Labor Movement

Seymour Lipset ■ Tom Kahn

William Gomberg ■ Herbert Hill

Tocqueville and the New Politics ■ James Keeney

The Ultra Right and the Liberals ■ Hal Draper

Algeria: The End of a War ■ Francis Roy

A Political Baedeker to Israel ■ Paul Jacobs

Bertie Brecht in New York ■ Lee Baxandall

Labor and Politics ■ Patrick Gorman

WHAT IS ALIENATION? The Career of a Concept ■ Lewis Feuer

NOTES FROM ABROAD ■ CORRESPONDENCE ■ BOOKNOTES

Spring 1962

90 Cents

Editors' Corner

The subscriptions to NEW POLITICS continue rolling in. We now have subscribers in every state except Alaska. Hawaii, interestingly enough, is well represented. Overseas, we have subscribers in England, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Germany, Japan, Israel, Korea, Burma and a number of South American countries.

The Winter issue of NEW POLITICS has been selling very well and making new friends in far flung places. The section on "Currents in Japanese Socialist Thought" induced a bookshop in Tokyo to take a standing order.

We do get around. Articles originally appearing in NEW POLITICS have been reprinted in several publications. *Critica Sociale*, an Italian socialist journal reprinted Paul Barton's "Trade Unions in the Soviet Orbit" and synopsized the symposium on Cuba which appeared in our first issue. In its March issue, *Current* carried a digest of Victor Alba's "The Middle Class Revolution," and the *Negro Digest* is reprinting Herbert Hill's "Organized Labor and the Negro Wage Earner" in May.

Readers continue to comment most favorably. From a subscriber in Torrance, California: "Congratulations on the debut of your periodical! The level of analysis is . . . of the highest, and not since the days of the nineteen thirties have I seen such brilliant political discussion." From a reader in Connecticut: ". . . I must compliment the editors on the spirited tone of most of the articles and the presence of some strong reasoners among them. I particularly liked the piece by Douglas Dowd; also that of Feuer, and Barton on "Despotism and Totalitarianism."

We are delighted to welcome a new sponsor starting with this issue, Robert Pickus, National Director of Turn Toward Peace. Mr. Pickus will have an article in a forthcoming issue.

We still have a limited number of Volume I, Number 1, Fall 1961 and Volume I, Number 2, Winter 1962 for sale. Orders will be filled on a first come first served basis. Please enclose a \$1.00 check with your order for a single copy.

Since the New York NEW POLITICS party last Fall was such an enormous success, we will hold a repeat some time in May. Subscribers in the New York area will receive letters of invitation. By all means bring friends. The object of the socializing is to introduce our readers to our staff and to each other. Incidentally, we would like to raise some sorely needed funds. As we have explained a number of times, NEW POLITICS is not a commercial venture. It has no paid staff. The financial deficit it incurs is paid for through the contributions of friends and well-wishers.

Continued inside back cover

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new POLITICS

a journal of socialist thought

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AMERICAN SOCIALISM and THERMONUCLEAR WAR

ROBERT ALEXANDER
JULIUS JACOBSON
SIDNEY LENS
MULFORD SIBLEY
NORMAN THOMAS
WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS

A British View of the Cold War

DOUGLAS JAY, M.P.



NORMAN THOMAS

ONE OF THE GREAT appeals of socialism, especially before World War I, was "workers of the world unite." Today, when men live in fear of World War III, it still has power but in greatly diminished form. Socialism has been rent asunder by communist tactics. Both socialism and communism have been in some degree prey to the dominant religion of the absolute national state. Paul-Henri Spaak observed some years ago that what socialists have learned to nationalize best is socialism. It could hardly have been otherwise when democratic socialists in each nation were seeking the support of the workers on the basis of a program operative within the framework of a national economy which could be altered by a socialist government on a national level.

International socialism, I have long thought, missed an opportunity the like of which could not return again. Before World War I its feeling of internationalism was real and strong, so strong that it talked about a strike against mobilization in Germany and France where international war was most likely to begin. Came the war in 1914 with a rush—nations, walking in the road of rival capitalist imperialism, in Lloyd George's words, "stumbled and staggered into it." The Socialist International had made no plans for a strike; its most eloquent advocate, Jean Jaures, was assassinated by a French "patriot" and soon socialists were killing socialists almost as cheerfully as Christians were killing Christians in what was, especially after the first battle of the Marne, one of the bloodiest and stupidest wars in history.

The Second World War was a very different story, and the differences between our time and 1914 are very much greater.

Of these differences the chief is not the aggressive missionary zeal of communism and its devotion to the doctrine that its ends justify any means, bad as that is. It is rather the stern objective fact that nuclear weapons, plus chemical and biological, should make large scale war what Khrushchev, Kennedy, Eisenhower and a host of others call it, literally, "unthinkable." (And then they think about it all the time.) There will be no victors. The USA and the USSR, whichever has the more numerous, wretched survivors, will be crushed for a long period into mutual impotence. China, if she does not come into the war, will most likely emerge as militarily the strongest nation.

It is a great pity that controversy rages around an unreal and irrelevant slogan, "Better red than dead," or the opposite. Whoever and whatever survives the wholesale indiscriminate destruction of tens—perhaps hundreds—of millions in the giant combatant nations, it won't be freedom. Liberty will not walk serenely among the corpses of the dead, the agonies of the dying, and the desperation of the survivors. Socialists in each great nation nevertheless sometimes argue that our only hope of preventing war and keeping national self-respect is to be ready to fight, to tie its economy to the arms race, and pile up still higher the weapons which now are sufficient to annihilate the human race.

Behind this, in America (as even less reasonably in Russia) is the belief that the only sinner is the opposing nation. For some socialists their concern for national security is strongly reinforced by their hatred for communist totalitarianism while other socialists in their hatred of war are inclined to forget the communist record and think peace too easily attainable.

ALL THIS MAKES IT understandable that our Socialist International has been more concerned to hold itself together than to be a vigorous, driving force for the peace which is also the condition of preserving freedom. It has acted much like church organizations in this respect and for the same reasons. One can quote admirable resolutions but discover no great *international* force at work in the name of socialism for substituting a peace race for the arms race. Little if any notable or dynamic thinking on war or peace in our time has come from socialists *because they are socialists*. For a divided socialist movement in the modern world to insist that "socialism," largely undefined in its working, is the necessary basis for peace is no contribution.

The British Labor Party rendered a great and too little appreciated service to peace, justice and freedom, when it so constructively began the dissolution of the British Empire and its replacement by a Commonwealth, in which, however, the individual nations go their own way. Socialists generally support—as they certainly should—the

United Nations, but *as socialists* they have done little to strengthen that imperfect organization or constructively to educate for necessary changes in its charter.

Socialists generally have strongly favored the end of colonialism and aid to emerging nations. But in power the French socialists made a very bad job of it in Algeria. Neither the French nor any other socialist or labor party has pioneered for steps toward economic and political unity in Western Europe or wider areas. They have felt obliged to protect the relative position of their own workers—again with some justice—but without much trace of ability to develop international working class sentiment or to turn it to constructive action. The Socialist International, although many of its constituent parties have governed or been in very powerful opposition, is by no means equivalent as a moral and intellectual force for internationalism and peace to the socialist internationalism of the early years of this century—and then it missed its great opportunity.

But who are we American socialists to criticize! I do not speak merely of our numerical weakness in this most powerful of the—imperfect—democracies, but also of our general educational influence. We are, most of us, active in general peace organizations. This is as it should be. We can't serve peace and freedom by herding by ourselves. The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation (SP-SDF) 1960 platform is sound in urging as the prerequisites for peace: (1) universal disarmament down to a police level in nations and between nations; (2) strengthening the UN; (3) disengaging our nation from such ridiculous and dangerous commitments as Chiang's claim to represent China; and (4) more actively, intelligently and cooperatively waging a holy war against world-wide poverty, disease and illiteracy. We encourage discussion in our own ranks of means to carry out a program on these lines but all of us, in and out of the SP-SDF, have failed to link our socialism to the absolutely essential task of providing concrete alternatives to unthinkable war. To outline a position it would take a book.

NORMAN THOMAS, *the veteran American socialist is the author of a large number of books. His latest book, Great Dissenters, published by Norton, appeared recently.*

*The author sees
the choice as between
war and dictatorship or
peace and social change*



SIDNEY LENS

NO ONE, EXCEPT FOR a small hysterical fringe, wants nuclear war. Back in Washington the theoreticians of the Pentagon may speak a strange jargon of "first strike," "second strike," "pre-emptive war" and the like, but in the grass roots of America—as in the grass roots of the Soviet Union—nuclear war is viewed as the ultimate horror. Some Americans assuage their feelings of inadequate masculinity by proclaiming that "we must be strong at all costs," but deep down the rank and file is far less anxious to be "better dead than red." Louis Cheskin, motivational research expert, reports that his interviews show ninety per cent of the people are terrified at the prospect of war.

Abstract opposition to war is universal. Everyone, even the Pentagon, speaks of peace; and most Americans honestly believe that the arms race really deters the Soviets from attacking us. "So long as the Russians know we're strong enough to destroy them"—so runs the argument—"we're safe." Alas, this conventional wisdom is accepted even by some socialists. They, too, are opposed to war in the abstract, but they feel that the road to peace lies in military strength. Just as there are "Kremlin socialists" who concede this or that "error" of communism, but see no wrong in Soviet policy generally, so there are "State Department socialists," on the other side, who believe that while the U.S. has a few blotches on its democratic bib, it is storing megaton monstrosities merely as a shield for decency and freedom.

It is here that we come to the point of controversy. Both views are basic transgressions on the humanistic and political aims of true socialism. Whatever the disputes over method, the avowed goals of

socialism are still "peace and plenty." Neither of these aims can be furthered by either Soviet or American foreign policy. The Soviets have had the edge on the U.S. in the Cold War because they have been more flexible in dealing with the social upheavals since World War II. But their materialistic notions of social change are far removed from the humanistic socialism so aptly described by Erich Fromm. And while the U.S. and its allies have finally accepted the inevitability of the present revolution they do so grudgingly and they try at all costs to preserve as much of the old status quo as possible.

If war—as Clausewitz pointed out—is the continuation of politics by other means, then neither the militarist policies of the Eastern bloc nor that of the Western bloc can serve a humanistic politic. Drawn to their logical conclusions, neither policy—even if they avert war, which is unlikely in the present arms race—can result in the kind of world that socialists aspire to.

In both camps militarism is the other side of the coin of dictatorship. The extreme militarists in the Soviet block look back with nostalgia to the terror under Stalinism, and the extreme militarists in the United States are intent on refashioning America in the image of the garrison state. Both "hard" factions look on the revolution in underdeveloped countries as obstacles. Hard groups in the Communist world, such as the Maoists, consider these revolutions "bourgeois." Hard groups in the West consider them "Communist" and equally undesirable. Internally and externally, as far as both camps are concerned, militarism is the shield for dictatorship, conformism and regimentation.



PERHAPS THE BEST RATIONALE for State Department socialism is made by ex-Communist Jay Lovestone, now George Meany's key advisor on foreign affairs. To him the conflict in the world today is between democracy, with all its failings, and totalitarianism. This simplified analysis obviously flies in the face of distasteful fact. The so-called "free world" is an amalgam of some advanced and moderately democratic countries, and some unrepentant dictatorships. One need only list a few of the West's heralded allies of this past decade and a half: Chiang in Taiwan, the SEATO leaders of Thailand and Pakistan, Somoza in Nicaragua, Ydigoras in Guatemala, the Kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Salazar in Portugal, Franco in Spain. If you define "free world" to mean anything that is non-Communist and is militarily-allied to the West then these dictators fill the bill. But most of them head semi-feudal nations which are not only the antithesis of freedom but the very type of *social system* against which the revolu-

tionaries (including those of the U.S. in 1776), fought during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.

Lovestone and his friends are fully aware of this. No doubt they would prefer better regimes in Portugal or Saudi Arabia. No doubt, too, they would be happier if the colonial powers would once and for all jettison the remainder of their empires. But Lovestone insists that we must *first* destroy the Communist dictatorships before we can turn our attention to the rightist leaders. In his view the immediate enemy is Communism; once we have disposed of this we can turn our attention to the rightists. In the *meantime* we must *utilize* many if not all, of them in the common venture against the "world Communist conspiracy." To do so we must be "strong," armed, ready to fight even with nuclear weapons. Otherwise the Communists will blackmail us and overrun "free countries."

Even if you accept Lovestone's *axiom* that this is a war between democracy and totalitarianism, the conclusion is still wrong. If you threaten thermonuclear war you must be prepared to fight it—otherwise the threat has no credibility and can serve no political purpose. But unlike wars of the past, when political purposes could be achieved through military victory, when at most only fifteen per cent of the world's population could be destroyed by all the weapons at hand or about to be fabricated, nuclear warfare today means—to use General MacArthur's term—"double suicide." Certainly within this decade it will be possible to kill off all of humanity with the weapons at hand. In 1959 Congressman Holifield's committee estimated that if the Soviets dropped 1,446 megatons on the U.S. it would inflict 50 million deaths and 20 million injuries. That was three years ago. Russia's stockpile today is at least 10,000 megatons and no doubt will grow rapidly to 40,000 or 50,000—more than enough to kill every American, whether sheltered or un-sheltered. Similarly our own stockpile is at least 35,000 megatons, and growing rapidly. We can inflict equal or greater damage, therefore, on the Soviets. Under such circumstances "deterrence" is obviously a clipped weapon. If there can be no victory in war, it becomes useless to threaten it. As Walter Lippmann has pointed out we are at the peculiar transition stage where the old weapon of militarism no longer serves an political purpose, but we have not yet fashioned a new weapon to defend our interests.

"Deterrence" certainly can claim a few victories, here and there. It must be conceded that Berlin and Taiwan might very well have fallen if there were no deterrent power on the part of the U.S. But the matter must be viewed not in its parts but in its totality. We have lost infinitely more, despite our military superiority since the end of World War II, than we have gained. No victory that we have gained can be offset even by a hundredth part against the pivotal gain of the Communist world in China. And the setbacks that the West has suffered in Viet Nam, Laos, Cuba and many other places, despite our military advantage, far outweigh anything the Communists may have lost.



MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS pragmatic consideration is the strategical one. "Deterrence"—contrary to what liberals, Love-stoneites and some socialists believe—is much more than a mere military phenomenon. It is a way of life. It alters the very fabric of our own society, and it imposes restrictions on what we can do for progress elsewhere. It is a concomitant of the status quo. If we rely on the military as our main weapon against Communism then we must seek out dictators and backward regimes in the underdeveloped areas for our allies.

The more revolutionary countries have little interest in military alliances or military expenditures. They want to *develop* their countries, and they behave very much like the U.S. did until the 20th century—they play off both power blocs against each other to get economic aid from both. They want to be rid of military bases on their soil; they want to cut rather than increase spending on armaments. Hence they repel approaches for a military alliance. One need only call the roster of America's allies in the underdeveloped areas to see how true this is: it is usually the corrupt or slow-moving government that is willing to deal with us on a military basis, not the progressive, revolutionary one.

The tragedy of this policy has been proven over and over again. The \$3 billion in aid we gave to Chiang Kai-shek vanished with the night when his unspeakable regime toppled. When Nuri Said's government fell in Iraq one bastion of our SEATO alliance fell, never to be repaired. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Nicaragua, etc., cling to their alliances with the U.S., but they are backward and un-progressive countries right now, and their regimes will certainly fall within the next decade or so in favor of revolutionary governments. Deterrence and militarism, which force us to rely on such unstable allies, are therefore their own worst enemies. They can only lead to further setbacks for the West.

Internally, deterrence has the effect of subverting democracy itself. To fight, as President Wilson once pointed out, you must be prepared for obedience; the fabric of the whole nation becomes conformist. Today, when it is no longer armies which do the fighting and the dying, but *whole* nations, the nation itself must be transformed to the élan of the military—obedience. If we continue to threaten the Soviets with "instant retaliation," and we are always poised "on the brink," we must also have a social structure where obedience and conformity, rather than individualism, are the prime values. War can come so

suddenly, under present circumstances, that each citizen must be ready to jump to attention when ordered, just like the private does for his sergeant. Many people who believed that mccarthyism was an episodic aberration in the U.S. are surprised that so much of its fabric still remains. But in truth mccarthyism was merely an excess of the militarist élan. The military itself curbed mccarythism when it became too un-subtle and reached into the military itself. Nevertheless, the values of conformity and obedience are the ones that are still injected into our social veins, because a society that depends on military deterrence can only evolve such values. The garrison state and dictatorship are the final expression of this tendency, and it is only to the extent that there is a political struggle against deterrence and militarism that it is curbed.

IN A DECADE AND A HALF deterrence has not deterred, and neither our efforts nor that of the Russians have enlarged the area of democracy and progress. It is the *contest* between the two which has made it possible for many countries to advance their social goals. By taking advantage of the conflict they have received economic aid from both. But on neither the Russian nor the American side is the struggle anything other than a power contest. The Russians have been much wiser in the way they have handled world problems, but in both cases the question of democracy and progress is irrelevant. Both sides are willing to perform any number of undemocratic acts to secure their power. Russia may speak of self-determination, but it rigidly denied it in Hungary 1956; it may speak of fighting for the working class, but it put down with tanks and guns a legitimate rising of the workers of East Berlin in 1953. It may talk of freedom but it has permitted a wall to be built in Berlin to prevent free movement of East and West Germans. The same standards apply to American behavior. There may be differences in nuance and in harshness. There is no comparing, for instance, American intervention in Lebanon with that of the Soviets in Hungary. Yet the main goal of both blocs are the same: the securing of their power. The U.S. role in Lebanon, Guatemala (where it toppled the Arbenz government), Iran (where it organized the overthrow of Mossadegh), Cuba (where it supported reaction to the very last and even attempted to place a military junta in power when Castro's victory was imminent), and so forth and so on, indicate that it is not democracy essentially that motivates our State Department, nor is it totalitarianism against which we fight.

The weakness of the West—a weakness which deterrence not only doesn't cure but exacerbates—is its failure to understand the revolutionary character of the post-war world.

MILITARISM HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE in the past in a variety of situations. The British, with their military superiority in the 19th century, were able to put down one nationalist revolution after another. Their navy and their army were their bastion of power. With 50,000 or

100,000 troops Britain could conquer sub-continents like India. But all this has changed in the last two decades. Despite the overwhelming *military* strength of Britain and France vis-a-vis their empires, they have lost them; and it has not been because they were "humanitarian" and wanted to give them up. They lost them because there is a new nationalistic force sweeping Asia, Africa and Latin America that is irrepressible. In places like Viet Nam, Algeria, Malaya, and a dozen others, guerrilla warriors imbued with nationalism have been as effective as, or more effective than, the most modern military machine. America's overwhelming military superiority in the first decade after War II did not prevent China from going communist, did not even succeed in conquering North Korea when General MacArthur attempted to drive to the Yalu. Military power has lost its sting in the face of revolution. It has not prevented the great expansion of Soviet influence—even though we always had a bigger and better stockpile of nuclear weapons.

In the present relations between nations revolution has become a far more important factor than military strength. This is just the opposite of what prevailed before. And it is these revolutions which are the most un-stabilizing factor in international politics, in the Cold War, and in the hot war that will follow the Cold War unless there is a disarmament and social justice. That bloc will emerge the victor in the present contest that relates to these revolutions more adequately. Even more, the very nature both of Soviet and American society will be determined by how each reacts to the world in revolution.

If the West tries to suppress totally the revolution, through military power, it will convert itself in the end to dictatorship. If it straddles the issue, by agreeing to national liberation of the colonies but simultaneously trying to slow down the social phase of the revolution, the West will suffer defeat after defeat until its own living standards and power are seriously jeopardized. Conversely, to the extent that the Soviets keep aloof from the non-Communist revolutions, they will retain large vestiges of Stalinism. And to the extent that they decide to aid non-Communist revolutions, they will more and more liberalize their own regime.

In either case, the "weapon" each bloc needs for its preservation is a social, not a military, weapon. We have a choice today between one or the other—not both. I am aware that most liberals and State Department socialists reject such a thesis: Why, they ask, can't we have both? Admittedly we can keep *some* military force, while placing most of our emphasis on a social strategy both abroad and at home. The question relates, however, to emphasis. It is ridiculous to assume that we can be spending 63 per cent of our national budget on armaments, that we can build a \$200 billion-plus military machine, and still place our main emphasis on helping the social revolution in underdeveloped areas. The military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned against in his last days in office is not only a military and industrial phenomenon but a social force. It stands for

the status quo, or as much of the status quo as can be rescued. And with the power of \$52 billion a year budgets and \$200 billion military establishments, it is capable of directing American policy towards that status quo or at "worst" towards an unhealthy straddle.

The policy of deterrence is not just a matter of adding together so many planes, weapons, and guns—it is, in the most literal sense, a way of life. It has a political function of its own—to defend the status quo. It is a *total* policy, with all that this implies in supporting dictators, escalating the arms race, subverting democracy at home. We are faced therefore not with a choice of this-and-that, but either this or that. Either we rely on the military deterrent which makes it impossible for us to take a consistent position in favor of the social revolution now in being; or we abandon completely the concept of military deterrence in favor of a social approach to the world conflict. That would mean not only disarmament, not only changes at home in racial relations and towards an expanded welfare state, but international planning and international subsidy to guide the underdeveloped areas towards thoroughgoing social reform.

THE ALL-IMPORTANT FACTOR in the post-war world is the tidal wave of revolution. Forty-eight nations have won their freedom from some form of colonial control and are in various stages of social reformation as well. If you include China more than half of humanity has been affected. And each of these revolutions has been and must continue to be a consideration of the Cold War. Each one de-stabilizes the relationship of world forces, either by joining the Communist bloc, veering in our direction, or adopting a positive neutralism. We have only to list the so-called "trouble spots" of recent years—China, Viet Nam, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Cuba, the Congo—to note how closely knit revolution and war have become. Each of these situations, and others, threatened to alter the world balance of power. each brought humanity to the "brink" of world-wide war. Military power can no longer prevent it—as it might have in the 19th and early part of the 20th century—and military deterrence cannot draw it in our direction.

Our only hope is to evoke the friendship of both revolutionary peoples and governments through judicious support. In this the advantage is with the United States—if only we can reorient our policy. We have the surplus capital and the know-how that can help the revolution proceed along the democratic groove. If nations such as Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Ceylon remain short of capital, and if they decide to industrialize rapidly, they will have to do something akin to what the Russians have done. They will have to fashion a totalitarian state, with total controls over capital formation, farming, unions, and individual rights. But if the U.S. were to grant large amounts of capital in return for social reform, and loan these countries our know-how, the transition to democracy would be easier and they would certainly draw to us rather than to the Russians.



THE RUSSIANS, in their competition with the U.S., have a compensating advantage which they have used with greater dexterity than we. For the Soviet Union is itself part of the revolution. Distasteful as this may sound to most Americans and to some socialists, it is a fact. The Bolsheviks rebelled against the same things that most revolutionary nations are now rebelling against: a semi-feudal land system, foreign controls, a semi-feudal social structure that inhibited progress. The Russian Revolution addressed itself to the right question: how to rise from this backward morass.

In the end, during a quarter of a century of Stalinism, it gave the wrong answer. Too rapid industrialization resulted in one of the worst terrors in history. But Russia did not, even at that, lose all its attractiveness to the underdeveloped countries. By destroying the vestiges of feudalism and by industrializing quickly it seemed to be blazing a path. That it was totalitarian was almost irrelevant in some places, for most of the underdeveloped world had never tasted anything *but* totalitarianism, whether it was in imperialist form or their own feudal and tribal government.

When we are critical of Communism we tend to think of it as a static phenomenon. Men like Sidney Hook refuse to see it as a dynamic movement, capable of change. Yet communism, like capitalism, has changed and is changing drastically. To lump all its phases and all its tendencies into one black pot is unrealistic. Even if every single phase were anathema to true socialism, it makes considerable difference in each of our lives who heads the Soviet world, or what is the balance within it of the hard and soft factions. All of this can be decisive in the present Cold War. There is a wide gap between a Khrushchev and a Stalin; a Khrushchev and a Mao; a Gomulka and an Ulbricht; a Tito and a Hoxha; or a Polish revisionist and a Mao. Soviet communism, as it becomes a "have" force, tends to complete a cycle. There was first a somewhat clipped multi-party system with the Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries; then a one-party system, but with quite a few open factions; later a three-cornered open fight between Stalin, Trotsky and Bukharin; still later a hidden fight within the Central Committee between Stalin and Kirov; then at the totalitarian pinnacle a Stalinist monolith. Since the death of Stalin the process is being reversed, ever further away from the monolith. The slave camps, the purge trials are no more. There is a visible improvement in living standards, a visible relaxation in the

Soviet air. And there is an increase of open factionalism in the Communist world and within each Communist party.

I recall the first time I was in Yugoslavia in 1950 there were forced laborers in the streets of Belgrade working with sub-machine guns at their backs. By the time I went there again, in 1953, this phase had ended. And in subsequent trips there have been signs of increasing relaxations and increasing rights for the masses. When, in 1953, I tried to explain to some socialist friends that for the Yugoslav people this made a very significant difference, they tended to dismiss the change as a mere nuance of something inherently evil, called communism. Since then many socialists have seen for themselves both the changes in Yugoslavia and other Communist countries. There *is* a difference in the various types of communism. Polish revisionists who have come to the United States and have visited socialists here do not sound too much different from left-wing elements in the Socialist Party.

NONE OF THIS SUGGESTS that we ought to embrace communism. Far from it. But it does suggest that communism *itself* is amenable to change. If the West is really concerned with communism *per se* it has many means at hand to alter its character for the better. As a matter of fact if we were to jettison the self-defeating strategy of deterrence we would automatically create new conditions behind the Iron Curtain. As things now stand the "hard" Communists, like the hard Pentagonites, excuse their totalitarian measures by pointing to American war preparations. "How can we give you democracy," they tell their intelligentsia, "when the U.S. has ringed us with 950 bases? We are in a virtual war situation, and in war there must be discipline." If there were to be a world relaxation and disarmament it would be the "soft" Communists, those who oppose war and favor real co-existence, who would become dominant. We are today witnessing the beginning of this titanic struggle between the softs and the hards in the Communist world. The Khrushchev-Mao fight, still in its infancy, will go down in history as a far more significant struggle than even that between Stalin and Trotsky. It will affect the world much more. Not that Khrushchev is an angel, but he is opening the door to a more decent form of communism that may, in the end, evolve to democracy.

Here again the strategy of deterrence blinds the United States—and the State Department socialists—to great possibilities. If we could follow a non-militarist policy, if we could join the revolution of rising expectations with true consistency, we would in the process not only keep our own power intact but force the best kinds of changes within the Soviet orbit itself.

The tragedy of the West today is that it is fighting today's wars with yesterday's weapons—the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. The present conflict pivots around revolution, but our strategy pivots around military considerations. The present conflict is rooted in revolutionary change, but we are fighting it as if it were

merely a force of arms or a conspiracy. We are unable even to identify clearly the real enemy—hunger, social stagnation, illiteracy, disease, frustration. Instead we focus on the *derivative* of that enemy, communism, as if it were the real thing.

It is this that makes thermonuclear war so possible. It is not just the Russians and their “provocations” (we too “provoke”—witness Laos, where we reneged on all our 1954 Geneva promises, or Japan and Germany which we have re-armed despite our unequivocal pledge to the contrary). If we continue to view the enemy in the black and white terms of mccarthyism, if we continue to think of the enemy as “Russia” or “China” without understanding the intrinsic relation of the conflict between us to revolution, then we shall continue the arms race long and furiously, until it finally explodes into thermonuclear war. And before that day comes we shall already be converted to the garrison state.


The choice for socialists, as for everyone else, is between war and dictatorship, on the one hand, and peace and social change on the other. To choose sides between policies of East and West, whether with one or the other, lends support to the arms race and can only lead to the first alternative. Those who stand for the second will continue to be critical of both camps, noting and supporting the improvements in each, berating the militarism and regressions in both.

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*The West needs to
maintain its strength
but be willing
to negotiate*

ROBERT ALEXANDER



CERTAINLY NO SOCIALIST, nor indeed any rational human being, would want to see the world explode in a thermonuclear war. Faced with the possibility of such a catastrophe, many socialists and non-socialists alike have tended to seek some easy and simplistic way out of the menace of mass suicide. To my way of thinking, many of the solutions proposed, particularly in socialist circles, start from false premises and reach naive conclusions.

In this article, I shall first present what seem to me to be several basic propositions with regard to the problem of war and

peace, and the socialists' attitude towards this question. Then I shall sketch briefly what I believe to be the only kind of approach which makes sense in the world in which we live.

My first proposition is simple: socialism and pacifism are not the same thing. Perhaps this seems obvious, but many socialists are prone to talk as if they *were* the same. They are not necessarily incompatible, but they are by no means identical.

Socialism as a dream, as an objective towards which political action is undertaken, is a society in which, through rational economic planning, a reasonably equitable distribution of wealth and income and the fullest possible development of political and social democracy, the individual is assured of the material basis which will permit him to develop to the fullest his own capacities, predilections and interests. Socialism as a political movement is an organized group of citizens seeking in a democratic fashion to make use of the machinery of the state to achieve the wished for reorganization of the economy and society.

Pacifism, on the other hand, is a particular approach to one aspect of this broader problem. On a personal level, it is the individual refusal, for whatever reason, to participate in the use of violence in public life, whether on a national or international plane. On a mass scale, pacifism would substitute the use of non-violent for violent means of dealing with clashes of groups within a nation and of nations with one another. Since in today's world, pacifism as

an organized movement exists in only one of the two opposing blocs, it amounts to defeatism for that bloc in its struggle with its antagonist.

The socialist movement as a whole has never been pacifist. Although always opposing militarism and seeking to prevent wars which arise from clashing interests in the old order, socialists have upon innumerable occasions taken sides both in armed struggles within a single country and in wars between different countries.

Thus, Karl Marx supported the North in the United States Civil War (the largest and most bloody conflict between 1815 and 1914), and backed the Paris Commune in its uprising against the French Government of 1870-71. Before World War One, Jean Jaures argued for the substitution of a citizens' militia for a standing professional army, but never suggested as an immediate objective that his nation—or any other, for that matter—completely abandon its armed forces.

Socialists almost unanimously supported Ethiopia in its war against the Italian invaders of the 1930's, the struggle of the Chinese against the Japanese militarists, and needless to say, the fight for life of the Spanish Republic against Franco and his allies. Likewise, virtually all socialists throughout the world supported the Allied cause during World War Two, and the defense of Korea against Communist invasion in the early 1950's.

My second proposition is equally simple: There will be no gain for socialism if the existing world balance of power shifts decisively in favor of the Communists. The whole history of the Communist movement indicates that the first victims of successful Communist tyranny are the democratic socialists. Whatever changes may have taken place in the U.S.S.R. in recent years, there is little evidence so far that this "tradition" of the Communists will not continue in the immediately foreseeable future.

Needless to say, pacifist socialists would fare no better than any other kind. There is yet to come into legal existence anywhere in the Communist bloc a pacifist organization; and individual citizens of the bloc countries who express the idea that the constant calls for "disarmament" and "peaceful coexistence" made by Khrushchev and his friends ought to be applied first to their own part of the world are quickly hustled off to the nearest cell.

A world dominated by the Communists would mean the end of the hope for democratic socialism, as well as of the democratic Socialists. Furthermore, there are certainly reasonable grounds to believe that if the Communists were no longer faced with a large "outside world" in which democratic values were still more or less generally adhered to, whatever trends there are in the Soviet Union towards "liberalization" and "democratization" would come to a halt. It seems highly likely that the existence outside of the Communist bloc of vastly more freedom than exists within it is a fact which exercises continuous pressure inside for amelioration of the state of affairs which has come to be summed up in the word "Stalinism."

MY THIRD PROPOSITION is that there is no assurance that there would be universal peace or even the abandonment of nuclear weapons and their use, if the balance of power were to shift decisively in favor of the Communists. In the first place, there is no reason to doubt that if they thought they could do so with impunity—through intimidation or actual invasion: the Soviet Union and its allies would seek to reduce the rest of the world, the present neutrals as well as the present North Atlantic bloc, to subservience. Furthermore, there is not even any degree of certainty that, if they were reasonably sure that there would be no retaliation, the Soviet Union would not launch an atomic attack on this country as a means of destroying whatever non-nuclear military resistance they might otherwise encounter here.

One might add that the idea of some of our pacifist friends that if the Communists took over parts of the world they do not now control it would be possible to deal effectively with them through passive resistance, is utopianism in the extreme. The Communists of whatever brand are distinctively not the British with whom Gandhi dealt. They don't play by the same rules.



Unlike the British, the Communists would not be faced with a glaring contradiction between their professions and behavior at home and their actions in newly occupied countries. There are few barbarities which the Communists could practice on us in the United States which they have not already experimented with in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and Communist China. Passive resistance could be dealt with as ruthlessly by the Communists as they handle the non-passive kind. Nor would there be anyone inside or outside of the older Communist countries to denounce publicly their behavior in their newly occupied nations, such as the British government faced throughout the Gandhi period.

However, even if we were to presume that the balance of power were to shift to such a degree that the United States itself would either voluntarily become a Soviet satellite à la Fidel Castro's Cuba, or would be peacefully occupied by the U.S.S.R., there is certainly no assurance that after a few years nuclear war would not break out within the Communist bloc itself. Who is to say for certain that the Soviet leaders (in a completely Communist-controlled or dominated world) would not launch a "preventive" nuclear attack on Red China, when as seems likely, the conflict between the U.S.S.R. and China reaches the intensity which the internal Soviet feud between Stalin and Trotsky achieved in the late 1920's and the 1930's, or

which the Stalin-Tito quarrel reached in 1948-49? Or, barring a preventive war, who is to assure us that a later conflict will not occur when both of the antagonists are armed with nuclear weapons?

In an all-Communist world, in which power within each nation and each group of nations would be infinitely more highly concentrated than is today generally the case throughout the world, the task of preventing war would be much more difficult than it is today. There would be no opposition to warn of the dangers of war, and both internal public opinion in each country and world public opinion, which are today deterrents to some degree on the actions of leaders of both blocs, would be all but non-existent.

Proposition number four: There is no certainty of war if the present balance of power ("balance of terror," if you will) continues for some time into the future. It is popular today to assert that the existent situation will "inevitably" lead to war. However, history doesn't necessarily bear this out. A balance of power was successfully maintained in Europe for more than a century after the Napoleonic Wars.

Of course, there is always danger of the frightful pile of weapons which each side possesses being used, by mistake or on purpose. But, I have already argued, this danger will by no means be eliminated if the present stalemate is broken by a deterioration of the power position of the so-called NATO bloc.

The fact is that we have lived in this situation for a dozen years already, and there is a better than even chance that we can live thus for an even longer time in the future. Indeed, I am inclined to believe that the possibility of working out a long-lasting peace in the end is greater if this situation does continue for some time than if there is any sudden surrender on our side—for reasons which I have sketched in proposition #3 and others which I shall elaborate further on.

Proposition number five: The "better Red than dead" argument put forward by many of the "peace" groups verges on being a *reductio ad absurdum*. Swinging the world balance of power decisively in favor of the Communists will by no means assure that the great mass of the people of the earth will not be successively Red and then dead. This argument is based on the fallacious premise that the only alternatives open to us are inevitable thermonuclear war or a unilateral surrender on the part of the NATO powers.

WHAT, THEN, IS THE WAY OUT which socialists should advocate and support? The answer is complicated. It involves a variety of approaches and it involves a degree of patience to permit certain trends evident in today's world to reach their logical conclusion. Finally, it assumes a degree of risk—as does any other approach which has been advocated.

First, I would argue that socialists should support the maintenance of the existing balance of power until a negotiated way out of the impasse can be achieved. Indeed, past history would seem to

indicate that negotiation is possible only if the balance of power is maintained. The Soviet Union did not "negotiate" with Bènéš in Czechoslovakia in 1948, nor with Imre Nagy in Hungary in 1956. In contrast, the Soviet leaders have engaged in endless parleys with the United States over a wide variety of matters, never carrying truculence and aggressiveness beyond the limits set by the danger of armed conflict. Khrushchev, or his successor, is not much more likely than the policy makers of the United States to invite utter disaster for himself, his system and his nation by provoking nuclear war.

Furthermore, the only real solution for the "balance of terror" is one which is negotiated and has the support of both sides, or better said, of all sides. The political problems between us and the Communist bloc will not really be settled until both sides are really willing and anxious to settle them. The question of destroying the apparatus of destruction which hovers over the world will not be resolved until both sides are willing to agree to a system which, in fact, disarms both sides and is so inspected as to provide at least reasonable guarantees that one side or the other is not "cheating."

Mere surrender by the NATO powers will not achieve this. The themonuclear menace will still be with us after that. Only a mutually agreed upon and inspected dismantling of this machinery of Armageddon will guarantee its destruction.

Second, socialists should insist that the Western Powers always stand ready to negotiate. No matter how nerve-racking and tiresome the process may be, a successful peaceful resolution of our differences is the only feasible alternative to the present world stalemate.



THE WEST should not only stand ready to negotiate the standing differences between the two blocs on atomic testing, disarmament, the German question, and a wide range of other matters, but socialists should insist that it also be willing to sit down with the Communist powers and work out cooperative programs wherever this is feasible. The peaceful use of atomic energy, programs for probing outer space, and a mass cooperative effort to help the developing countries are the kinds of things which the West should be constantly insisting on as being fields for cooperative efforts of the two power blocs as well as the uncommitted nations.

Third, pending the working out of a cooperative program in the field, socialists should insist on the United States and the Western Powers generally devoting the largest possible amount of resources, energy and talent to furthering the efforts of newly developing nations to diversify and industrialize their economies and raise their peoples' levels of living. So long as half to two thirds of the world populace continues to live in dire misery and is frustrated in its efforts to overcome this state of affairs, there will exist a source of discontent and a power vacuum which will be a constant invitation for both power blocs to interfere. Furthermore, these frustrations of the underdeveloped countries are fertile breeders of the kind of "small wars" which can easily give rise to the "big" war.

Fourth, one need hardly say that socialists must maximize their efforts to preserve and extend the democratic way of life which is essential to socialism, and which is the greatest achievement of human history in the last half a millenium. If civil liberties are not preserved and increased, and if racialism and similar evils are not combatted and overcome, it will make little difference what is the outcome of the Cold War.

Fifth, socialists must point out the inevitability and the desirability of the emergence of a large neutralist bloc. Such a bloc already exists of course, but it should be clear to socialists that the general world situation will be healthier if there arise within this group several nations of first rank in the world scene. India, Brazil and perhaps one or two other countries give promise of such development.

The emergence of new Great Powers can only be for the good. One of the great problems of the last fifteen years has been the fact that any crisis which arose anywhere in the world tended almost immediately to become an issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. If there are half a dozen or more Great Powers—including, perhaps, a united Western Europe, and a Communist China which participates fully in world affairs—it will be much more likely that local "brush-fire" situations can be localized and isolated from the threat of nuclear war.

Sixth, socialists should use their influence throughout the world to stop the drift towards totalitarianism and Communism in areas in which it has not triumphed. We should give our support to sound democratic socialist and near-socialist parties. At the same time, we should use our influence, particularly with some of the newer brother parties, to show them the inevitable pitfalls involved in fellow-travelling or playing the role of "innocents" for the Communists—while studiously avoiding doing so ourselves.

Likewise, socialists in the United States and Western Europe should make their voices heard in urging their governments to encourage the kind of social and economic changes which are long overdue, particularly in the developing nations. We should impress upon those running the governments of these countries that the only effective way to prevent the advance of the international Communist

movement at a time when the balance of military power is approximately equal, is through overcoming age-old social injustices, providing for an equitable distribution of wealth and realizing the potential benefits of modern technology and culture. We, in the United States, should particularly press our country to return to its own revolutionary past and become the supporter of democratic revolutions.

Finally, it seems to me that socialists should use all of their influence to get the Western Powers to encourage disaffections and divisions in the Communist monolith. It is becoming obvious that this process of dissolution is already well advanced, and it seems likely that it will progress even more rapidly in the immediate period ahead.

IN MY OPINION, IT IS THE BREAKUP of the Communist movement as a worldwide, crusading quasi-religion which holds the real hope of achieving a situation in which prolonged peace will be possible. This will not only result in a much wider field for negotiation, maneuver and compromising among both large and small powers of the world. It also seems likely to result in internal developments within many of the Communist countries which will dull the sharp ideological distinctions between at least some of them and the Western bloc. Permutations and combinations will then be possible in world politics which can lead to a more rational solution of many of the problems which right now seem insoluble.

Furthermore, the political life of individual countries will be less plagued by the Communist versus anti-Communist division. World politics generally will be a good deal healthier if there exist various kinds of Communist parties, covering a range which in some cases may overlap some of the democratic parties, from a kind of Titoism to Khrushchevism to the extremes of Stalinism.

Of course, this will not develop overnight. However, it is taking place. Until the process is matured, it is this socialist's opinion that the Western Powers should maintain their own strength, be constantly ready to negotiate differences where this is possible, and should be ready and willing to take advantage of the fissures in the Communist monolith, so as to reach a community of opinion with as large a part as possible of the late and unlamented Communist International.

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WHAT SOCIALISTS HAVE to offer today by way of peaceful solutions to the Cold War impasse depends on what one means by socialism. The term has become so abused that definitions are called for in a symposium on socialism and thermonuclear war.

Socialism, as I understand it, is a revolutionary philosophy of opposition and democratic affirmation. It resists the rule of oppressive minority classes and places no trust in their self-redemptive evolution. Economic dislocations and inequities and the frustration of human creative impulses are seen as endemic to these class societies; and

unjust wars are viewed as a proclivity of noxious social systems.

Socialism places its hope in the ability of the mass of people to reach high levels of political consciousness and to substitute its rule for the authority of a propertied or dictatorial class.

As *democratic affirmation*, socialism offers as its fundamental contribution to the cause of peace a society with constantly expanding perimeters of political and social democracy. Obvious enough, but it tends to elude socialists at times. Applied more concretely, however, to the American peace movement, socialism implies a special commitment to the idea of democracy. A peace movement need not have well defined political principles to be effective, but it must, at a minimum, adhere to the broad concept of political freedom.

As *revolutionary opposition*, socialism suggests resistance to both sides in the Cold War. Spelled out a bit, this means:

- *Against Testing and For the Unilateral Initiative in Disarmament.* It is unfortunate that so much discussion in radical circles centers around total unilateral disarmament, a proposal that is unreal and difficult to defend. Actually, only a few raise this demand, even in the pacifist movement.

A demand that is real and if achieved might serve to relax Cold War tensions, is that this government, unilaterally, undertake the initiative in disarmament. A first step in this direction would be the unilateral commitment to cease all testing.

That I do not propose that the United States unilaterally junk its nuclear armaments does not mean that I am *for* deterrents any more than left wing socialists in less complicated periods, who did not demand of their respective governments that they scrap their armies and navies, meant that they were for an armaments program.

A further move would be for the government unilaterally to dismantle a portion of its nuclear equipment. (There would still be enough kill, over-kill and over-over-kill left to satisfy the goriest of deterrent dispositions.)

The positive effects that such moves could have for peace should not be underestimated. This is primarily a political approach, one that could undercut Communism's popular appeal. But it requires a minimum of political imagination that we are not likely to find in American governing institutions or political parties.

- *Opposition to Civil Defense Programs.* Civil defense is illusory and the bomb shelter program is, above all, dangerous. It is self defeating in that its consequences would be the intensification of the arms race, bigger bombs and in the event of war a devastation of such vast proportions that all terrestrial life might be consumed by fire or destroyed by radiation. What is no less an objection is that to submit to the *idea* of a bomb shelter program—even a “good” one—means to accommodate oneself to the *idea* of nuclear war, to deterrent politics and, conversely, to abandon the struggle for peace and against the war makers at home.

- *Opposition to NATO.* No socialist can afford to equivocate in his opposition to NATO. This American controlled nuclear army is an integral part of American capitalism's increasingly aggressive nuclear strategy. As a means of defending Europe from Russian nuclear aggression it is pointless; it makes the European continent an immediate nuclear target in the event of war; it includes perfidious Portugal and involves obligations to fascist Spain (which is not formally a member of NATO but provides it with military bases); it is a threat to the integrity of countries in and out of the Pact; it provides the Communists with an excellent propaganda target; it interferes with the possible evolution of a united Europe which could serve as a needed neutral barrier between the two war camps.

Opposition to the two war camps does not, in my opinion, carry with it any dogmatic refusal to see a limited merit in negotiations, summitry, disarmament conferences, etc. More important, socialists need to take a more positive attitude toward the United Nations as against the militant, and justifiable, opposition of socialists in earlier days to the League of Nations. The UN can provide at least temporary compromises in many specific areas of conflict that might otherwise erupt into total war. And the United Nations also offers the means for neutralist and unaligned nations to coalesce into a more effective counterweight to the two imperialist camps.

Socialism, as opposition to the two war camps, is not fed by theoretical considerations alone. It is confirmed by the experiences of two wars and reinforced by the unique character of the Cold War. It is with such questions that I am primarily concerned in the rest of this article.

I.


IN 1914, RIGHT WING FRENCH socialists rallied to the Tricolor to stamp out the militarism of the Hohenzollerns—necessary, they said, for the vic-

tory of European socialism. Right Wing German Social Democrats preferred a Kaiser-led industrial nation to a Czarist-led semi-feudal despotism and they goosestepped to their death with Marx's earlier call for a German crusade against the Romanoffs inscribed on their banner.

As it turned out, the Kaiser was overthrown, but not by the French socialists; the Czar fell, but not at the hands of German "Marxists." Instead, the glorious strains of the *Marseillaise* and the imperious tones of *Deutschland Uber Alles* were subdued by the realities of a four year long war with its toll of 12 million dead. The rewards the living inherited from the dead: a twenty year interregnum, between Versailles and the Blitzkrieg; highlighted by Entente efforts to destroy the Russian Revolution, imperialist penetration of the Ruhr, mass unemployment in Europe, a crippling economic crisis in the United States, the rise of Hitlerism and the consolidation of Stalinist counterrevolution.

In World War II the tragedy was repeated as the world socialist movement rallied to the war of "democracy against fascism." Many pro-war socialists in the second war conceded that pro-war socialism was wrong during the first war. But *that* war was different, it was argued. And much of what they said was true. In 1914-1918 there was, indeed, little to choose from. One would be hard put to prove that had Wilhelm dictated the peace to Clemenceau the world would have been a sorrier place to live in. There was no similar balance of evil in the Second World War. Had the Blitzkrieg achieved its objectives, Europe would have been subjected to forms of savagery that only Hitlerite or Communist societies seem capable of inflicting. However, the small pockets of socialists who remained in political opposition during the last war did not base their opposition on any false equation of the Allied forces to the Nazis, or deny that it would make a difference who won. Instead, socialist opposition reflected a profound disbelief that capitalist governments — in alliance with a Stalinist system not a whit less brutal than Hitlerism — could produce a victory that would bring either peace or freedom. The war, it had to be said, was *not* a war for democracy, the peace would be neither stable nor democratic. Socialists could rightly give no political endorsement to the "lesser evil" and were obliged to resist all efforts to subordinate the interests of the people — the no-strike pledge, for example — in the name of a united war effort.

Seventeen years have passed since the second crusade concluded with a peace signed in Potsdam no less cynical than the one signed in Versailles, and with another peace treaty sealed by the fiendish blasts in Nagasaki



and Hiroshima. (Is Truman any less a war criminal than those who faced the Nuremberg tribunal?)

Among the rewards of both V-Days —

- The Cold War began before the shooting war ended, and erupted in the bloody Korean conflict.
- Nearly 40 per cent of the world's population is now under direct totalitarian control.
- The West remains reactionary and inept, even with the leadership of the liberal politician, Kennedy, who extends his New Frontier to the Bay of Pigs with the blessings of liberal statesman Adlai Stevenson (a fact that seems to carry less weight with liberal intellectuals than Stevenson's ability to quote from F. Scott Fitzgerald).
- Many newly emerged and neutralist nations are compromising themselves as their ruling élites gravitate toward the totalitarian camp in world affairs and to authoritarianism at home in the absence of a dynamic, democratic counterpull in the West.
- The socialist movement today is confused and disorganized. It does not understand the nature of Communism; in it, apologies for Communism abound along with parallel distortions of the democratic and humanist content of socialism. This is, in large measure, the responsibility of socialists who supported the war and either toned down their opposition to Stalinism, at best, or benignly embraced the big Russian bear, at worst.

As topping to these fruits of "victory," the human race is now threatened with annihilation by all the victors in the war for democracy.

IF REASON PREVAILED, this aftermath to World War II would inspire some soul-searching, loss of equanimity, embarrassment or similar human reaction among those socialists who contemptuously dismissed their anti-war opponents; at the very least, some hesitation before taking up the intellectual cudgels in the name of Western democracies and once again trying to overwhelm radicals who do not share their enthusiasms. Apparently, human nature is as perverse as politics is illogical; for the same style, the same rationalizations and often the same voices are again raised to rally support for the democratic capitalist war camp against the totalitarian enemy.

Take the case of Sidney Hook, the most effective exponent in radical circles of pro-war socialism in the last war who writes without perturbation about the justice of his position then and the need to rally to the West today.

In a recent article in *Partisan Review*, Hook—who interests us only as a prototype of a school of thought—presents a more explicit picture of his own ideas on the Cold War. It is worth some examination.

It is Hook's wont to hurl logical thunderbolts at artificially created targets. He writes, for example, that "it is the sheerest dogmatism to predict that all life and civilization will be destroyed" in a nuclear war.

Actually, few "predict" that "all life and civilization" will be destroyed. But so much life will be destroyed that it raises the spectre of annihilation; and civilization will be disfigured, *possibly* obliterated. In Cold War dialect, he continues with broadsides against "the assorted groups of pacifists, unilateralists and indifferentists [!] who are so intent on peace that they would sacrifice our freedom for it" and follows through with vulgarities such as the admonition to opponents to "cease the macabre death mongering which exaggerates all dangers beyond measure." ("Death mongering"! A fine contribution to the Cold War vocabulary.)

There is political method to minimizing the effects of nuclear war; it is ideological softening for its possible occurrence. As Hook notes in one ominous euphemism: ". . . mankind has often paid a heavy cost in defence of freedom."

But what if the defense of freedom heralds the end of civilization? Then the operational consequences, to borrow a phrase, of supporting the "lesser evil" in a nuclear war, is hardly distinguishable from supporting either the greater evil or neither side. The easiest way out of the dilemma is simply to pooh-pooh those who foresee unimaginable destruction as "sheerest dogmatists" and "death mongers." That way, nuclear deterrent socialists can evade the responsibility of thinking through the special and unique problems raised by the new technology of nuclear weapons.

In the opening sentence of this Western clarion call, Hook tells what the Cold War is, and is not, all about: "What is at stake in the cold war is not free enterprise but human freedom . . . the same cluster of freedoms which the West defended against Hitler." The assertion that what is at stake "is not free enterprise" can only provide either the extreme of mirth or panic among Hook's dévotées in the State Department. Of course free enterprise is at stake. As for "human freedom," that and more is certainly at stake; but the question remains whether it can best be defended by supporting either side in the Cold War.

Hook, of course, believes that defense of human freedom means defense of the West and to reinforce the virtue of his side, he writes that "in almost every respect, the state of freedom and public welfare today in the West is far healthier than when we resisted Hitler." Here, the issue is begged, for even if the state of the Western world is more agreeable than twenty years ago—and this needs qualifying—the real problem resides in the fact that this so-called free world's domain of political influence is rapidly shrinking and the Communists' expanding.

Hook's passion for the West blinds him when he writes:

It is sometimes said that the West is fearful of disarming not so much because it distrusts Soviet *bona fides* but because it shrinks from peaceful competition on the *ideological*, economic and social plane. *I can find no warrant for this statement.* Why should we fear such competition? (Emphasis mine.)

Here, reality is totally by-passed; the character of the Cold War completely missed. Someone should inform Hook that "we" do fear ideological competition with the Russians because "we" are losing it. And the war-rants for this statement are everywhere—in the events in Indonesia, Indo-

china, Cuba, India, and most of the newly emerging nations of Africa—among millions of people in all the continents who have repudiated the West and either favor or tolerate the Communist East. The ideological successes of Communism are yet more pervasive than this, manifested in a widespread mood and politics, that can be defined as neo-Stalinoidism.

Despite Russia's totalitarian structure, her empire, the Hungarian suppression, Berlin brinkmanship, unilateral resumption of atmospheric testing, the Kremlin overcomes temporary reverses and its popularity continues. Its successes are not due solely to its achievements or propaganda skill; they relate no less to the nature of the enemy. The Kremlin finds it relatively easy to project its false counter image as a progressive, socialist alternative to the decadent, unimaginative, capitalist, imperialist West. In this sense, Hook notwithstanding, the Kremlin needs the West as a lever to advance its own imperialist designs.


It should be added that in the sense that the Kremlin needs the West, apologists for Russia need men like Sidney Hook for opponents. They would have a field day in vague liberal and non-conformist circles if all they had to contend with were the nuclear-deterrent socialists.

II.

THE FREEDOMS THAT DO EXIST here are indeed precious, and the West is certainly preferable to the East. Precisely for these reasons it is impermissible for socialists to defend a West that cannot defend either itself or its freedom in ideological and political competition with totalitarianism.

Since the end of the war we have had a moderate Democrat in the White House, followed by a liberal Republican and now a liberal Democratic President. Under all three, we have seen foreign policies that are reactionary, dishonest, hypocritical, imperialist: brinkmanship, support to dictators, bigger bombs, nuclear threats, a war in Korea, several troop landings in Asia, a sponsored invasion in Cuba. Even with the Alliance for Progress, capitalism cannot execute its beneficence with dispatch or without political and economic stipulations.

Of the three administrations, the present is the most dangerous from the point of view of global peace. Consider some of the accomplishments of the Kennedy administration, surrounded as the President is with authors, poets, lecturers, theoreticians—some of the best brains in the country, I am told.



- *The Cuban invasion.* This imperialist crime, conceived under Eisenhower but consummated by Kennedy, only served to disorganize the forces of *democratic* resistance to Castro and provided a propaganda bonanza to the Kremlin.

- With the Cuban disaster still fresh in everyone's mind, Kennedy turned his attention to Laos. Here, the administration was all set to intervene directly with American troops in Laotian jungles to defend a corrupt ally from the Russian backed, Communist-led Pathet Lao guerrillas. And, as recently revealed, *Kennedy was prepared to make this move although he knew it might very well bring on a nuclear war.*

- In Vietnam the corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem regime, which would never survive a free election, is propped up militarily by an American government whose policies have succeeded only in driving native neutralist forces toward the Communist camp. The Communist Viet Cong, fighting American trained and equipped troops, may well find themselves fighting specially trained GIs: Kennedy has personally spurred the program for training thousands of troops in this country in guerrilla and jungle warfare. Thus the anomaly of American troops training here—thousands are already in Vietnam—in preparation for armed intervention in distant lands to fight in defense of hated dictatorships against “subversive” Communist troops recruited from among the *native* population. This, some nuclear deterrent socialists tell us is part of the struggle, not for free enterprise but for the defense of human freedom.

- Where nuclear strategy and disarmament are concerned, Eisenhower at least gave a verbal commitment that the U.S. would never be the first to drop the bomb. And it is possible that he meant it. Kennedy has reversed this policy and made it clear that the *United States is prepared to use the bomb first.* “In some circumstances,” Kennedy told reporter Stewart Alsop, “we might have to take the initiative [in dropping the Bomb]”. In the same vein: “in some circumstances we must be prepared to use the nuclear weapon at the start, *come what may.*”

What happens to nuclear deterrent socialism's enthusiasm for the West now that nuclear weapons as a deterrent strategy has grafted onto it the threat — “in some circumstances” — of *nuclear aggression*?

Both camps propose world nuclear disarmament. But each has a pretext for not moving in that direction. The Americans insist upon inspection teams to guarantee against weapons' testing in violation of a disarmament treaty. The Russians reply that this is only a trick to get spies into Russia and, anyway, inspection teams are not necessary since there are now devices which can detect atmospheric explosions, even smaller underground blasts. The evidence mounts that the Russians are right about the superfluosity of inspection teams. And they are right when they cite this as evidence that the United States does not really want disarmament. America would rather rely on its nuclear striking power and the threat of nuclear aggression to achieve political objectives.

Of course, the Russians fear disarmament, too. The Kremlin feels less threatened, in fact, by inspection than loss of its big bombs. The Geneva conference provides the rare spectacle of Russians and Americans voting together to defeat the neutral nations' proposals that both Great Powers agree to a prohibition of launching nuclear weapons into space. Geneva is for maneuvering, not disarming.

THE SOLUTION TO AMERICA'S reactionary foreign policy transcends electing either a Republican or Democratic administration with a better foreign policy. Most of Ike's babbits have been removed from Washington; bright young liberal professors and sophisticates have taken their place — and the change has been for the worse. Nevertheless, there are socialists, who do not share Hook's chauvinism but still identify with the West in the absence of a viable socialist camp. It is possible, they say, that a genuinely liberal, although capitalist, administration could come up with a democratic and appealing response to the totalitarian threat. But the evidence is already in, sampled above, that the limits to what a brainier President, scholarly advisors, energetic and clever diplomats can do are set by the system to which they are committed. Capitalist policies can vary, of course, some may be better than others, but the degree of flexibility of capitalist politics *in the Cold War* is established by the nature of the beast that is being defended. Not only does Capitalism as an abstract economic and social system delimit its democratic anti-totalitarian potential, but *American* capitalism is singularly handicapped given its distinctive historical origins and evolution which has made of it a uniquely primitive, narrow, unthinking, violent class.

What is called for in Washington is an administration that *consistently* fights against all forms of imperialism; that shows respect for the rights of other people; that promotes democratic movements abroad and sets the democratic example at home; that is capable of making an effective political appeal to the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain; that is *really* for a unified Germany and prepared to disengage its troops in Western Europe; that is ready to give assistance without strings attached to underdeveloped countries.

To believe that an American capitalist government—even a good Democratic one—is capable of such a course is the height of self-deception.

What is more, an effective political war against totalitarianism—in Asia, Africa and for the peoples under Kremlin rule—has as its precondition the positing of an alternative to capitalism. This is not theory but a fact proven by the trend in newly emerging nations and by the direction of the Hungarian revolution. No matter how sophisticated a capitalist administration in Washington, it is hardly going to champion social alternatives to capitalism, i.e., to itself, in the interest of a democratic political war against Communism. That is why the needs of peace and freedom and practical politics requires socialists to clearly separate themselves from the framework of capitalist politics and contribute their energies to the realization of a democratic Third Camp, opposed to the camps of capitalism and Communism.



III.

LEFT WING SOCIALISTS CAN NO longer afford to dismiss pacifism as a "utopian tendency" that "sows illusions" and is therefore "socially reactionary." In the U.S. the recent growth of the pacifist and the broader peace movement (the two are not synonymous) calls for a positive response on the part of socialists. (In Europe, there are large socialist movements, and for all their flabbiness and compromises, they do have the possibility of emerging as significant socialist-peace movements. In the United States, by contrast, there is no socialist *movement* while a large peace movement is evolving and organized pacifist groups accrue strength.) No less important is that pacifism is made relevant by the new nuclear technology which makes war unthinkable.

A positive response does not mean relinquishing socialist criticisms; a movement that is just for "peace" *is* inadequate. In a sense it is even more utopian today than, say, forty years ago. The reason for this resides in the different character of international rivalries today compared to the earlier period.

During the early part of the century, international alliances were fluid. A year before the outbreak of World War I one could not predict with certainty on which side of the trenches in the impending war all the great powers would be aligned. This element of uncertainty is alien to the Cold War. For all the maneuvering within each bloc, we know in advance which great powers will be on which side in the event of war. Also, in World War I, to a lesser extent in World War II, the warring nations were relatively secure as social and national entities regardless of the outcome. This time the vanquished will belong to the victor, the East will swallow the West or the West absorb the East — assuming that anything is left of either. The reason for this is that the struggle is between two competing and irreconcilable social systems; if you will, it is a class struggle, no mere contest between cynical politicians with insatiable imperialist appetites. Summitry can relieve Cold War tensions but never free the world of the special anxieties and threat of war as long as capitalism and Communism remain.

Recognition of this new, *permanent* character of international rivalries must be a starting point for any movement dedicated to peace and free-

dom. It is at the starting point, unfortunately, that pacifism reveals its inner weaknesses. For, in the main, the pacifist solution emanates from moral absolutes at the expense of probing in any depth the nature of the Cold War. It is a Western phenomenon that responds too exclusively to the imperialism visible to it in the West, failing to assess properly the fact that in the East pacifists would be treated as criminals. It is a terrible tribute to the ideological force of Communism to admit, therefore, that where Russia is concerned whole sections of the pacifist movement have been neutralized. From this neutrality many individual pacifists, in violation of their own moral precepts, become victims of the ideological pressures of the Cold War and shift into a school of apologetics for Communist foreign policy. The process does not always end with rationalizations for Russian strategy and lopsided presentations of American culpability; Communism as a social system begins to look more acceptable, even appealing, to some. The ultimate absurdity of this devolution can be seen when one wing of American pacifism — morally opposed to all forms of force and violence—becomes militant Fidelista and abuses other radicals and pacifists who resent this posture, describing them, in Stalinist fashion, as supporters of American imperialism.

IV

ONE MAJOR MISCONCEPTION about Russia which disorients many pacifists and radicals (non-radicals, too) needs to be dealt with briefly. This is the all too common view that as Russia liberalizes internally, its foreign policy grows more flexible, the Kremlin's new rulers become more susceptible to reason, willing to negotiate differences, to compromise and, most generally, shed themselves of the aggressive methods and imperialist ambitions of Stalin.

The theory is wrong from beginning to end. The reforms in Russia are real and welcome; but they must also be understood. The reforms are not only consistent with imperialism but further impel economic and political penetration of areas of which Stalin never even heard.

The Communist ruling class in Russia did not spring full blown from Stalin's brow. It had neither a history nor a clear initial purpose. But the early Stalinist cadres understood that to consolidate their power in the Communist Party they had to dispose of active and potential opponents at home. And to establish their economic base, they had to industrialize Russia the only way they could—through force and terror. Both tasks required Russia's peaceful co-existence with the rest of the world. Stalin could not carry on a war on two fronts: against the people at home and against capitalism abroad. That was the real meaning of Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country" and that is why it was *Stalin*, not Khrushchev, who first promoted the phrase "co-existence with capitalism" (Stalin wrote a booklet called *Peaceful Coexistence*) and applied that policy even in a period when the term was not in fashion.

Stalin's ruthlessness was matched by his xenophobia; his concern was Russia and to consolidate Party and state hierarchies over which he would

rule supreme, he was prepared to make concessions to foreign capitalist powers that Khrushchev would not dream of making today.

Stalin ordered the French Communist Party to vote for war credits to help secure a treaty with French imperialism. He ordered the American Communist Party to extend its "hand of friendship to J. P. Morgan" to advance Russian-American friendship. Earlier, he averted revolutionary situations from coming to a head in Germany and China to keep other centers of world Communism from developing and to maintain the peaceful *status quo* he needed for building "socialism in one country." He held the Communist Party in check on the eve of Hitler's rise to power; better Hitler than a revolutionary upset to Europe's peace. Seven years later he sought salvation via his infamous pact with Hitler.

This was Stalin's policy of peaceful co-existence until the war. After the war Russia descended upon the world scene like a poisonous vapor, driven by the winds of new political and economic ambitions. Through systematic plundering of its possessions in East Europe, Russia's economy was rebuilt. A detente followed Stalin's death with the ascension of Malenkov. With the rise of Khrushchev and the subsequent de-Stalinization, Russian imperialism took on new vigor. The ruling class not only continued to guard the initial foreign conquests made under Stalin (with the generous assists from Churchill and Roosevelt) but accelerated the drive to penetrate politically the colonial and semi-colonial world. *It needed to expand its spheres of influence to satisfy the new needs of the economy, to raise the living standards of the Russian people, to increase the economic, political and moral well-being of the ruling class as a whole; and Khrushchev, particularly, needed victories outside of Russia to increase the power of the Party apparatus, and sustain his authority in it.*

Reforms in Russia, then, did not reduce Russia's imperialist appetites; they whetted them. Khrushchev's diplomatic style, of course, is different from Stalin's; it is also more effective. At any rate, imperialism is less a matter of style than the direct or indirect subordination of the interests of weaker peoples to stronger nations.

Where, concretely, are the signs that Khrushchev the "reformer" is less imperialistic than Stalin, the oriental despot? Khrushchev has abandoned none of Russia's possessions, and has not the slightest intention of doing so. Hungary made that quite clear. And his imperial visions extend to continents never explored by Stalin.

Other evidence of the new, intensive and dynamic form of Russian imperialism today is the manner in which the Kremlin is economically integrating and incorporating East Europe through the instrumentality of COMECON,* a dead letter under Stalin but most alive today. It is an extraordinarily interesting and important development. It tells us much about Russia as an imperialist power, what Khrushchev means by peaceful co-existence and the limits of reform. It is a pity that those who seek — with the best of motives — their own form of personal political co-existence with the totalitarian monolith seldom concern themselves with such details.

*Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, organized by Stalin in 1949 to help, presumably, the economies of Russia and her satellites.



THE NOTION THAT RUSSIA is not a dynamically driven, pugnacious, imperialist society is often invested in a reactionary version of "co-existence" that has never been made more explicitly, to my knowledge, than in Erich Fromm's book, *May Man Prevail?* Fromm writes:

What, then, is the realistic basis for an American-Russian understanding? Actually, the answer is eminently simple. *The basis is the mutual recognition of the status quo, the mutual agreement not to change the existing balance of power between the two blocs.* (Emphasis in the original.)

The answer may be eminently simple; it is certainly unreal and blessedly so.

What Fromm proposes is a chemically pure imperialist solution: in effect, representatives of the two war camps sit around the table fingering an enormous globe and saying to one another: this part for you, this for me.

But what about the people? They might prefer to be on a side other than the one to which they have been assigned, or, hopefully, on neither side.

The cynicism of this plan is more apparent in relation to the Russian camp than for the West. Russia has a vast empire in East Germany, East Europe, the Balkans and Baltics, whose peoples yearn for release from the totalitarian oppressor. With this plan they are doomed. But their national aspirations have been intensified by the reforms in Russia and in the satellites. What is Fromm's solution, given his scheme, for another Hungary or Poland that makes a break for freedom? The answer is inescapable, though it is not made this explicit: suppression, as in 1956, for the greater good of maintaining the status quo.

We might also ask how the neutral nations would fare? Are they obliged to give up their neutrality—by force if necessary—in this operation? And if they are to be permitted their freedom of action what happens to the status quo if they express a preference for one camp as against the other or grow more militant in their neutrality, more competitive, economically and politically, with either of the frozen spheres?

What is ironical about this proposal is that it denies the real hope for

peace coming from the East. That hope is not in Khrushchev's reforms but in the enormous discontent brewing in the empire, released, paradoxically, by the de-Stalinization. This discontent in the Communist world from below, and the schism in the Communist world from above, each in its own way, opens up the possibility of the internal collapse of totalitarianism. It is such developments which should give us heart and need our encouragement — not imperialist panaceas which condemn mankind to either Communism or capitalism.

WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES among socialists in the first and second World Wars, they shared the assumption that socialism could influence the course of the war and the war affect the future of socialism. A similar brief cannot be made for the relevance of socialism during all-out nuclear war. Whoever survives the holocaust will be confronted with problems of physical existence and social organization on such primitive levels that discussion of a postwar possibility for socialism strikes this writer as absurd on the face of it.


But if socialism is to be relevant today it must present a policy for peace *and* freedom. Peaceful solutions can be offered short of freedom but they can not be socialist solutions (nor do I believe they can assure peace) because socialism *is* freedom and a policy which denies freedom, denies socialism.

JULIUS JACOBSON, the first Editor of Anvil magazine and Managing Editor of The New International from 1952-58 is the Editor of New Politics.



*A proposal to put
the American back into
American socialism*

WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS



MY COMMENTS ON the subject of this symposium proceed from two propositions:

1. The Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Union have been the opium of American Socialism for 45 years.

2. The possession of thermonuclear weapons by the United States and Russia has created an environment—what Marx might have called a balance in the relations of production—which makes it possible for American socialists to kick the monkey and proceed with the honorable and healthy labor of being socialists.

Granting the exceptions, it nevertheless remains basically true that, of all segments of society in the United States, it was American socialists who made between 1890 and 1917 the most relevant and mature adaptation to the end of the frontier. This was a great and courageous achievement. It has never been fully understood or properly appreciated, even by latter-day socialist intellectuals. Among other things, it casts a great deal of very revealing light on the intellectual quality of Marx's analysis of capitalism, upon the validity of his projections and prophecies, and upon his fundamental humanism. Despite the seeming irrelevance of such an effort to the formal subject of this discussion, those considerations are worth brief examination.

The first point is that Marx grasped and understood the underlying validity of what we in the United States call the frontier thesis long before it was advanced by Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams, and other American intellectuals. (It is not at all improbable, indeed, that Adams got the essence of the idea from Marx.) Marx realized and explicitly explained that it was foolish to look for, or expect, an American socialism to develop until the first, rough capitalistic conquest of the continent had been completed. The frontier in America provided the kind of expansion that capitalism depended upon, and with which it functioned tolerably well.

The second point is directly related: Marx also understood that the frontier operated in political and social affairs exactly as Turner once admitted. It provided "a gate of escape" from the demands and the self-disciplines of living with other human beings in a truly responsible, humane fashion. The creative approach to life could not even begin, Marx repeatedly explained, until people stopped running away from the human condition.

Finally, Marx argued that socialism offered the most relevant and the most humane approach for coming to terms with the end of the frontier, and for proceeding to organize the society of advanced industrialism. It may be admitted, at this point in history, that the prophecy or article of faith has to be left moot. No nation has yet established what Marx called a socialistic society. But the issue is no more than moot—neither the argument nor the prophecy has ever been disproved. In the United States, the so-called Vital Center—meaning a coalition of reformers and enlightened conservatives—has for some 75 years attempted to find or create a new frontier in overseas economic expansion, or in the Keynesian accumulation of capital from the taxpayer to sustain the corporation, or in a combination of both approaches. The results do not disprove Marx. They only disprove Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Between 1899 and 1917, on the other hand, American socialists acted on the assumption that Marx was correct. The results were certainly encouraging, if admittedly not conclusive, and they evoked a significant response from the American people. Three issues and events disrupted that effort. First, the split among socialists over whether they should support American involvement in World War I. Second, the similar but far more devastating argument about the meaning and significance of the Bolshevik Revolution. And third, the generally discounted (or certainly underestimated) campaign of direct and indirect suppression initiated and carried on by the Wilson Administration.


THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE FACTORS was the Bolshevik Revolution. For what the great majority of American socialists did, either immediately or gradually, and either consciously or *à la Freud*, was to respond to the Bolshevik Revolution by giving up Marx in favor of their own curious version of the frontier thesis.

Let us examine this development with the aid of the paradox so beautifully perceived and defined by Roland Van Zandt in his sadly neglected book on *The Metaphysical Foundations of American History*. Van Zandt's central point is that the traditional or Jeffersonian concept of democracy and prosperity defined the good society and the good life as being dependent upon conditions that, even as early as the 1790s, were steadily and ever more rapidly becoming non-existent in the actual or real United States. Hence Jefferson and his followers became expansionists in an effort to recreate conditions appropriate to their beliefs.¹ Even with such expansion,

however, the American ideology and tradition continued to grow increasingly irrelevant.

It thus became progressively more un-American to think and act as a realist. This explains why American socialists were so desperately attacked by the Wilson Administration. The socialist definition of reality became dramatically and dangerously un-American because it exposed the double standard of the traditionally American ideology. The socialists demanded that Americans of the New Nationalism and the New Freedom either continue to act on their avowed pluralism in a society and a world no longer favored by the frontier "gate of escape," or else confess their disbelief in pluralism.

This was a brilliant, courageous, and eminently fair demand. It still is. The tragedy developed as American socialists became ever more American in the traditional sense. This process began the moment American socialists defined the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Union as their own new frontier. None of this is said in supercilious or petulant anger. Tragedy is defined by the confrontation and clash of two or more opposed truths. And there was a truth in the emphasis placed on the Bolshevik Revolution by American socialists. It was also a deeply human reaction, particularly in the context of their own tribulations over supporting the war, and the repressions of the Wilson Administration.



All that granted, it nevertheless remains true that the act involved an abandonment of Marx in favor of the frontier thesis. For what the frontier thesis did—either in the Jeffersonian or other versions—was to externalize good. Put another way, the frontier thesis asserted a chain of logic and causation in which desirable and moral results at home became a dependent variable of external factors or conditions. But in externalizing good the frontier thesis as a logical and psychological corollary also externalized evil.

Now this is precisely what American socialists did in connection with the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Union. The specific percentages and their chronological evolution can no doubt be debated *ad infinitum*. Broadly speaking, however, American socialists started out by externalizing good in the revolution. Then they proceed to reverse the process. And by the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 they had externalized evil in the Soviet Union.

¹ Van Zandt's most serious error is in limiting the tradition to Jefferson—at least in his presentation. It was shared by all the Founding Fathers.

The result was a redefinition of American socialism as a dependent variable of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Union. In order to protect its very existence, American socialism had as a consequence to invest an increasing proportion of its intellectual and moral and psychological energy in attacking Russia. It quite naturally and logically became less socialist and more American.

Now it is quite true that Marx was a moral man. And it can be argued from that axiomatic fact that socialists had to damn the Soviet Union in order to remain socialists. Let the proposition be admitted. But moral condemnation neither means nor of itself leads to a definition of moral existence in terms of the damned. That result flows either from the Freudian principle and dynamic of the obsession, or from the logic of the frontier thesis in externalizing good and evil. Indeed, the frontier thesis considered as a phenomenon of intellectual history may offer a classic case in which the analytical approaches of Freud and Marx can be merged to reinforce each other and to produce a truly profound interpretation of reality.


IT ALSO CAN BE ASSERTED, of course, that Marx's emphasis on the internationalism of the labor and socialist movements either produced or demanded the damnation of the Soviet Union. The only weakness of that asseveration is that Marx never defined internationalism in that fashion. He waved the banners of brotherhood, sympathy, and assistance. He did not demand suicide in the name of socialism. But this is very close to what a good many American socialists began offering as Marxist advice, first in 1939, and then ever more vehemently after 1944.

This was superficially persuasive so long as America enjoyed an absolute (or significant relative) superiority in nuclear power. But it was unadulterated frontier thesis rather than sophisticated Marxism. It externalized evil in the frontier of Russia and argued—exactly in keeping with, George Frost Kennan's policy of containment—that all would be well once the frontier was civilized through the application of American power. Remember that Kennan admitted that liberation was merely “the other side of the coin” of containment. Along with a few other aristocrats, Henry L. Stimson was in this situation both more moral and more of a Marxist than such American socialists. For, while holding fast to the reforming mission inherent in the frontier thesis, he at least recognized the catastrophic results of thinking of the atom bomb as no more than an updated six-shooter.

Hence it seems to me that, dangerous and awesome as it is, the existence of thermonuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union offers American socialists another chance. Since in effect the frontier of American socialism has become a nuclear power, and has begun to generate its own reforms, they can gracefully abandon the frontier thesis on the grounds that it is no longer moral or practical. It evades the fundamental issues and it serves

in action to strengthen the more reactionary elements. They can thus cease externalizing evil as located in the Soviet Union, and externalizing good in the form of forcing changes upon the Russians. There is, and always has been, good *and* evil in the United States, in the Soviet Union, in Nigeria, in Cuba, and on down the list. The proper emphasis for socialists is to concentrate on creating more good, not on labeling, classifying, and decrying all the evil. The latter job belongs to the theologians, and American socialists should stop moonlighting.

There is a considerable difference involved between being a socialist as critic and being a socialist as innovator. Both are necessary, but American socialists have been the former far too narrowly and persistently in the years since 1932. One of the benefits of giving up the frontier thesis is the psychological one of creating a need and a demand for fundamentally different alternatives. And certainly the United States needs to be bombarded from within by a barrage of such creative proposals.



IT SEEMS VERY PROBABLY TRUE, as a good many 19th century conservatives argue, that Keynesian political economy gradually creates what they call socialism. But it is not socialism. It is instead a kind of mesmerizing corporate capitalism which cannot truly be said even to caricature socialism. This corporate capitalism is what the New Deal and Fair Deal have produced, and what the New Frontier proposes to maintain and even consolidate. It seems to me time to say this *as socialists* rather than saying it as a tactic of good-hearted men interested in keeping the improvements that have come as part of this rationalization of modern capitalism. It is time for American socialists to stop worrying about liberalism, and periodically wringing their hands over it, and instead to seize this opportunity and exploit all its potential opportunities.

The obvious place to begin is with a stepped-up campaign to focus all the active and latent resistance to America's thermonuclear policy. There is a refreshing and profoundly hopeful significance, as well as a bedrock intelligence, in the average citizen's negative reaction to all the official nonsense about winning a thermonuclear war. That response should be welcomed and respected and supported. But that is only a start. It is crucial for socialists to realize and admit that any real damping down of tension with Russia will turn the spotlight on domestic affairs.


That means that American socialists will have to be prepared for two things. First: an increase in attacks from those who still think in terms of the frontier thesis, and who will therefore explain the frustration of co-existence in terms of domestic radicals. Secondly, it means that American socialists will have to be prepared to offer concrete proposals for improving life in the United States, and in the fundamental character of its overseas aid programs. These proposals will have to be capable of standing on their own merits. They will no longer be able to rely on the logic of Cold War necessity.

Furthermore, and most vital of all, these proposals will have to be socialist. They cannot to any point be warmed over palliatives snatched from the medicine cabinets of Populism, Progressivism, or New Dealism. It seems to me that they will have to be based on three essential propositions: decentralization, the quality of material and human production instead of its quantity, and the substance and tone of human relationships. Socialists in the United States have for too long whored after the capitalist mistress efficiency. But Marx was not talking about being better capitalists, he was talking about being something drastically different—about being socialists.


These demands are not unfair. They are the classic tests for any viable movement in the political marketplace. So far, to put it bluntly, American socialism since 1917 has flunked the course. To change the metaphor, the contemporary existence of a thermonuclear stalemate represents the third strike that American socialism has coming to it by the rules of the game. It finds itself in a situation very similar to the predicament of Roy Hobbs, the protagonist in Bernard Malamud's allegoric novel, *The Natural*. In the crucial game, and though he had already compromised himself, Roy wanted desperately to get a pennant-winning hit. But he had so long defined baseball as something else that he failed in the clutch.

American socialism is in many ways a natural, too. It could by all expectations produce an exciting and creative commonwealth with the material and human resources at hand. But it will never do so as long as it defines socialism as something else. To put the socialism back into American socialism seems to me to be both the need and the opportunity posed by the advent of thermonuclear weapons.

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*Democratic Socialism
must reaffirm its
principles in a modern
Stuttgart Program*



MULFORD SIBLEY

DESPITE THE FACT THAT it is perhaps the most important issue of the day, it remains true that there is no "socialist" position on the problem of thermo-nuclear war. Instead, there are positions held by various socialists, some of which would appear to be mutually contradictory. How does this happen, we might ask, and what are some of the considerations which should enter into the formulation of a socialist attitude?

1.

The problem of a socialist view of war has been with us a long time and there are both parallels and differences between, for example, the classical days of socialism just before World War I and the issue as we confront it today.

Until the early part of the twentieth century, there was only a hazily formulated socialist attitude to war. International congresses were primarily concerned with such questions as internal tactics, relation of socialist activity to trade unions, and the place of the co-operative movement in socialist plans. Looking back on those days from the perspective of two World Wars and the dread possibility of a third, it is hard to believe that it was not until the Stuttgart Congress of The Second International (1907) that the question of war was seriously discussed. Confronted by an accelerated arms race between Britain and Germany, the tenuous "balance of power" situation, and other similarly alarming phenomena, far-seeing members of the International came to the conclusion that there was a real likelihood that the long international "peace" might be brought to an end. G.D.H. Cole (*History of Socialist Thought*, v. III, p. 61) has put well the issue which confronted them:

The Socialists had to make up their minds whether their declared hostility to the capitalist States was so deep as to absolve them from all obligations to defend their national territories if they were attacked, or whether they recognized an obligation of national defense as transcending their opposition to the Governments under whose auspices it would in practice need to be conducted. They had to make up their minds whether they were prepared to co-operate with bourgeois pacifists in attempts to prevent war . . . and whether they should be prepared to assign degrees of guilt to the rival imperialist powers in the event of a threatened or actual conflict.

As is well known, the resolution on war which emerged from the Congress was a compromise between four basic positions which had been stated early in the proceedings. It was, however, a fairly forthright statement which pointed to the economic causes of war and said that wars would cease only when capitalism had come to an end or when the burdens of war caused men simply to refuse to support it. The resolution advocated abolition of all standing armies and the substitution for them of national militias. Finally, it dealt with the problem of what socialist attitudes and actions should be in the event that war should become imminent:

If a war threatens to break out, it is a duty of the working class in the countries affected, and a duty for their parliamentary representatives, with the aid of the International Bureau as an active and coordinating power, to make every effort to prevent the war by all means which seem to them the most appropriate—means which naturally vary according to the intensity of the class-struggle and to the political situation in general.

Should war none the less break out, it is their duty to intervene in order to bring it promptly to an end, and with all their strength to make use of the economic and political crisis created by the war to stir up the deepest strata of the people and precipitate the fall of capitalist domination.

The Stuttgart resolution was confirmed at Copenhagen in 1910. At the same time, however, the British Labor Party, Independent Labor Party, and French Socialist Party felt that the Stuttgart resolution was weak in that it had not mentioned the possibility of using the general strike to hinder war preparations. They endeavored, with the aid of Keir Hardie's memorable oratory, to amend the statement, so that it would also say: "among the means to be used to prevent and hinder war the Congress considers as particularly effective the general strike of workers, especially in the industries which supply the instruments of war . . ." Consideration of this proposal, however, was postponed to future Congresses: there was such a widespread disagreement on it at Copenhagen that it was feared that an outright vote might injure the cause of socialism as a whole.

At Bâle in 1912, it was made clear that the Stuttgart resolution still stood. And there were socialist efforts through agitation and demonstrations to shorten the Balkan Wars and to prevent rash measures in the days following Sarajevo.

In the end, however, despite the words of Stuttgart and the belief of many socialists that an international general strike led by socialists could paralyze war-making machinery, the will to resist World War I broke down rather easily. Social Democratic members of the German Reichstag voted for war credits unanimously; and while the Italian and American socialists and a few in Britain, France, and Austria opposed the war, in general it can be said that serious efforts to implement the spirit of Stuttgart were never taken.

Thus the splendid socialist organization which the world apparently possessed in 1914 collapsed like a pack of cards before the overpowering demands of nationalism and despite the Stuttgart resolution. Germans saw a greater menace in France than in war itself; and the French, too, came to think of Germany, and not the slaugh-

ter of fellow-socialists in battle, as the "enemy." As for British socialists, some, like Robert Blatchford had for several years begun to think of Germany and not capitalism or war as the opponent which socialists had to fight.

In the twenties and thirties, of course, the split in international socialism caused by the rise of the Communist movement and, after 1933, the new situation created by the rise of Hitler, came to dominate socialist thinking. To be sure, socialists continued to be active in movements for international peace. But they never really resolved, both in terms of verbal commitment and of will, the issue with which Cole said they had been confronted in 1907: they never settled, both intellectually and emotionally, "whether their declared hostility to the capitalist States was so deep as to absolve them from all obligations to defend their national territories." When World War II came, socialists generally flocked to their respective national colors and began shooting and bombing one another as they had in 1914. For them, as for most partisans of "bourgeois" causes, the social evil was not in war itself; rather was it to be found in such satanic figures as Adolf Hitler.

Thus socialists failed in the years before 1914 and during the twenties and thirties to prevent war. In many respects this failure is among the most disappointing facts of modern political history. In 1914, organization and verbal commitment certainly seemed to make possible serious efforts to prevent the onset of slaughter; and while the pre-1914 unity was absent in the twenties and thirties, still there were many ingredients in the socialist movement which superficially should have made it a more effective anti-war instrument. Nevertheless the failure stands in all of its tragic implications.

2.

ARE THERE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED from socialist experience in dealing with war? How does our problem differ today from the issue with which socialists were confronted in 1914 and 1939? And if the relatively powerful socialist movements of 1907 to 1914 and of the twenties and thirties either would not or could not prevent war, what is the point of discussing socialist attitudes and politics with respect to thermonuclear war in 1962? If there is a policy which socialists ought to adopt in 1962, how should it be precisely formulated?

We can indeed learn from the experiences of earlier socialists. Their weakness was two-fold: first, while the Stuttgart resolution was relatively clear, it was still sufficiently ambiguous to justify the conclusion that socialists had not really made "up their minds whether their declared hostility to the capitalist States was so deep as to absolve them from all obligations to defend their national territories;" secondly, even if the Stuttgart statement be regarded as unambiguous, the will to effect it was absent, as Cole suggests, at the level of national party organizations.

The problem which socialists confront today is similar in one

respect to that of their predecessors, in that there can be little doubt that the threat of war is the overwhelmingly important issue, as it was in 1907. The difference between 1907 and our day is that the technological revolution in weaponry makes the question vastly, indeed almost immeasurably, more grave. This world could recover, after a fashion, following World War I and even World War II. Today, however, few can doubt the utterly nihilistic character of any thermonuclear war or even of persistent threats of such a war; thus all values which socialists have traditionally held dear are put in jeopardy every day that the so-called Great Powers continue to rely on threats of nuclear war for "defense."

As for the question as to whether socialists today can do anything to avert such a war, when their predecessors in 1914 and 1939 either would not or could not prevent World Wars I and II, the answer would appear to turn on two problems: organization and clarity and depth of belief. Internationally, socialism is obviously weaker than in 1914. On the other hand, new socialist movements have been born in parts of the world which did not know them in 1914 and 1939. Here we are concerned primarily with the second problem—that of clarity and depth; but its resolution could in turn help shape a more vigorous and effective organization. The clarity of socialists' attitudes to thermonuclear war and the depth of their convictions could be factors in inhibiting policies which lead to war. Unfortunately, socialists are badly divided in their attitudes and until they cease to be divided it would appear impossible for them to be effective.

True, like most non-socialists, we are appalled by the possibility of using nuclear weapons and in the abstract we shudder at the thought of thermonuclear bombing. Like non-socialists, too, we are aware of the technological revolution which has made "war" in 1962 something radically different from what it was in 1914 and 1939.

Despite this abstract agreement, however, many socialists, if asked whether there are "enemies" more dangerous than thermonuclear war, would answer, like their forbears with respect to primitive war in 1910, that there are. For example, I think it almost certain that, if given the choice between Communist domination and a nuclear war, many, if not most socialists, would probably choose a nuclear war. Just as British socialists like Blatchford in 1914 could not accept Keir Hardie's argument that it was war, and not Germany, which was the enemy of all socialist aspirations, so implicitly many of us continue to believe that Communists and Communist organization are primary menaces in the attainment of socialist goals. And just as Germany's Social Democrats voted solidly for war in 1914, so many socialist members of parliaments throughout the world probably think in 1962 that under certain circumstances a war against the Soviet Union or China might be justified.

Or again, just as Hitler stood as the satanic symbol against which socialists rallied during World War II, so, today, many social-

ists, in both overdeveloped and underdeveloped countries, will argue that war or threats of war are justified to eliminate "colonialism." Thus the American Socialist Party recently seemed to justify the Indian action in Goa, which, while not war in the strict sense, certainly involved willingness to wage "conventional" warfare.



One might also point out that very few socialists have really emancipated themselves from their nationalist prejudices; and it can be plausibly argued that until they do so, they will be under constant temptation to accept war as an instrument of national policy. Were the British Labor Party in power today, for example, it would probably act as nationalistically as the Tories; and since nationalism almost everywhere tends to be associated with the symbols, dogmas, and outlooks of confidence in military might, we could probably expect British socialists in power to accept most of the military premises of the Conservatives. True, there are important exceptions within the ranks of British socialists, but the statement still holds in general.

THE UPSHOT OF ALL THIS is that socialists today are even less emphatic than their predecessors were in relating their abstract internationalism and undoubted concern for humanity to the threat of nuclear war. Divided by national allegiances and still believing, for the most part, that there are evils worse than war, they tend to be paralyzed as it approaches. On the one hand, their theoretical concern for humanity leads them to be very much outraged as the Great Powers rattle their missiles. On the other hand, their nationalist ties and their often unexpressed beliefs that there are greater evils than war counteract their humanitarianism. Thus they tend to be unprepared to develop any distinctively socialist positions and actions. Instead, they mechanically repeat, as at the recent International Congress, the same slogan used by non-socialists: disarmament under effective international inspection.

What socialism badly needs today, therefore, is a position on war which will be consistent with its internationalism and humanitarianism and which will not surrender to nationalist shibboleths. Nor can it be a position merely on thermonuclear war: In our day, it seems to me, it must be an attitude which sees the inconsistency

between socialist ideals and the waging of *any* war. To be sure, thermonuclear war should be the center of concern; but it should also be recognized that any so-called limited or conventional war is very likely to become a nuclear conflict.

To develop this new and consistent attitude will require much re-thinking and new analysis. Socialists will have to eliminate the still widely prevalent notion that there are greater negations of socialist principles than war. War is itself the “enemy” before which all others—communism, colonialism, and hypothetical national enemies—pale into insignificance. This must be realized both intellectually and emotionally. In an age in which a “moderate” nuclear war might result in 80,000,000 deaths in a single nation, socialists above all others must repudiate all policies which rely on threats of war for their implementation.

This means that socialist politics must become essentially pacifist, following the spirit if not the letter of Keir Hardie’s viewpoint in 1910. Once international socialism became convinced that this was its proper position, how could it express its view? What would be a modern and strengthened version of Stuttgart? It might read somewhat as follows:

While international democratic socialism recognizes many political issues which must be confronted during the coming generation—among them the tyranny of totalitarian communism, the liberation of the remaining colonies, the development of underdeveloped areas of the world, the destruction of oligopolistic private capitalism as well as of State capitalism, and the more equitable distribution of income and resources throughout the world—it emphatically insists that military violence or its threat can never play a useful role, either negatively or positively, in meeting these problems. This is true because modern war, whatever be the objects for which it is ostensibly employed, always sets up its own imperatives which are ethically and politically nihilistic.

In view of this fact, the international socialist movement sees the method of war as the chief enemy of mankind and of socialist aspirations for mankind. It calls upon its constituent units:

- 1) Not to support politically any foreign policies based on threats of war;

- 2) To ask their parliamentary representatives to vote against all appropriations for military purposes, including space research tied in with preparations for military violence;

- 3) To encourage their members active in trade unions and professional associations to urge collective withdrawal of labor from all plants manufacturing weapons of war;

- 4) To implement the idea that socialists, as such, are conscientiously opposed to all military service;

- 5) To demand complete and universal disarmament, and, if this is not possible within a reasonable period of time, unilateral disarmament by their respective nations;

- 6) To recognize that compromise of political issues, however important those issues may be, is always better than war;

- 7) To develop the technique of the strike, a characteristic weapon of labor, as a method for opposing both domestic and foreign tyranny;

- 8) To demand a build-up of programs of economic development to such an extent that within a few years overdeveloped nations will be devoting the equivalent of their present expenditures on armaments to assistance of

underdeveloped nations—at least within the limits of economic and technical feasibility and of democratic social aspirations.

If a war threatens to break out, it is duty of the working class in the countries affected, and a duty of socialist parliamentary representatives, to make every effort to prevent the war by all means which seem to them most appropriate—including the method of the general strike.

With such a program, socialists would be attacking the foundations both of the oligopolistic capitalism characteristic of so much Western society and of the State capitalism of nations like the Soviet Union. For on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the system of war is closely connected with the respective socio-economic orders. In the West, preparation for war has become a gigantic boondoggle upon which vested interests have become increasingly to depend. In the East, threats and counter-threats connected with the war system are used to solidify support behind regimes which otherwise might be accepted reluctantly. Although socialists would not minimize differences between the “liberal” philosophy of much of the West and the “communist” ideology of the East, all such differences would be seen as insignificant when put beside the enormous reliance of *both* systems on war and threat of war. Thus a revolutionary socialist modern Stuttgart program would have the effect of saying “a plague on both your houses” insofar as both Western and Eastern systems repose on war and preparation for war.

To develop this kind of an attitude, it seems to me, is one of the primary tasks of modern democratic socialism. Of equal importance, obviously, is the effort to build a will which would carry out the position consistently and without regard to nationalistic prejudices and secondary “enemies.”

MULFORD SIBLEY, a sponsor of New Politics, teaches in the Political Science Department at the University of Minnesota. He is a leading pacifist and the author of *Conscription of Conscience*.



A British View of the Cold War

DOUGLAS
JAY, M.P.



THE COLD WAR—which we had all hoped to see thawing—has grown more bitter again this Winter. Mr. Khrushchev spent August and September shouting up a new Berlin crisis, and then shocked the rest of the world with his unilateral H-bomb bangs in the Autumn. Yet at the same time we have a new American President who (as seen through the eyes of British radicals) seems genuinely willing for serious negotiations; and Mr. Khrushchev himself was revealed by the October Moscow Party Congress as moderate among his fellow Communists. He and Mr. Mikoyan had to defend themselves against the Chinese, the Albanians, and even Mr. Molotov who thinks they are being too soft towards the capitalists.

Why did a Berlin crisis occur at all in the Autumn of 1961? The only fair answer to this is that Mr. Khrushchev provoked it. The Berlin situation, unsatisfactory as it is, could well linger on for many years yet, as it has for the last sixteen. Neither the U. S. nor any other Western country stirred it up again this Autumn. It was purely Mr. Khrushchev who made threatening speeches, hotted up a sense of crisis, and then—rather unpleasantly in the manner of Hitler — offered to “negotiate,” by which he meant submit to his demands for acceptance.

Why did Mr. K. provoke all this trouble at this time? Some would say it was all part of Russian expansionist strategy which is to begin with detaching West Berlin and then West Germany from the West. Certainly the existence of West Berlin as an island in East Germany is perpetually in the minds of the Russians and is regarded by them as a military threat. But, more probably, the pressure on Mr. K. this Autumn came from the East German Government, which felt itself so lacking in support in its own country that it could not face the continuous flow of refugees “voting with their feet” for the West.

For the Western governments the dilemma is certainly acute. If there are no negotiations and no settlement, then the Berlin crisis, erupting into periodic fits of nuclear brinkmanship, is always with us. But if we simply made concessions to Mr. K. because he shouts loudly, there is a clear danger that he will shout for more. My own view is — and this was the view voiced by Mr. Hugh Gaitskell for the British Labor Party officially

in the last foreign affairs debate in Parliament in October — that mere surrender to Mr. K's demands would not make peace more likely. By surrender I mean any suggestion that the West would not resist military attacks on Berlin, or any concessions made without counterconcessions by Mr. K. in return. This might really be appeasement in the fatal sense, and tempt an expansionist Mr. K. to become (what he is not, I believe now,) an aggressor on the Hitlerian model. Second, we cannot abandon the West Berlin population to whom we have pledged our word to an autocratic regime.

We ought, therefore, I believe, to make clear that force would be met by similar force, but also to propose positive terms for negotiations. Here there is no need to wait for Mr. K's terms. We should begin by suggesting that Russia and East Germany agree to some international, physical and military controls (not just paper "guarantees") for access to West Berlin. If Russia is sincere in saying she accepts our rights to be in Berlin, why should she refuse to agree to a corridor of access to East Germany?

If Mr. K. and the East German regime would accept this, and honor it in practice, we could then reasonably make concessions which we should certainly not give away for nothing. We could grant some *defacto* recognition for the East German government. This is little more than commonsense, though even so it should not be handed away without getting anything in return. Second, we should recognize, and try to persuade West Germany to recognize, the present Oder-Neisse line between Poland and Germany, and the present (pre-Munich) frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Third, we should propose a real measure of military "disengagement" on both sides in Germany, with a non-nuclear zone and international control of armaments. This would have to involve simultaneous withdrawal by Russia in the East, and NATO forces in the West (out of Germany into the rest of Western Europe naturally, not out of Europe)—and the exclusion of nuclear weapons from West or East Germany. The Russians profess their willingness to discuss such a scheme; and Western leaders have more than once proposed it. It offers the only hope of cooling off the chronic crisis point now generated by West Berlin and the confronting forces there; and it might possibly be combined with U.N. control of armaments and even transfer of some U. N. agency to Berlin. But, if Berlin is to become somehow a U.N. city, East as well as West Berlin ought to be included in it.

It is surely obvious that some such bargain would greatly relieve the dangers in Europe and the world as a whole. From the German point of view it is the only step which can bring unification of Germany nearer, because this can only come by agreement and not by force. We are also more likely to achieve such agreement if we put forward our own terms than if we simply wait for the Russians to make threatening noises and unreasonable demands.



MR. K., IN A LETTER in October to a group of British MP's, offered to negotiate on guaranteed access for the West to Berlin, recognition of the Oder Neisse line and "disengagement of the armed forces of the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Treaty in Central Europe."

President Kennedy, answering a similar letter, said "we are committed to no rigid formula." In these circumstances, despite all the disappointing experiences of negotiating with the Russians in the past, it seems sensible to have a try. (On the Korean Armistice, let us remember, and the Austrian Treaty, agreement was reached in the end, and kept.)

Agreement here might — and this must be a matter of hopes and probabilities—lead to a better chance of the really crucial agreement to ban nuclear tests. Russia's bad faith this Autumn, in starting nuclear tests (possibly Mr. Khrushchev's reply to the Mao-Molotov "get tough with the U. S." party on his side of the curtain) should not deter us from pressing on with the effort to achieve such agreement, as the very first priority in the race to save humanity. Indeed, the further dangerous pollution of the atmosphere by Mr. Khrushchev's October tests clearly intensifies the urgency of collectively stopping any more.

The second compelling argument, however, for an agreed test ban is the effect it would have on nations like Sweden, Italy, China, India or Brazil who have not yet developed nuclear weapons themselves. There is no great technical, or insuperable economic barrier to these nations manufacturing their own nuclear weapons after a few years. For electric power production from atomic energy is yielding ever-increasing supplies of plutonium. Yet, if they do, the political obstacles in the way of ultimate international nuclear control will be far more formidable. The more nations that have nuclear arms the more will want them (e.g., Egypt and Israel). And the more that get them, the harder general disarmament will be.

A test ban by the present four nuclear powers, however, would at least make the other nations far less inclined to hurry on with their nuclear plans. They would shrink — perhaps even China — from defying an agreed Great Power test ban; and without tests, manufacture would be a waste of money. A test ban, in short, would have a good chance of being extended. It would also — like an agreement on Berlin — by the mere fact of U.S.-Soviet accord on *something* greatly lessen enmity and suspense between East and West, and so ease the path at any rate a little to real comprehensive disarmament with inspection and control, which alone can give the world any real security.

WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY at present of any advance toward agreement on all these crucial issues? Not any technical difficulties. If only, say, the U. S., Britain, Canada, and Sweden were negotiating, I do not doubt we should reach a comprehensive disarmament and control treaty in three months. The snag is political — the great divide of mistrust and hostility between East and West. If we are to make progress in the short time left before nuclear catastrophe, it is this which we have to bridge.

Though (as I argued earlier in this article), the Berlin crisis of 1961 had been almost wholly the fault of Mr. Khrushchev, this does not absolve all of us in the West from the duty of working as hard as we can to curtail, and in time dissolve, the barrier of mistrust and ignorance. Having visited both Russia and the U. S. myself for long periods in 1955 and 1956, I was greatly struck by the similarity of popular feeling in each about the other—ignorance, suspicion, fear. The same sort of ordinary people had the same fears and prejudices about their opposite numbers, because they were based on the same sort of simple ignorance.

It is this spiritual barrier we have to break; and of course it must take time, though we have not much time. There are already signs inside Russia which are hopeful. Better education and higher standards for millions are stimulating more debate, more questioning, and more demand for civil liberties, free speech, and peaceful activities. Russian leaders, I am sure, believe increasingly in co-existence because they have increasingly more to lose by war. Hence, surely, the sharp clash over the inevitability of war with the more backward Chinese—backed by the sea-green incorruptible old Bolshevik, Mr. Molotov. It is quite possible that if the West plays its cards wisely, Russia will be asking before a generation is out for a defense pact with the West against Peiping. At any rate we should act on the assumption that all these differences of opinion exist in Moscow. The October Communist Party Congress showed how wide they are; with Molotov actually sending from Vienna a memorandum to the Central Communist Committee attacking the Khrushchev foreign policy as too pacific. Mr. Khrushchev (50 megatons or no), is a “pacifist” in Mr. Molotov’s eyes!

According to all human experience, the education of Russian youth should steadily intensify the pressure for more freedom inside Russia. If the U.S., Britain, the West generally, take advantage of this by promoting the maximum of individual contacts and exchange—through tourism, we may be able to push on an already flowing political tide a bit faster. Much has been achieved in this way already since Stalin’s death in 1953. We should keep it up, despite all discouragement, in the knowledge that Russia will certainly change somehow, and that the direction of change will partly depend on us.

We must not neglect China in this process either. Her population will probably reach 1000 million by 1990; and if she is then industrialized, she cannot help being the most powerful nation in the world. It therefore matters a bit to the rest of us whether she is peaceful and liberal, or totalitarian and militarist! Here, as it seems to almost all eyes in Britain, a great and gratuitous folly is being perpetuated by the U. S. Government in refusing to recognize the Peiping Government as a member of the U.N. There is no logic in this, since we all recognize Russia and

other Communist regimes. We ought to realize that China's desire to enter the U.N. is a source of hope. We all grieved deeply when Germany left the League of Nations in 1933. What madness to keep China out now, just because we don't like her regime.

WHILE WE STRIVE FOR advance towards these immediate objectives, we should also—looking further ahead—press on for a much greater prize: the steady conversion of the U.N. into a real world government, with a permanent effective military force (and as soon as possible a monopoly of nuclear weapons), and the power to settle international disputes and so prevent war. If we hope humanity is going to survive more than fifty or a hundred years, this is the only solution. We should not regard it as remote or academic, because we may not have a hundred, or even fifty, years left. The simple truth is that in the long run national sovereignty is not compatible with peace; and in the nuclear age war is not compatible with survival. Certainly, at the moment, Mr. Khrushchev — though he rejects the Molotov-Mao theory of inevitable war — still accepts the John Foster Dulles theory of the Cold Holy War. So he resists the idea of a U.N. military force and the end of the veto, and proposes an unworkable Troika at the U.N.

We must, therefore, wean the Russian leadership away from this sterile doctrine, and persuade it somehow to join in building up the U.N. into a World Government before this century is out. And the best chance of achieving this is surely to spread our own ideas of personal freedom to the fertile soil of the young, ever more educated Russians of today through every sort of personal contact that we can discover or devise.

DOUGLAS JAY is a Labor Member of Parliament. His book, *Socialism in the New Society*, recently published in England (Longmans, Green) has received wide attention.

THE REVIEW

A Quarterly of Pluralist Socialism

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Tocqueville and the New Politics



ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, author of *Democracy in America*, now overshadows writers like Crèvecoeur and Bryce as the most prominent of all foreigners who have written about America. Historians have enlisted his support almost indiscriminately. Rarely have they questioned or explained his particular attitude toward democracy, an attitude which colored all his observations. Recently this negligence has been replaced by an enthusiasm on the part of certain persons who find in Tocqueville's political philosophy a conservative ideology which supports American democracy, yet at the same time challenges Marxist

ideology and the increasing threat of totalitarianism. They have discovered a man who upholds democratic government in the hope of conserving order amidst the storm of revolution precipitated by growing equalitarianism. Tocqueville's stature has grown with the increasingly conscious conservatism which now pervades the whole fabric of American political thought.

I.

TOCQUEVILLE BELONGED TO THE Generation of 1830, that bright group of artists and writers who were among the first to express the modern estrangement of man from his society. The power and values of the middle class, the sweeping changes and monetary crassness, the hideous scene of their king as an unscrupulous speculator, separated these young aristocrats from the new world.

For Tocqueville, the shock of events had very personal meanings. He had broken with his family over the July Revolution only to be cast aside by the new government. Not yet twenty-six, these incidents rudely awakened him to his own insignificance in a world out of joint. He quickly accepted the proposal of a trip to America, because, as he assured a friend, what he could learn of "so celebrated a people" would surely raise him above the crowd. "On returning to France," he explained, "you certainly know yourself possessor of a talent that you did not have on leaving. If

the moment is favorable, some sort of publication may let the public know of your existence and fix on you the attention of the parties." Thus Tocqueville suggested, so candidly, his personal reasons for writing on democracy. Later, in his introduction to *Democracy in America*, he explained his scholarly aim in exploring the subject:

A new science of politics is needed for a new world . . . The most powerful, the most intelligent, and the most moral classes of the nation have never attempted to control it in order to guide it. Democracy has consequently been abandoned to its wild instincts, and it has grown up like those children who have no parental guidance, who receive their education in the public streets, and who are acquainted only with the vices and wretchedness of society.

BY RAISING HIS STUDY of democracy onto a scientific level, Tocqueville hoped to escape the limitations of taking sides with either the aristocracy or the masses. Yet, when suggesting the need for a new science of politics, he manifested his personal and inextricable involvement in the struggle quite clearly. He approached his problem as a chastened aristocrat. "You judge 'democracy'," wrote his friend Guizot, "like an aristocrat who has been vanquished, and is convinced that his conqueror is right." Sainte-Beuve believed that Tocqueville's whole doctrine had been "a marriage of reason and necessity, not at all of inclination." *Democracy in America*, contrary to the author's aims, and contrary to the opinion of his current admirers, more often than not reflected the personal hopes and prejudices of its aristocratic author.

Democracy, for Tocqueville, was a spirit among all people—the spirit of equality which had been the moving force behind all historical events for the last seven hundred years. Tocqueville's concept of history emphasized only one economic axiom: once man changes the inheritance laws the effect "shatters and reduces to powder every obstacle, until we can no longer see anything but a moving and impalpable cloud of dust, which signals the coming of the Democracy."

Tocqueville believed that democratic man, tormented and driven by an insatiable desire for equality, no longer looks to a certain man or class of men, but is thrown back upon himself. Democratic man becomes an individual. In Tocqueville's view, individualism was the raising of a vice almost onto the institutional level; individualism was selfishness clothed as a social virtue: "selfishness blights the germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life, but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness." Selfishness, once judged a grievous fault among men, had been held in check by the bonds of aristocratic communities. "Men living in aristocratic ages are . . . closely attached to something placed out of their sphere, and they are often disposed to forget themselves." But individualism, now considered a virtue in the democratic age, destroys the bonds of society, estranges men from each other, and allows rank selfishness to flourish.

The social injustices Tocqueville found in democracy he blamed on these two inseparable characteristics of equalitarianism and individualism. The key to the travail of the modern world was the replacement of the

philosophy of feudalism by that of the middle class. Democracy meant change. It destroyed the system of hierarchical relationships by which the purpose and order of man had been preserved: "Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king; democracy breaks that chain and severs every link of it." All change, all conflict, led to naught. It led only away from the social order which gives life meaning, and man purpose.

Midst the social chaos called democracy, Tocqueville found the state acquiring limitless control. When no class or persons are recognized as superior to others and when all men are alienated from each other by their unconditional belief in individualism, the state becomes the source of despotism as it wields its guardian role over each citizen estranged from class, family, and even his own heart. After subjugating the will of the people in all matters of life, consequently cultivating among them the cruelest apathy, democratic governments call on these same people to perform the most responsible of political acts—the selection of their leaders.

It is indeed difficult to conceive how men who have entirely given up the habit of self-government should succeed in making a proper choice of those by whom they are to be governed; and no one will ever believe that a liberal, wise, and energetic government can spring from the suffrages of a subservient people.

Tocqueville's alternative to what he considered an absurd political condition was his "new science of politics," as he called it. Though in announcing his new politics he assumed a brave stance for which a recent admirer has called him "an adventurous conservative," the tone of *Democracy in America* remained that of a jeremiad whose author cannot help but utter the anguish he feels in being born in the age of democracy.



II.

THE IMAGE MOST AMERICANS have of Alexis de Tocqueville is that of a young aristocrat standing above the current battle of his time between aristocrats and democrats, a man who visited America during the Jacksonian period on the pretense of studying American prisons, and who soon afterwards wrote a two volume study of American democracy for the benefit of Frenchmen and other Europeans. Their appraisal of *Democracy in America* echoes the sentiments of John Stuart Mill who wrote of Tocqueville that "not a trace of prejudice, or so much as a previous leaning either to the side of democracy or aristocracy, shows itself in his work." His most recent popularity arises, however, from his belief that American institutions controlled rather than fostered equalitarianism and that power evolved into the hands of the responsible thus limiting the tyranny of the majority.

Tocqueville found that American society, even after extending broader suffrage, had actually limited the consequences of democratic government and extended the authority of private interests. Thus, the awesome dangers which haunted European conservatives had all but been sapped in America. In writing of the virtues of New England town government he explained that the officers of the county are not elected, the state "is only a second-rate community whose tranquil and obscure administration offers no inducement sufficient to draw men away from the home," and the Federal government offers positions of power to too few men and often only to those who have gained prominence in some other career. He concluded by explaining that the true magic of the system lay in the township which, "at the center of the ordinary relations of life, serves as a field for the desire of public esteem, the want of exciting interest, and the taste for authority and popularity . . ."

Such democratic politics which remained on the harmless local level, diverting the little ambitions of the common people, became a cornerstone to Tocqueville's new politics. While the mass was tranquillized into believing its desires for political equality had been fulfilled, the important functions of government fell into the hands of lawyers, men Tocqueville happily described as reflecting the character of aristocrats: "they entertain the same repugnance to the multitude, and the same contempt of the government of the people."

The bulk of political power in America, Tocqueville discovered, rested in the hands of private citizens who formed associations in order to protect themselves against the tyranny of the majority and the despotism of the state. In these associations he found the key to the new politics he would have established in Europe. He wrote:

I firmly believe that an aristocracy cannot again be founded in the world, but I think that private citizens, by combining together, may constitute bodies of great wealth, influence, and strength, corresponding to the persons of an aristocracy. By this means many of the greatest political advantages of aristocracy would be obtained without its injustices or its dangers.

Out of the chaos of equalitarianism and individualism, Tocqueville saw rising a new order built on the same self-interest he believed so destructive to society. The difference was a self-interest *rightly understood*. Consequently, while maintaining a critical attitude toward the culture and mores of the middle class, he presented a sophisticated apology for their powerful position. Although he never acknowledged the existence of the class conflict emerging out of the industrial revolution, he made clear whose interests he believed were "rightly understood." He found it incredible that "the people themselves often entertain against these very associations a secret feeling of fear and jealousy, which prevents the citizens from defending the institutions of which they stand so much in need." Yet he admitted that the manufacturing associations, which were the largest and most powerful, had created an aristocracy which "first impoverishes and debases the men who serve it and then abandons them to be supported by the charity of the public." At just critical points in Tocqueville's new politics there often emerged aristocratic limits of social consciousness.



TOCQUEVILLE'S GREATNESS LAY in his ability to stand outside the American situation and appraise it with some objectivity. At least he recognized the problems of making a democracy work under social and economic circumstances which allowed people only a slight degree of self-government. Where his objectivity fell down (though not, of course, in the eyes of those for whom he wrote) was in condoning the new men of power and the fraudulent democracy by which they ruled. Faced with accepting either what he considered an absurdity—government by the mass, or the hypocrisy of a democracy in which government remained severely limited and under the control of a new aristocracy, Tocqueville had really no choice. He threw in his lot on the side of order.

Tocqueville wrote that: "Nothing conceivable is so petty, so insipid, so crowded with paltry interests . . . as the life of man in the United States." Yet by paying no heed to the economics of human existence in his new politics, he created a system of social control as dehumanized as the bourgeois culture he so correctly abhorred. Under the system of social control he found in America not only were the social and cultural values he disliked insured, but the rights and freedom of the majority of men were left without protection. Consequently, all of Tocqueville's philanthropic criticisms of the cruelties of modern life can only be considered meaningless, for, though aware of the importance of politics, he consciously believed the mass of men should remain bereft of political power.

Yet Tocqueville did face the problem to which most American historians have so often remained oblivious. How is government by the people really possible? Tocqueville said it wasn't. It would appear that as American society matured and the prime question of democracy became increasingly important, the inability to answer this question began to merge into an acceptance of Tocqueville's new politics.

An historian such as Henry Adams, for instance, practically stumbled over the problem when he wrote of conditions around 1800:

Every day a million men went to their work, every evening they came home with some work accomplished; but the result was matter for a census rather than for history. The acres brought into cultivation, the cattle bred, the houses built, proved no doubt that human beings, like ants and bees, could indefinitely multiply their numbers and could lay up stores of food; but these statistics offered no evidence that the human being, any more than the ant and bee, was conscious of a higher destiny, or was even mechanically developing into a more efficient animal. As far as politics proved anything, the evidence seemed to show that the American tended already to become narrow in his views and timid in his methods.


Adams apparently saw no causal relationship here. He showed no sign of knowing that in a democratic society the drone life of humans would necessarily be reflected in the politics of that society.¹ There seemed to exist in the American consciousness two concepts of politics. One was democracy which terminated at the ballot box; the other was statesmanship which commenced with the proper authorities. In the gap between the two, sparks rarely occurred. When they did, as in the strikes of the late nineteenth century, men like Adams and his friend John Hay stood aghast. As long as the working class remained bee-like and ant-like, as long as there existed not one ripple in the wide sea of humanity bent to tasks from which they gained not the simplest human content, then America remained free from the hell of an immorally turbulent Europe. Once rebellion broke out, once the American working class demonstrated openly some human sentiment, then men like Adams and Hay shuddered. The world became not one of their making.

For historians a breakthrough in their understanding of American power structure and its political ramifications arrived with Charles Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*. By showing that economic interests lay at the basis of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, Beard hoped to challenge the mystique of American political power. Beard, however, shared a relatively simple view of society with his fellow Progressives. Unhappy with the injustices and general sloppiness of America's social machinery, they believed the cause for America's ills was that (to use the words of Tocqueville) "the most powerful, the most intelligent, and the most moral classes of the nation have never attempted to control it in order to guide it. Democracy has consequently been abandoned to its wild instincts . . ." Thus, when Beard revealed the existence of classes in *An Interpretation* he was actually declaring his distance, not his proximity, to Marx. In *Social Thought in America*, Morton White argues that "Beard's apparent endorsement of *all* of Madison's tenth Federalist paper brought out sharply a fundamental difference between Marx and Beard. For Madison classes were rooted in human nature, but for Marx they were associated only with specific transitory phases in the development of production." (Emphasis is White's.)

IV

AS THE EXISTENCE OF CLASSES became increasingly clear, American intellectuals began to echo more clearly the social and political sentiments of Tocqueville. On the one hand, the new mass culture demonstrated with a fearful vengeance the validity of Tocqueville's indictment of it. Madison Avenue and mass media have so exaggerated "the kind of virtuous materialism," about which he wrote, and so "enervated the soul and unbent its springs of action" that even the most obtuse social scientist today admits the paltriness of American life. For many Americans, then, the experience of sharing both Tocqueville's fears and his limited concept of democracy has driven them to espousing views as aristocratic as his own.

This current endorsement of Tocqueville's new politics has many ramifications. Among statemen, like Adlai Stevenson, it is argued that the responsible character of democratic government should receive more attention among the newer nations. The attributes of a government *for* the people far outnumber those of a government *by* the people, particularly in countries which lack the political sophistication of the democratic American. Political sophistication for the Stevensons, just as for Tocqueville, is measured by the degree one accepts the power division inherent in capitalistic societies. Among economists for whom order takes precedent over human freedom and political rights are subordinate to the health of the existing economic system there has grown up over the last thirty years a school of neo-corporatists who would push Tocqueville's aristocratic concept of "private associations" to its most logical conclusion (see Hal Draper's discussion of their views in *New Politics*, Fall, 1961).



Some political scientists and historians, responding to the polarizing pressures of the Cold War, find in Tocqueville the political philosopher of the West, just as they view Karl Marx as the philosopher of the East. In comparing these two, J. P. Mayer writes: "Tocqueville was a realistic sociologist, Marx in comparison with him an Utopian." Another Tocquevillite, John Lukacs, explains: "We experience a re-vision, in the literal sense of that word. With it Marx and Spencer and Bentham and Tolstoi and Metternich and Burckhardt and Henry Adams grow."

In all these cases the limits of democracy are given precedent over its possibilities. As the political problems of democracy become less academic and problems of freedom and equality become more real in the face of the breakdown of Tocqueville's "new science of politics," democracy in the mouths of many American intellectuals has become as meaningless as when uttered by Communists. The "realism" of Tocqueville and Metternich is nothing more than the justification of the use of power for the continuation of the status quo. The celebration of such limited, antiquated political concepts certainly demonstrates the paucity of American political thought.

Tocqueville stood on the threshold of that century whose class wars and ideologies excited the human passions and produced the human anguish of millions of men. Yet he saw nothing but chaos, cultural mediocrity, and the end of significant politics. Divorced from the conflicts waged around him and afraid of their consequences which he could only predict

as disastrous, he projected his fear of the mass onto what he believed an objective, scientific blueprint of democratic society. Although singularly struck by the horror of life in industrial centers, his social philosophy left him no alternative but to support those same persons and institutions which fostered them.

History has taught us the limits of Tocqueville's new politics. Yet when faced with the same breakdown of political and social theory, when cast into the same cold waters of consciousness in which this young aristocrat in post-Revolutionary France found himself, we forget that history—or we re-write it. Americans hail Tocqueville and live in an age when American democracy has become synonymous with order, responsibility and power; and when individualism, instead of remaining the true yeast of democratic politics, has become the albatross round the neck of American democratic leaders. Like Tocqueville, many social and political writers today understand by democracy something which is truly its antithesis. The growing number of Tocqueville's admirers further testifies to the impoverished state of American political thought.



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Algeria: The End of a War



THE ALGERIAN WAR, declared by the Mendès-France government on the Algerian revolutionary movement in answer to the uprising of November 1, 1954, officially ended on the evening of March 18, 1962, when the representatives of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) and of the French government signed the cease-fire agreement which became effective the following day at noon.

One might have expected that the end of this war would have brought about explosions of joy

in France and in Algeria—a war had ended which represented a nightmare for Algeria and, to a lesser extent, for France, which killed close to a million people, ravaged Algeria, precipitated France into chaos, brought it under the rule of an authoritarian government and tied down the youth of France in an inglorious battle.

Even the traveler passing through France, however, is struck by the absence of any outward sign of joy, of satisfaction, of relief; in short, by the absence of any manifestation of feeling at all . . . The news of the cease-fire found the French people in a state of lethargic indifference which it was unable to dissolve.

At first sight, the absence of reaction in France seems incomprehensible, even shocking. Yet, it is perhaps the most revealing fact about the nature of the peace now being attempted in Algeria. This apathy, heavy and general, which resists even the announcement that peace has come, and even the murderous attacks of the *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS), can be explained by the *manner* in which the peace negotiations were conducted, the *content* of the peace and the fact that the cease-fire agreement does not mean that the war has ended, but that it will continue under a new form, for an unforeseeable duration.

THE GAULLIST REGIME is a text-book example of bonapartism. Since its establishment in 1958, it has consistently succeeded in excluding from political life, not only the working class, but also the social

forces which brought it to power and from whom it continues to derive most of its support. While enjoying the confidence of an important sector of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie, whose interests are admirably well defended under its administration, the Gaullist government has increasingly detached itself from all classes and asserted itself as an independent authority, mainly based on the use of violence, i.e. the police. Indeed, the police force is continuously increasing in numbers and, since his accession to power, de Gaulle has undertaken a slow but thorough purge of the army cadres to turn them into as reliable an instrument as possible.

True to its nature, the Gaullist administration has always conducted its negotiations with leaders of the Algerian revolution by the classical methods of *secret diplomacy*.

The Franco Algerian conference which ended at Evian on March 18, was the fourth of its kind. In June 1960, after de Gaulle's invitation to the rebel leaders to come to France in order "to find an honorable way to end the fighting which still drags on," MM. Boumendjel and Ben Yahia, delegates of the FLN, talked for three days with the semi-official representatives of the French government: M. Roger Moris, General de Garties and Colonel Mathon, all three very secondary figures.

In May 1961, a more consequential French delegation, led by Louis Joxe, met an Algerian delegation led by Krim Belkacem. The talks lasted three weeks.

The same delegations met again in July 1961, at Lugrin, in Switzerland, and talked for a week without results.

In all three cases, the content of the talks remained secret, and the explanations given by the powers that be to account for their failure never went beyond propaganda slogans and the usual selective leaking of information.

The aim of the Gaullist government was to achieve peace outside of all mass movements, even outside of the feeble "pressure" which the Left, ranging from the Communist Party to the Catholic trade union center (CFTC) would have liked to exert in a direction no different than that in which the government was going in any case.

From the point of view of the government, any mass movement, however limited, was dangerous because it could only benefit the Algerian revolutionary movement. As to the "pressure" of the Left, one wonders what meaning it could have in a regime where parliamentary institutions are reduced to their most insignificant expression. A democratic opposition can obtain concessions from a bonapartist regime only when the latter is unstable and threatened. This has never been the case for the Gaullist administration; this is also why the General's police has clubbed without compunction, and sometimes

killed¹, the militants of the Left who demonstrated in support of the government's own policy against the OAS!

Parliament was left out of the entire process of negotiations to the end. It was informed of the content of the agreements after the accomplished fact, like all other French citizens, and without the possibility of changing a single item in the agreements as a result of its debates. Even though the regime has assured itself a solid majority in Parliament, it does not wish any discussion, however harmless, to take place in this non-representative and weighted forum on the peace it has concluded.

Through its complete lack of militancy, and by the isolation of its "representative" organizations, the bulk of the French population has been wholly excluded from the negotiations. Nothing could be more wrong than the slogan which the Communist Party has been spreading all over the city of late: "The cease-fire agreement is the result of a common struggle conducted for seven years by the Algerian and French peoples." There is no need for detailed opinion polls in the streets and in the plants of Paris to realize that the "French people" does not have the feeling of having imposed the peace by a so-called struggle of seven years. It accepts the peace with cautious relief, but also with the feeling that this peace is not of its own doing.

A journalist recently wrote in *L'Express*: "It can be said that the agreements safeguard the essential interests of both sides." This phrase, which, on the whole, defines fairly well the thinking of the French Left, makes very little sense: the "essential interests" of French imperialism and of the Algerian revolution are so contradictory that any compromise assumes far greater sacrifices by one camp than by the other.

The fact that the new peace represents such a compromise is hardly debatable. Two problems, rather, are worth closer examination: (a) what the FLN gained and what it lost; (b) what, in the agreements, can be respected and what must be trespassed upon by the Algerian government of tomorrow.



¹ On February 8, the police killed 8 demonstrators. On February 13, 800,000 Parisians, most of whom were workers, demonstrated in homage to the dead. This enormous demonstration, the largest ever to take place in Paris, was curiously not followed by any other for many days.

The Gains of the FLN

THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS provide for the organization in Algeria of a referendum on the following three questions:

- should Algeria remain a French department?
- should Algeria become independent and break all ties with France?
- should Algeria become independent and be associated to France?

All the provisions of the agreements, however, already assume that Algeria will be independent. The results of the referendum are taken for granted by both the FLN and by the French government. Until then, order is maintained by a Provisional Executive appointed by the French government and supported by a local armed force, constituted by former "harkis" (special units of Moslems who joined the French armed forces) and by French police troops, to the exclusion of any element of the nationalist National Liberation Army.

The first gain of the FLN is therefore the recognition of Algerian independence.

The Gaullist government had already recognized without combat the political independence of all African territories, after Tunisian independence had been accepted by the Mendès-France administration in 1954 and Moroccan independence by the Edgar Faure administration in 1955. Why did it take over seven years of murderous fighting to obtain in Algeria what nationalist agitation and a few local uprisings secured for Morocco and Tunisia, and the African states obtained by simple discussion?

De Gaulle answered this question when he said that France could only negotiate in Algeria with a force capable of maintaining order after the conclusion of peace. The machinery of the bourgeois state had remained intact in Tunisia and in Morocco, and the states of Tropical Africa had not experienced revolutionary activity of any consequence. From the Gaullist point of view, Algeria, on the other hand, suffered from three disadvantages:

- it was the scene of the revolutionary struggle of an urban and rural proletariat aspiring to a thorough-going social transformation (agrarian reform, nationalization of industry);
- the political apparatus of the FLN may be the emanation of the nationalist bourgeoisie of the Madhreb (Arab North-West Africa) and therefore acceptable, but the Gaullist administration had little confidence in its ability to confine the Algerian revolution in the bourgeois framework of formal political independence;
- the presence of a strong European minority, which had maintained the Algerian people outside of the country's political and economic life, and which enjoyed wide-spread support in the army,

greatly reduced the margin of maneuver of the Gaullist government. The fear of a revolution which would despoil it of its privileges, could only precipitate the mass of the Europeans into an "ultra" adventure.

Political independence by itself is therefore a nationalist victory, but a meager victory if compared with the price paid. However, the FLN also obtained a second victory: that independence should be granted to the whole of the country, including the Sahara. In September 1961, General de Gaulle had already recognized the Algerian character of the Sahara; the agreements now include the formal recognition of this concession, while the enormous privileges France has kept in the Sahara are considered as provisional gaps in Algerian sovereignty.

The Concessions of the FLN

A. P. LENTIN WROTE IN A RECENT issue of *France-Observateur*: "[The FLN] . . . makes it known that, if it is prepared to accept the independence and the territorial integrity of Algeria, France may well receive very substantial advantages in Algeria." (March 22, 1962). The peace that has now been signed, and that was hailed as the "sad peace" by a Tunisian journalist, confirms this hypothesis. The FLN paid a heavy price, in the military, economic and social fields, for the recognition of political independence for Algeria, and of Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara.

"As a whole, the provisions of the agreement give France satisfactions that many did not expect to be possible under a policy of negotiations and considered incompatible with the demands of the Algerian nationalists" wrote Alain Jacob in *Le Monde* (March 3), with reference to the military clauses of the cease-fire agreement. In addition to the fact that the responsibility of maintaining order until the referendum is given to a "local force originating from French army units, and maintaining its former officers' corps", the agreements contain provisions which are all-important for the maintenance of French economic interests in Algeria.

Michel Debré, the French Prime Minister, says: "The military clauses provide, to begin with, for the presence of the French army in Algeria for the next three years. For a longer period, of at least five years, our scientific and military testing in the Sahara will continue. The naval base of Merse-el Kebir remains a French concession for a renewable period of fifteen years. The use of the airports needed for our connection with Africa is guaranteed without time limit. As far as the Sahara is concerned . . . the safeguard of the French interests is guaranteed by the unchanged continuation of all mineral rights now held, and by the preference to be given, at equal offers, to French companies when new concessions are granted. In addition,

oil supplies for France and for the countries of the franc zone are also guaranteed.”²

Debré’s speech already touches on the economic questions: it is quite clear that French capitalism will maintain strong positions in the Sahara! In a less obvious fashion, but just as substantially, in the Sahara and in all other parts of Algeria the agreements guarantee the “essential interests” in agriculture and industry. The relevant provisions are designed to inhibit a thorough-going agrarian reform and the nationalization of industry: private property is sacred under the agreements and, in the case of agrarian reform, expropriation is only permitted against “adequate” compensation. The question of nationalization of industry is discreetly touched upon in the following terms: “Algeria guarantees French companies established on its territory, as well as companies with a majority of [French] capital, the normal exercise of their activities, to the exclusion of all discriminatory measures.”

The distances from paper to reality can, of course, be long. But the real guarantee, from the French point of view is the presence of the French military apparatus in Algeria for the three years following the referendum. De Gaulle has learned from the Moroccan and Tunisian experience, that, in colonial countries, the groundswell of revolution is strengthened and stimulated by the issue of national independence, but that the inability to achieve the two fundamental demands (agrarian reform and nationalization of industry) rapidly breaks its strength. The present situation in Tunisia and Morocco, where the bourgeoisie is all the more ferocious since it is poor, is instructive in this respect.

The violation of these agreements by the Algerian government of tomorrow would involve the suspension or, at least, the drastic reduction, of French “aid” to Algeria. For French capitalism, tomorrow’s Algeria must remain a privileged market, and, as far as oil is concerned, the best and cheapest source of supply. The Gaullist administration is prepared to go quite a long way in making concessions as long as this double character as privileged market and cheapest supplier is safeguarded.



² Speech by Michel Debré before Parliament on March 20, 1962.

Tomorrow's Algeria

IF THE KIND OF SOCIAL CHANGE that can alone solve the vital problems of the miserable urban and rural proletariat in Algeria do not occur after independence³ the only way to the construction of a "stable" Algeria involves the active support of the French ruling class to the embryonic Algerian bourgeois state.

The history of anti-colonialist struggles shows that the limitations originally imposed on the sovereignty of new states by former ruling states very rapidly become untenable. Morocco and Tunisia rid themselves of the last vestige of French control soon after independence. But, as far as economic agreements are concerned the situation is quite different. The weaker the bourgeoisie of a newly-independent state, the more dependent it is on the good will of its former master. It can, of course, change masters, as South Vietnam did when it traded the suzerainty of Paris for suzerainty of Washington, but this possibility is difficult to envisage for Algeria.

The Algerian people, after fighting an incredibly heroic battle for more than seven years against a modern army of 700,000 men, cannot but consider the cease-fire agreements as purely provisional arrangements, and will spontaneously attempt to go further. This possibility is suggested by the French papers which write of "Algerians who are more nationalist than the FLN." The continuing presence of the French forces in Algeria for three years is, in fact, intended to discourage any militant development. It is indeed obvious that the revolutionary tension of the Algerian people will not remain in a state of suspended animation for three years under the benign supervision of the French army. Either the revolutionary *élan* of the Algerian masses will rapidly spend itself, or it will lead to clashes with the French army whose mission it is to make certain that, the bourgeois character of independent Algeria is not threatened.

For this reason, it cannot really be said that the war is finished. In fact, the war changes its nature: the new Algerian government and the French forces in Algeria will have to conduct a struggle on two fronts:


- to eliminate the fascist subversion of the OAS;
- to pacify a more or less sizeable segment of the Algerian people, who will not resign itself easily to leaving the land in the hands of its present owners and the oil in the hands of the French.

³ In a country where an olive tree is not infrequently divided among several owners, and where unemployment reaches enormous proportions, any reform policy based on the respect of private property can only offer totally inadequate remedies.

At the date of this writing, March 26, General Jouhaud, one of the top leaders of the OAS, has been arrested in Oran. This arrest is a sign that the Gaullist administration is henceforth determined to fight the OAS with new energy, now that the agreements with the FLN have been signed, and there is no longer any need to use the menace of the OAS as a device to bring pressure on the FLN and on the French Left which will cast a "yes" vote anyway, practically unanimously, in the coming referendum.

The OAS has absolutely no power in France, only a few hundred terrorists, who are isolated from the mass support of the right wing, despite their close ties with some of its political leadership. It is strong among the European population in Algeria, but this population has just suffered a crippling blow, and wars are not won with defeated soldiers. The defeat of the OAS is shown by the fact that it is now reduced to terrorist rear guard actions, the fighting methods of desperadoes who do not have anything either to win or lose.

The attitude of the Algerian masses is the unknown factor in the coming peace. Until the referendum establishing self-determination, Algeria is in a "transitional" period, and while the dismantling of the OAS is in progress, the Algerian masses are motionless. No one can foresee in what way they will choose to re-enter the political scene. The absence of any revolutionary leadership is a serious handicap for them; the collapse of the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA) has left a void allowing just as easily for "leftist" adventures or for blind acceptance. This is, today, the gravest problem of revolutionary Algeria.



The Ultra Right and the Liberals



CALIFORNIA IS NATURALLY one of the main arenas of the growing ultra-right movement. It is also probably the most interesting testing-ground right now for it and its opponents.

It was in Los Angeles that the big Fred Schwarz operation (Christian Anti-Communism Crusade) pulled off its massive "spectacular" at the Hollywood Bowl. And it was in the San Francisco Bay Area that Schwarz ran into a public Resistance movement for the first time. The East Bay labor movement vigorously denounced him. In San Francisco itself a "Conference on the Impact of the Radical Right" met on February 3, right after Schwarz held his "School of Anti-Communism" road-show.*

Some patterns are emerging on both sides.

While Schwarz, Welch, Billy Hargis and their friends are by no means reaching for power, of course, the speed with which they have come up is enough to give pause. But there is no question of panic-mongering.

They do not yet have what it takes. For one thing, this is still a stage of division among competing führers. There is, notably, distinct coolness between Schwarz and Welch. On the eve of Schwarz's Bay Area "school," Welch made a speech in San Francisco in which he publicly endorsed the enterprise and mentioned that many Birchites were active in promoting it. Schwarz responded to this embrace by announcing he thought Welch was a detriment to the Birch Society and not doing anyone else any good either. This is a sentiment which is supposed to have some currency even within the Birch Society itself, presumably among the left-wingers who do not think Eisenhower ever actually took out a party card.

*Schwarz's fund-raising circular for March admits: "When the San Francisco Bay Region School of Anti-Communism was held . . . the viciousness of the attacks surpassed all previous experience." New Yorkers will be inspired by another part of this circular: "To use a colloquialism, 'They ain't seen nothing yet.' We are breathless with anticipation as we plan the Anti-Communist School in New York City."

For another thing, there is no charismatic leader in sight. Welch, besides being unnecessarily screwballish, is a public speaker only superior to General Walker. Schwarz is a fluent orator in a school-masterish style; but there is some difficulty about whipping up an American mob with an Australian accent. Fred Schwarz's personality is not the main danger, and Fred-baiting is not the solution.

Thirdly, neither Schwarz nor Welch seems to be on the road to a mass-movement type of operation based on social demagoguery. Welch obviously aims at a hard-core, semi-underground, "cadre" organization modeled after the accounts he has read by American experts on how the insidious Communists took everything over with "operational codes" and "organizational weapons" and such inspiringly sinister devices. Schwarz, on the other hand, makes his pitch toward a mass audience, but not for a mass organization.

Besides, the latter's Crusade is oriented toward big business with rather astonishing openness. Everybody knows that Richfield Gas, Technicolor, Schick Razor and other affluent crusaders have been paying his way. His *News Letter* for this February makes its pitch with the utmost candor for the support of big business and the wealthy. The headline is "The Responsibility of the Average Businessman in the Battle Against Communism," and it starts right off with a warning of "the danger Communism presents to his business interests." It goes on to complain bitterly about the businessman who knows that Communist victory would deprive him of his "assets and income" as well as other treasured possessions such as his life, but who *merely* says to himself:

In the light of this it is my obvious responsibility to concentrate on the defeat of Communism, so I have dedicated myself to this end. My yacht cost me a mere \$300,000. It only costs me \$60,000 a year to run it. I have given \$10,000 to defeat Communism. I am dedicated.

Schwarz then censures this reprehensible attitude with the words: "*How typical this is of the attitude of so many.*" This news letter, which goes out to a mass mailing list, is not exactly slanted toward the masses.

2

ALL OF THIS APPLIES as of right now: it may not apply tomorrow. These people are feeling their way, still trying out their tools. The raw material is there. So if panic-mongering is hardly justified, still less advisable is the kind of *minimization* which, it has become evident, is the first reaction of those liberals who have spoken up. By minimization I do not mean the crackpot variety articulated by John P. Roche in the *New Leader* but the practical type exemplified by the following cases.

Case 1. A loud laugh went up all around when a report on the Birch Society by the state attorney general's office cracked that it was infested with "little old ladies in tennis shoes." The quip was

quoted for a while more widely than the latest jeu d'esprit by Mort Sahl. At the Conference on the Impact of the Radical Right, assistant attorney general Howard Jewel was introduced as speaker by mention of his proudest achievement: its authorship.

Now we must all be for a chuckle now and then, and I have only admiration for people like the El Cajon editor who printed this satirical jingle about the Birchites:

*You cannot trust your neighbor
Or even next of kin,
If mommy is a commy,
You've got to turn her in.*

But there is also a well-known theory in some quarters that the way to meet the ultra-right is with a guffaw; if we can only giggle them out of existence they are done for. While every contribution to the jollity of existence is welcome in grim times, it is doubtful whether history has borne out these theories about the power of risibility. At any rate, when a few dozen Bay Area mayors could be arm-twisted or euchred into giving the Schwarz "school" their official blessing, it might seem that the joke has gotten out of hand.

As a matter of fact, the notoriety of that line about the little old ladies does not do justice to the report from which it was extracted. The report referred to the composition of the Birch Society as heavily based on big-businessmen and retired military officers, as well as the LOLs. And that is a good deal less hilarious. The Schwarz circus in the Hollywood Bowl, with its repeated prime-time TV showings, for hours at a time, was not paid for by the ladies with the footgear, but by the dedicated owners of \$300,000 yachts.

There, in one sentence, we had a reference to a deep-lying political-social reality—the role of the big-businessmen and the military—and to a triviality. What was taken up was the triviality. Could it be because if you begin attacking big-businessmen and the military you are getting into dangerous political waters? Even if you are not getting into dangerous politics (can good Democrats start slinging arrows at businessmen with Joe Kennedy's boy in the White House?) at least you are getting into *politics*, some political ideas or other. Isn't it safer to titter over the tennis shoes?

But if the Birch Society really consisted of LOLs, it would not be worth quipping about.

Case 2. State attorney general Mosk—who is not the worst liberal in the Brown Administration—reacted to Schwarz's invasion of the Bay Area by speaking up vigorously against his operation. That this deserves praise goes without saying, when we compare him with others who grovel before any charlatan who barks out "Anti-Communism."

But Mosk's line of attack was entirely to imply that Schwarz's school is simply a "fly-by-night" racket to squeeze money for admissions out of suckers; i.e. not *really* an anti-Communist school.

Now this may have been a "smart" attempt to keep down Schwarz's gate-receipts. But it is false, demonstrably and indefensibly. The point is not whether Schwarz really does get only \$5000 a year plus expenses as he claims, or whether his part of the take is a bit more; after all, Mosk's liberalism has not been exactly underpaid either. Nor is there anything "fly-by-night" about Schwarz's road-show. Nor is he simply fleecing suckers; and Richfield Oil is not his patsy. The point is that if Schwarz's crusade is just a con-man's racket, then it is of no importance, and certainly not a social danger.

Schwarz has a bigger political horizon than that. And if clever liberals try to combat the ultras in this way, they will outsmart themselves. Schwarz can and will prove to his audience that he is being slandered.

The meaning of this Mosk line was that it was an attempt to deal with the Schwarz danger *without taking up political ideas*. To take up political ideas—"anti-Communism," for example—would be dangerous: you have to *say* something. This is unfortunately typical of the American climate, where political life is being more and more purged of political ideas, the ideological rationalization for this being incantations about the End of Ideology.

Case 3. One of the favorite liberal approaches, with a view to discrediting the ultra-rights, is the psychiatric line: "These people are giving vent to their aggressions . . . phobias . . . paranoid . . . frustrated . . ."

The question is not whether this is true but whether it is to the point. Everyone, it is reported, has his quota of phobias, fears, frustrations and the rest; and every movement of discontent has its oddballs. The Birch Society perhaps has more than its quota. But what causes a movement, even with a quota of crackpots, to take on social and political significance? What causes a movement, even with crackpots, to collect a million dollars or so from big business tvcoons? (It is not because they are pixillated too.) Why is it that, in the political climate of a different decade, the lunatic fringe infiltrated movements like *Thirty Dollars Every Thursday*, or *End Poverty in California*, or even the New Dealers or the Communist Party fronts, instead of right-wing hate movements? We ask these questions for the benefit of the same people who used to explain that Adolf Hitler was a psychopath as a substitute for accounting for the rise and victory of fascism. The pattern repeats.

If psychiatry is not the answer, yet calling these wretched people mere nuts does do one thing; it makes it unnecessary to discuss political ideas. This is the American way, and we are getting very good at it. We now have whole election campaigns untainted by any political ideas—why not a fight against the ultra-right that is also kept pure?

The aforementioned Conference on the Impact was saved from being almost totally devoid of political ideas only by the contributions of two socialist panelists, Irving Howe and S. M. Lipset. More typical

was the lucubration offered by Prof. J. H. Bunzel of Stanford's political science department; he was against "both Communism and venereal disease—both ought to be rooted out." While I offer the standard disclaimer that I am not for the Communists and that I am not now and have never been a supporter of venereal disease, still what is striking is the coupling of the two. Has anyone seen lately a movement for venereal disease with a mass political appeal and a program?



3

BUT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE to fight Schwarz and the ultra-right without any political ideas, certainly not in the long run. The ultra-rights are trading in political ideas, in their own way. That is why they are growing.*

The question why the Ultra-Right *is* growing offers an interesting path to the re-examination of current politics. An answer was given to this on behalf of the Official Liberals by their dean, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the theoretician of those intellectuals in the Kennedy apparatus who believe in getting their hands dirty. At a convention of Young Democrats in San Diego about this time, Schlesinger answered as follows: The rise of right-wing extremism was "predictable at this time." Why? Because "In conservative times the radical right is dormant and disorganized, because it is always hopeful that a conservative administration will do something it wants. But when a liberal administration is in power the right wing becomes agitated and vociferous." The cause of it all, then, is that the Kennedy administration is so liberal . . .

Of course, a court-liberal is supposed to say things like this when he orates at a party luncheon; but on the other hand Schlesinger used to be an historian; and as such he may one day record the fact that his organization, Americans for Democratic Action, has raked the Kennedy administration thoroughly for its next-to-empty record in the last Congress as measured by liberal objectives. At any rate it would be hard to say just what are the great liberal gains put through by Kennedy that have so infuriated the right wing that they begin to grow in a surge. It is also a curious fact that the same Robert Welch who has not scrupled to denounce Eisenhower as a Communist, and to imply that Lyndon Johnson is a tool of the same,

*The section which follows is not intended as a complete discussion of why the right is growing; it skips, for example, such obvious background factors as the real fear of Communist totalitarianism, which the right merely utilizes, or the over-all impact of the cold war.

and that Barry Goldwater is half a socialist—this same Welch has yet to give the supreme accolade to John F. Kennedy. Most important, it is a caricature of history to claim that it is typically in a period of liberal health that you get this growing cancer of ultra-rightism in the body politic. It is simply not true that extreme-rightism burgeons as a rule under liberal governments. We are not faced today with movements like the Silver Shirts or the Nazi Bund of the '30s. Schwarz is powered by respectable and responsible reactionaries at or near the top of society, not by hate mobs. Welch and Walker are not starting with a shirt movement. Schwarz begins not with a beerhall putsch but with a Hollywood extravaganza decked with Congressmen and actors and “personalities” and an abject letter of capitulation by the Luce empire.

This kind of ultra-right upsurge is taking place because our whole political structure has shifted its center of gravity steadily to the right. Pressure from the left has fallen off, and in accordance with the laws of political physics, the equilibrium of the system leans to the right. As the center shifts to the right, liberals press closer to the center in order (being practical and realistic) to forestall the calamity of finding themselves too far out. As they rush in this direction, the equilibrium of the system necessarily shifts right again—and the cycle repeats. This describes what has been happening to American politics in at least the last decade.

The secret of the whole process is the political vacuum on the left. There is no left opposition in American politics. It is this vacuum which pulls the new Right out of the walls.

There is this kernel of truth in Schlesinger's story: a connection does exist between the rise of the ultras and the character of the Kennedy regime. The connection is the exact opposite of Schlesinger's, but it exists:

An allegedly liberal administration is in power in Washington, and yet . . . and yet, nothing is changed. No solutions are in sight to the frustrations which the rightists appeal to. The Communists are still under their beds. The cold war and its taxes go on. There are no victories in foreign policy. Something is wrong; there must be a plot . . . We need something new, something different!

In their own way, the ultra-rightists are reacting to the desert of bipartisanship in this country which goes back monolithically through Kennedy and Eisenhower to Truman to the Fair Deal to Wendell Willkie . . . to the whole mess of Demo-Republican liberal-conservatism and conservative-liberalism.*

They are reacting blindly, unintelligently? To be sure. But they are reacting, with a program.

Indeed, they have a program, a political program; and it is one

*“Though Mr. Kennedy is a progressive and a liberal, he is also a profound conservative, and only the befuddled theorists find that strange and hard to understand.” Walter Lippmann.

of the curious features of the liberal reaction, as I have heard it, that the liberals impute to the Right that very aversion to facing politics which is their own failing.

The ultras' political program, of course, is not "anti-Communism." The only people who take this gambit seriously are their dupes and the Communists. Their program is simple and primitive. It consists of such planks as "Down with the UN!" to solve all issues of foreign policy, and "Down with the income tax!" to solve all questions of domestic policy. Its defects as a program are not fatal as long it is propped up by the desperate feeling that the status quo is intolerable.

They also have a political theory. It is equally simple and primitive: Everything is a plot. This is capable of fully explaining anything, and it is therefore more satisfying than most political theories, as long as facts are not allowed to interfere.

THIS ULTRA-RIGHT MOVEMENT is a political movement, equipped with a political program and a political theory, even if not in finished form. Schwarz is not (now) organizing storm troops or castor-oil squads. He is spreading political ideas. If he cannot be combated merely with snickers, slander or psychiatry, then he will have to be met with other political ideas.

There's the rub. Insofar as the liberals have directed a political attack against the ultra-rightists, it has been to denounce them as . . . *radical*.

The "radical right" is the phrase, invented during the McCarthyite period, which epitomizes the timid political reaction of liberalism in face of the ultra-right's self-confident aggressiveness. It does not, to be sure, make sense either politically, historically or etymologically—no movement is less inclined to go to the root of our social evils—but this is a minor drawback when we consider its main reason for existence: to smear the enemy with a label which is in bad repute with the American populace. It also smears the label. It gives you that warm, *safe* feeling that you are eschewing "extremism both of the right and the left" as you mince down the middle of the road.*

But what determines the middle of the road and how do you find it? In 1947 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., came out in *Partisan Review* for a "moderate socialism"—in order to avoid both extremes; it was his "middle of the road" of the time. Howard Jewel, whom we have already introduced, told the San Francisco conference about the late Senator Taft's middle of the road: he put through the Taft-Hartley anti-labor act, it is true, "but if you don't like it, just compare it with the Right-to-Work legislation, or outlawing trade unions altogether." Professor Bunzel at the same conference explained that the Birchites were a middle-of-the road rightist organization, being

*It exemplifies the wonders of politics today that the "Conference on the Impact of the Radical Right" in San Francisco, which was sparked to a large extent by radicals, somehow got presented to the public with a call which stated that the "radical right" was going to be discussed by "experts on radical political movements," in order to encourage "opposition to the threat of radicalism from any quarter." No one seems to know who wrote this thing in the hurry of arrangements, but the point is that it could happen. At the conference itself, Irving Howe effectively attacked the use of the term.

between the Schwarzites on the one side and the G. L. K. Smith types on the other. Some liberals who yesterday were expressing alarm over the FBI's harassment of nonconformists are today attacking the ultra-rightists on the ground that they arrogate to themselves the FBI's proper function of policing subversion: i.e., J. Edgar Hoover is now the middle of the road between Robert Welch and the ACLU. Everybody knows, of course, that Brüning and Von Schleicher were in their time the middle of the road between red and brown extremes . . .


This game is easy to play. For the obvious truth is that the middle of the road in any given political situation is determined only by the active extremes. The middle of the road is a mirage in this physical sense: it *must* shift away from you as you move toward it.

What this points to is the modest service which radicals and socialists can perform not only for their own program but also, as a by-product, for the poor bedeviled liberals who would like to dig their heels in against the pull from the right. What these harassed souls need is a firm pull from the left. How can they find a comfortable position of compromise unless we present them with something to compromise with? How can they take the respectable course of moderation unless we fight for something they can happily water down? Liberalism exists to blur the social struggle: ergo, it can be given a new lease on life only if someone else is struggling.

It is no favor to them if we socialists yield to their pleas to drop our "sectarian" radicalism and pretend to be liberals ourselves. This only convinces more of them that, in turn, the smart thing for them to do is to give up the burden of their "ultra-liberalism" and move over to the (new) middle of the road.

Organized liberalism is in the sad state we see here *because* there is no aggressive American socialism and radicalism to press them on the flank. Its spine stiffens only when it gets cuffed from the left. It can stand up to the right *only* when it can point with alarm to a threat on the other side of it. A radical political program is the only effective answer to the ultra-right—if only because its very first effect is to stir the liberals to life in order to denature it.

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**Against
Britain's
Entry**

**michael
barratt brown**

ANY POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC policies emanating from capitalist governments will be viewed by socialists on two levels; in the first place, how do they improve or worsen the immediate position of the working people; second, how do they advance or retard their long term interest in the replacement of capitalism by socialism. This article is written from the standpoint that, in fact, the two levels have to be integrated in middle-term programs; i.e., that socialists will not win public support for a radical long-term alternative to capitalism unless they go beyond the day-to-day defense of workers' interests to prepare programs which will take us to the limits of social reform.

Debate **The Common Market**

This writer's attitude, therefore, to an issue like that of Britain's joining the Common Market will be to reject arguments of the sort that "It is not our job to solve capitalism's contradictions for it" and "We should leave them to make the mess and pick up the bits at the end." For, in this way confidence in the positive capacity of socialist leadership is not enhanced and experience is not gained in the failure of attempted reform. It is necessary to preface this article with these remarks in order to emphasize that the alternative policies advanced below are also put forward as the program on which Labor could win the next election.

This approach should also reassure those who argue that it is inevitable that Britain will join the Common Market and there is therefore nothing that we can do except prepare to fight the worst consequences. For if we go in and the consequences prove as unpleasant as the writer expects them to be, then it is important that workers should remember that there was a socialist alternative, short of world-wide socialist brotherhood, which was available and was rejected. If we do not go in, then here is the alternative program with which to face the very real challenge of the Common Market.

ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET is presented as a solution for Britain of three critical problems that face us: the future of our trade, our future economic growth, and our survival in a nuclear arms race. The first arises directly from the establishment of the common external tariff wall around the six countries who joined the market. As internal tariffs come down, this wall threatens to exclude British exports. The Common Market countries at present take little more than an eighth of our exports, but

sales have been growing fast in this direction and Britain as a trading nation cannot afford to be excluded from any market. If the external tariff wall could not be broken down, it was argued, then Britain had to get inside it. The failures with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and with the Outer Seven left no option. It will be suggested later that the Outer Seven could have been made the basis for an alternative policy, involving a deliberate assault on the tariff wall surrounding the Six.

From the start of the British negotiations for entry into the Common Market it was recognized by both Labor and Conservative supporters of entry that the price could be too high. This was recognized in the 1961 resolution of the Labor Party conference, which required "guarantees protecting the position of British agriculture and horticulture, the EFTA countries, and the Commonwealth" and went on to require that "Britain retains the power to use public economic ownership and planning as measures to ensure social progress within the UK." The main short-term fear is that food prices in Britain would rise sharply, as they were raised to the unified price levels supported by the EEC commission. These are expected to be at least 20% above world prices. It is argued, however, that this level is no higher than the pre-subsidy level of prices for the half of British food consumption that is contributed by home agriculture. But the subsidy is not only a support for British farmers, it is also a form of income redistribution. To replace the subsidy with an import levy would be to ease the burden on the taxpayer at the expense of food consumers, thus substituting a regressive for a progressive tax.

Whatever concessions are won by Mr. Heath, it seems unlikely that Christian Democrat governments, deriving much of their voting strength from the large peasant populations of the Six countries, will permit free entry for Commonwealth and other food producers into the British market as at present. This brings us to the longer term dangers for Britain's trading position stemming from entry into the Market. To the extent that Commonwealth and other food producers are excluded from the British home market, they will have to reduce their imports from Britain also. This becomes the more serious because the Common Market external tariff wall is higher than Britain's in respect to raw materials from all sources and of manufactures from the Commonwealth. And here it is not only the richer Commonwealth countries that stand to lose, like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but the poorer countries also, and in particular India.

Here we raise what is, in fact, the fundamental trading choice before Britain. It is not so much a choice between Common Market and Commonwealth, as is often suggested, but between expanding trade in the rich West End of Europe or in the poor East End of the whole world. It is true that trade is highest among the most industrialized lands, but the moral is not necessarily for Britain to concentrate on her trade with the existing industrialized lands; it might well be better for her to help other lands to industrialize. This has been the traditional British role and it is an important point for socialists to remember that the gain from British overseas investment prior to 1914 did not come from the quite small-scale private

investment in colonial enclaves of raw material production (where yields to investors were very high) but from the large-scale loans to governments and railway companies in the USA and the dominions (where yields were low). For the gain from the latter lay not only in the provision of cheap food, but in the expanding market upon which rising British productivity and wealth were based. The tragedy was that the process stopped at the lands of European settlement; and the great settled lands of Asia and Africa were left at a standard of life that actually fell as their populations rose.

Today these underdeveloped lands are beginning to carry through their industrialization, but they are held back not only by the hangovers, political and economic, of colonial rule, but also by the lack of guaranteed markets for their products, on the earnings from which they must buy the capital equipment that they need. Aid is no substitute for trade. Yet, in recent years, the non-industrialized lands' share of world trade had been falling (from 32% to 25% between 1953 and 1960). This is not only because trade in manufactured goods has been growing faster than trade in primary products, as a result of the development of substitutes for natural materials, etc., but because the industrial lands have been capturing an increased share of the trade in primary products themselves (48% in 1960 compared with 42% in 1953). Added to this has been the steady worsening, in the years since 1954, of the terms of trade of primary producers as food and raw material prices have fallen, while prices of manufactured goods have risen.



THIS IS THE BACKGROUND to the crisis of Britain's foreign trade with its strong orientation toward the underdeveloped lands. It is even more the cause of crisis among the underdeveloped lands; for their development plans are in jeopardy as their earnings of foreign currency fall and reserves and credits are used up. The advocates of the Common Market are in effect arguing that we should abandon them; for the protectionism of the Common Market is bound to make the situation worse. Those who argue that a rich Europe will be able to give more than a poor Britain are simply turning a blind eye to the exiguous contributions to aid made in recent years by rich West Germany, and to the performance to date of the Community Development Fund's operations in their African associated territories.

The relationship established between the Six and their ex-colonial lands in Africa provides the best indication we could have of both the position that any British ex-colonies could enjoy as associated territories of the Common Market and of the philosophy that underlies the trading policies of the Common Market. Associated status opens the market of the Six countries to the products of overseas lands, but subject of course to the unified price level in respect of all temperate foodstuffs including sugar. Producers of tropical products may benefit in the European market from association. At the same time, they must all open their markets to the industrial products of the Community. This in effect makes it impossible for them to develop their own infant industries behind protective tariffs. It would seem that the associated territories are expected to remain primary producers and this impression is confirmed by analysis of the grants so far proposed and authorized by the European Development Fund. Out of the 129 million units of account authorized, or the 717 million proposed, all are for the development of primary production or for social projects; not one unit is for industrial development.

If the trade alternatives before Britain were entry into the Common Market or drifting downwards with the underdeveloped lands, the prospect would indeed be black. For the British people live in large part by machining and refining imported materials for export overseas. Exports are the equivalent in value of more than a fifth of the national income; a third of engineering output is exported. But there is an alternative open to us, which a Labor government would be bound to take and a Tory government could well be forced to attempt. This is to challenge the Common Market external tariff wall and to take all available measures to establish a rapid rate of growth in the whole level of world trade. To break down the Common Market wall, it would be necessary either to establish a common band of tariffs around EFTA and if possible associate Canada, Australia, and New Zealand also, or at least to threaten to do so, and then to fight inside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for the lowering of both walls. But the most important step that these rich EFTA and Commonwealth countries could take would be to guarantee markets for the primary products of the underdeveloped lands in exchange for the provision of capital equipment and certain special raw materials necessary for industrial development.

After the United States, these EFTA and Commonwealth countries have the highest per capita incomes in the world and are among the world's major importers of primary products. The aid that they could offer, and, more important, the markets they offer to the underdeveloped lands give these countries the opportunity to take the lead in a new expansion of world trade designed to advance world industrialization. The aim would not be the formation of yet another trading bloc, but the breaking up of the existing blocs in the interest of world trade as a whole. The development of East-West trade, as it is called, that is, of trade with the rapidly expanding Communist countries, would play an important part. The whole effort should be channelled, as far as possible through the United Nations and other international agencies.

THE SECOND MAJOR CLAIM in support of Britain's entry into the Common Market is that the British economy needs the stimulus of association with such a large, dynamic, competitive economic unit. That British industry with its stagnant, protected monopolistic position needs stimulation and that modern industry needs a wider market than 52 million persons cannot be denied. The benefits of the Common Market solution, however, may well be doubted except in providing a scapegoat for the contradictions and ineptitudes of Tory economic policies. First of all, the dynamism of an economy is not something that can be caught by contagion. West German economic growth has its specific origin in post-war reconstruction, the recovery of export markets, the rapidly rising population, etc. Secondly, the rate of growth has been easing off in recent months as these specific factors have worked themselves out. Thirdly, competition is a remedy that can kill as well as cure. British industries such as machine tools or shipbuilding caught at a low ebb in uncontrolled competition could be wiped out.

British industry does need a shake up in its protected and privileged positions. But it makes a great deal of difference to the British working people how the adjustment is made. And here we come to the essence of the Common Market solution, in its reliance on the unfettered working of market forces to solve economic problems. Article 85, Paragraph 3 of the Rome Treaty, which gives the green light to cartels, has only to be compared with Article 92 which restricts aid granted by states, to see the underlying philosophy of the framers of the Treaty's provisions. Their outlook becomes even clearer in the Articles that follow No. 123, which make clear that the basic principle of the Common Market is that men should move to jobs and not jobs to men.

Here is the nub of the thing: The British economy is already plagued by the uncontrolled drift of industry from Scotland and the north of England to the south and midlands, with all the social wastage and social distress this involves. How much worse would this be if even the Conservative government's measures to aid the declining areas were ruled out, let alone those further measure to which a Labor government would be committed. Already, in the Common Market, both capital and labor are concentrating around the lower Rhine, where population density is strongest. What future can North Britons look forward to there? A higher standard of living with greater labor mobility and, by definition, a higher rate of unemployment on the North American model, is not calculated to appeal to the British working man.

Two arguments are adduced by the Common Marketeers to combat these fears. The first is that there is much more economic planning and growth in, say, France and Italy, than in Britain and the Common Market commission also will be drawn increasingly into economic planning. But it is legitimate to ask what kind of planning this is; and the answer must be that it is planning by the great international corporations, whose union has borne fruit in the Coal and Steel community and now in the Common Market. This challenges the working people in two ways: first, the giant corporations are still in competition, even inside their price cartels, and a planned growth target on the French model does nothing to eliminate the


dangers of over-production as each of the giants tools up to capture the whole of the growth. It is only necessary to look at the planned capacity for motor car output in Western Europe for 1965, which together with imports, is estimated at a minimum of 10.4 million units, and to compare this with the anticipated demand for 1965, including exports, of 7.7 million units. Someone is bound to lose.

The major challenge to the working people implicit in the Common Market type of planning consists, however, in the uncontrolled power of the giant corporations working through the supra-national commissions. Belgian miners soon found that their Parliament and Government were powerless to intervene on their behalf when the Coal and Steel High Authority decided to close their pits. What power, it may well be asked, will British miners, British farmers, British shipbuilders have to influence the decisions of the Common Market commissioners? For the power of the commissioners is much greater than that of mere civil servants, subject to government parliamentary checks.

THIS LEADS US TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT of those who support the Common Market. This has several variants. Socialists argue that international integration is the inevitable process of capitalism and the only hope for the workers is to unite internationally and fight back. The Common Market and its institutions provide just this opportunity for European workers. It is difficult not to feel some sympathy for this argument, but it has several fatal flaws, at least in the short run.

The first is that while the employers are already strongly united in the Common Market in their own cartels, in interlocking directorates and in their influence on the Common Market and Coal and Steel Community institutions, the workers are divided into national, political and religious trade unions and trade union centers, Socialist, Communist, Catholic, Protestant, German, French, Belgian, Dutch, Italian, etc. The British trade union movement is at least largely united. In these circumstances, joining the Common Market to achieve European trade union unity would be like obtaining unity through joining a company union.

There is a further danger; the whole structure of Common Market institutions, plus the establishment of free capital movement inside the Market, render the chances of one country, on its own, establishing a left-wing government increasingly remote. The ruling Christian Democrat parties in the Six countries know that their present power depends on a peasant vote that must decline as industrialization proceeds. They are not unaware of the advantages to them of supra-national decisions and the threat of capital withdrawals from a defecting partner.



Finally, the argument for going into the Common Market to strengthen international working class solidarity ignores the growing importance of unity between workers in the advanced industrial lands and their brothers in the underdeveloped lands overseas. And this brings us back to the alternative solution to the challenge of the Common Market for Britain. Unity with the largely social democratic governments of EFTA and the national liberation governments in the new Commonwealth and other ex-colonial lands would provide not only a wider market for British industry, with a measure of competition among the richer members, but also the basis for wider economic cooperation throughout the world. All these countries have accepted measures of social planning in their economies at home and have a common interest in the world wide expansion of trade. A planned development of world trade would not be difficult to agree upon, in place of cutthroat competition in the European market.

One example alone must suffice, drawn once more from the motor industry. How much better for Britain to develop a simple, robust, and cheap vehicle for the bad roads and rough conditions of the underdeveloped lands than the sleek limousines for Europe's tarmac highways; or a large, if slow, aircraft needing only short and rough landing strips for solving the underdeveloped lands' transport problems instead of the supersonic jets for the rich trans-Atlantic passengers! These are the alternatives: cutthroat competition as overproduction grows in the rich West End of Europe or the industrialization of the world, by increasingly planned economic development. But it is a choice dictated not only by economic considerations; the maintenance of world peace depends on the same choice.

THE THIRD MAIN CLAIM the supporters of Britain's entry into the Common Market make for it is that a united Western Europe will be a force for world peace. There are two variants of this argument. Some believe that a United States of Europe can be a third force balancing the power of the two great power blocs of East and West. Others, more realistically, see such a force as firmly on the side of the West, as a counterweight against the growing strength of the Communist world. President Kennedy is reported to have told Mr. Macmillan that a Common Market of Western Europe with an exclusive tariff wall was not in the economic interests of the United States, but the political strengthening of the West which would follow from Britain, Denmark and Norway joining the Six was of overriding importance.

One should not be surprised. Britain's association with EFTA, whose members are either neutrals or have growing neutralist movements (with the exception of the ineffable Portugal) and Britain's association with a Commonwealth that includes Mr. Nehru and Dr. Nkrumah must have seemed a fatal weakness in the Western front. What better than to push Britain into the Common Market behind Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle and at the same time open the British Commonwealth to easier penetration of United States' goods and capital. With Britain's economy in crisis and the pound sterling dependent on subventions from the International Monetary Fund, what choice had Mr. Macmillan than to apply for membership? It is still not certain that the terms of entry will be ac-

ceptable to the British Parliament, where the extremes of right and left are united against the Market. The entry of Norway and Denmark is even less certain. Both countries have rather fresh memories of living in a federation of Europe under German leadership.

Those who believe that a united Western Europe can become a real force for peace rely on the influence of Britain inside the Community to soften the extreme anti-Soviet positions of Adenauer and de Gaulle, and to insure that German leadership in a tightly knit United States of Europe is dissipated in a much looser Western Europe confederation. This is the same argument that was put forward in Labor circles for Britain's continued membership in NATO. But we have found again and again that it is precisely the NATO commitment that has tied Britain to policies that bring ever closer the nuclear disaster, above all over Berlin.

As in economic affairs, so in the supreme issue of war and peace, Britain's survival depends not on what happens in Europe, but on the development of a world-wide movement. It must be emphasized here that what is proposed is not a third bloc of Britain, EFTA and the Commonwealth, but the development of Britain's association with these two groups of nations to reduce the centripetal attraction of the two great nuclear power blocs. So long as the pull of the two blocs remains, the danger of the arms race increases. In every great crisis, it is to the neutrals that we have to turn for solutions. But the neutrals are perilously weak; for they are poor and depend on both great blocs for economic aid.

For Britain to join the Common Market is to desert the neutrals not only in Europe and the Commonwealth but throughout the world. Instead, Britain should stay out of the Common Market and rally the neutral nations to a program of positive neutralism. On the economic front this would involve all the measures mentioned earlier for aiding the industrialization of the under-developed world — guarantees of long term markets, commodity stabilization agreements, economic aid from the rich to the poor, a concerted attack through GATT on the Common Market external tariff wall and many other measures carried out through the United Nations Economic Commissions and the other international agencies. Politically, this would mean the strengthening of support for the United Nations at its center and throughout the world and for the search for peaceful international solutions to the most critical world problems. Only by strengthening neutralist opinion, not only in the neutral nations, but inside the nuclear powers themselves, can the danger of a nuclear holocaust be avoided.

It is not impossible that the Labor Party could win an election on a program of social planning and positive neutralism such as has been outlined. Even a Conservative government can be pushed in this direction. But the essential condition for either event is that we keep out of the Common Market.

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For Britain's Entry

eric
heffer



THE LABOR MOVEMENT in Britain finally awoke to the problem of the European Common Market when the Conservative Government applied for admission. Prior to that time, the Trade Union Congress (T.U.C.) and the Labor Party paid it scant attention. This was a typical example of British insularity which permeates all walks of life, including the supposedly internationalist labor movement.

The discussion of the Common Market immediately revealed wide divergences, with traditional Right-Left attitudes abandoned. For example, the rightwing Labor M.P., Douglas Jay, one of the more bril-

liant exponents of revisionism, is bitterly opposed to Britain's entry, whilst the life-long left-winger, Bob Edwards, M.P., is for entry — a viewpoint shared by the writer — and also Woodrow Wyatt, M.P., of Liberal-Labor alliance fame.

The official position of the Party is summed up in the resolution carried at the Blackpool Conference in October 1961 as follows:

The Conference does not approve Britain's entry into the Common Market unless guarantees protecting the position of British Agriculture and Horticulture, the E.F.T.A. [European Free Trade Area] countries and and the Commonwealth are obtained, and Britain retains the power of using public economic ownership and planning as measures to ensure social progress within the United Kingdom. This Conference also calls on the National Executive Committee to convene a meeting of Socialist leaders of Western Europe and Commonwealth countries to discuss the effects of the Common Market.

This resolution had the support of the National Executive of the Labor Party. A resolution calling for unreserved support for joining the Common Market was defeated, while another resolution which flatly rejected Britain's entry was astutely withdrawn and remitted for consideration to the National Executive.

This position of fence-sitting was not acceptable to the T.U.C. which went much further by issuing a statement in the name of the General Council, a statement subsequently endorsed by the T.U.C. Annual Congress. The key section of the statement said the General Council "agree in principle with the Government's decision to open negotiations with the E.E.C. [European Economic Community] with a view to joining the Community, but insist that satisfactory arrangements must be made to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of E.F.T.A."

Of immense importance in the T.U.C. statement was the paragraph on social policy:

The T.U.C. was not originally in favor of the social harmonization provisions of the Rome Treaty, largely on the grounds that they could lead to State encroachment on issues (such as equal pay) which are traditionally settled in Britain by collective bargaining and that the improvement of social standards in Britain might be held back by the inferior standards then existing on the Continent.

The General Council have, however, been compelled by the intransigence of employers to ask the Government to ratify the I.L.O. Convention on Equal Pay (which could involve legislation), while social standards have improved considerably in recent years in the E.E.C. countries and are not now — with the exception of Italy — markedly inferior to those in Britain. The harmonization of social standards must be used as an instrument for securing further progress by Britain in this field.

A resolution calling upon the T.U.C. to oppose entry was heavily defeated with no less a trade union leader than Frank Cousins putting his weight behind the General Council policy.

The position of the Labor Party has not changed at all since Blackpool. It is still firmly on the fence. This fact is underlined by James Callaghan, M.P., presently front-bench speaker on economic affairs for the Parliamentary Labor Party, in an article in *The Statist* of February 16, 1962 in "Labor's Plan for Prosperity," in which he ignores the question of the Common Market until the last paragraph and then deals with it in the following offhand manner:

Finally what of the Common market? This article has been written without reference to the current negotiations. I know that many people believe the die is cast and we are on our way in. For myself, I suspend judgment. Having been told originally that there is no alternative if Britain is to enjoy a healthy economic future, I am now told that our economic troubles will remain whether we go in or stay out (this I accept); and some say that the economic advantages and disadvantages are pretty equally balanced.


Richard Crossman, M.P., last year's Chairman of the Party, put the position in somewhat different terms in the *New Statesman* of July 28, 1961:

A Labor Government taking over from the Tories would certainly have to negotiate with the Six in order to find terms of close and continuous co-operation with Western Europe. The issue in fact is not whether negotiations are to begin but what the attitude and aims of the negotiators should be.

The Labor Party, he said, was divided along the following broad lines:

There are socialists who see Britain's role as the center of a Commonwealth outside Europe. There are others who believe that the Commonwealth is bound to decline during the next ten years and that it is futile to try to build Socialism in one country of 52 million inhabitants. They see our role inside Europe organizing a federal European opposition, which in due course could hope to socialize the whole Common Market.

As with Callaghan and his suspension of judgment, Crossman makes his personal position clear by saying, "Most of us, I suspect, adopt a position somewhere between these extremes."



THE CASE AGAINST BRITAIN'S ENTRY, has been developed along many lines, ranging from economic arguments, through political objections, to downright chauvinism. *Tribune*, the Leftwing weekly, and V.F.S. (Victory for Socialism Group) in its statement against the Common Market, have used arguments which are a disgrace to Socialist internationalism, and I say this despite being a supporter on practically all issues of both the journal and V.F.S. The most serious pamphlet, from a socialist standpoint, opposing entry, has been that written by Michael Barratt Brown and John Hughes and issued by the "New Left."

The pamphlet, *Britain's Crisis and the Common Market* begins with an analysis of the decline of the British economy. Figures given prove beyond doubt that the British Government has been an abject failure. The Balance of Payments Deficit has risen, overseas investments by British firms have been at the expense of high interest rates in Britain and a piling up of short-term debt. Exports have declined, and until recently all planning has been rejected. Barratt Brown and Hughes argue that entry into the E.E.C. for the British Government is "a heaven-sent escape from responsibility for them." The question they pose is, "Will the Common Market solve Britain's crisis?"

Their answer is quite clear, when they say:

We need to sum up the very real loss of markets that would be the corollary of the possible gains made inside the Common Market. There would be losses in E.F.T.A. and losses in the Sterling Area, as the result of the reduced earnings of trading partners in both markets. A 5% cut in these markets where we sell more than half our exports would have to be made up by a 20% addition in the Common Market where we sell a little over an eighth of our exports, in order to stay in the same place. Could we in fact raise our sales in the Common Market by more than 20%? It would certainly take time and in the meantime there would be a flood of imports to face. And this would come just when Britain's Balance of payments is looking weaker than it has looked for 20 years. . . . It is not only the horticulturists and the investors in Commonwealth manufacturing and food trades, and the small inefficient firms in Britain that need to fear our entry into the European Community. The British working people should fear it like the plague and do everything within their power to find and impose upon the Government an alternative strategy for Britain's crisis.

The alternatives they propose are many and varied and come under two main headings: (A) First steps. (B) Longer term policy. As a first step they suggest: (1) A guarantee of the pre-devaluation purchasing power of the Sterling Balances of overseas Sterling Area countries; (2) A major reduction of U.K. Tariffs to E.F.T.A. members and quotas imposed on

Commonwealth manufacturers. They propose, on the Home Front, measures to insure that the above proposals can be effective.

On a longer term basis, at home, they propose: (1) a taxation policy which will stimulate growth and ease the burden on the lower income groups, (2) planning priorities, (3) physical controls, and (4) research and development. On the external front they propose a policy which they suggest is in line with Positive Neutralism. They advocate an All-European Treaty, a special United Nations Fund for Economic Development to assist industrialization of the underdeveloped areas, and also suggest that the newly formed Council of G.A.T.T. (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) should be strengthened.

Actually, the solution offered is very little different in the long run than that of the Common Market itself. To offset the Common Market competition, the authors propose that "E.F.T.A. and the Commonwealth have to construction some common wall, even if only at a low average of the present tariffs around themselves, if their association is to have the same cutting edge that the Common Market has."

When one cuts through all the economic jargon, the facts, figures, statistics of all kinds, it basically comes down to two things: first, the Common Market is dominated by capitalist monopolies; second, the governments of the Common Market countries are reactionary and see the Common Market as a means to perpetuate the Cold War, strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance, keep socialism out of Europe and keep capitalism going for all time.

On page 35 of the Barrett-Brown and Hughes pamphlet they said, "In home affairs the governments of the Six states are opposed to social ownership, repressive of communist activity and dominated by Big Business interests." It is pertinent to ask, where does this picture differ from that of the Tory Party in Britain? I cannot quite understand the continuous reference to the Communists either. Portugal is an integral part of E.F.T.A. and since when were the Communists, or any other opposition Party or group, allowed to function in that country?

To pose the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. against the Common Market is to pose bad red wine against bad white wine. There is little to choose between the two, and such reasoning has nothing to do with a socialist approach to the problem. Whether Britain is in or out of the Common Market, whether we head or do not head the Commonwealth, is really beside the point. It will not change the present character of British society, it does not remove control from the hands of the capitalist ruling-class. Surely, more long-sighted reasons must be sought, for an answer as socialists, to our dilemma.

Earlier in the pamphlet, the authors say, "In any case the 1960's are not going to be dominated by the affairs of Europe, but by the struggle of the under-developed countries to emerge from poverty and economic dependence; by that and by the dynamic growth of the economies of the Soviet bloc."

There are a number of points here that need to be taken up. First, it is now 1962, and certainly the affairs of Europe have been prominent in the

1960's, up to now. Germany, and Berlin in particular, has been consistently in the forefront of world affairs. Second, Russia and the Soviet bloc countries are essentially a European question, and what happens there must have decisive effects within Europe as a whole. Third, to write Europe off is to act foolishly and dangerously, apart from showing a lack of confidence in the European working class movement. Yet this is precisely what all the British Labor opponents of the Common Market do. They practically write off the European working class and Trade Union movement almost as if they do not exist.

It is interesting to note that all the unions in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) within the Common Market countries critically support the Common Market idea, while striving to change it in their interests. The Catholic unions equally support it. The Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.) oppose the Common Market, with one important and significant exception, that of the General Confederation of Italian Workers (G.C.I.L.) which issued at one of the World Congresses of the W.F.T.U. a document giving the reasons why it supported the European Common Market, and urged trade union unity within its boundaries, irrespective of political coloration and religious persuasion.

ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS which opponents strongly use is that if Britain entered the Common Market, she could not, in the event a Labor Government is elected, nationalize her basic industries, because this is not permitted under the Rome Treaty. This is an exaggeration. It should be remembered that both in France and Italy, there are important elements of public ownership in the motor, engineering, steel, aircraft, shipbuilding and oil industries, as well as services like railways. In fact, some of the countries in E.E.C. have a higher proportion of public ownership than Britain. It is not likely that this trend towards nationalization will diminish. The recent Papal Encyclical clearly accepts public ownership, and to a large extent fits in with Fanfani's program, which he has just pushed through the Italian Christian-Democratic Party.

The Rome Treaty is entirely neutral on the question of ownership of industry, apart from saying that it should be subject to the same conditions of fair competition as privately controlled industry. Even Barrett-Brown and Hughes say: "The solutions offered in the pamphlet [as quoted above. —E.H.] fully accept the necessity for making British industry competitive in a world of equals."

I believe it would be wrong for British Labor to oppose entry into the Common Market on the grounds that it is dominated by capitalist politicians and has competition as its basic motive. De Gaulle and Adenauer are reactionary politicians; so, too, is Harold Macmillan. Europe, however, has a socialist movement, although, it is true, it is at the moment disoriented and disorganized. The British unions and the Labor Party are the largest socialist organizations in Europe. They could, by being inside the Common Market, profoundly change the political and trade union atmosphere. They could help to give the European working class a common policy. In the Trade Union sphere the T.U.C. could give a lead by

calling together all Trade Unions, Catholic, Socialist and Communist, and urge that a common strategy be worked out against what is now likely to be a common set of employers. Politically, the Labor Party could bring the socialist forces together, seeking ultimately complete socialist control of the European Parliament, which must of necessity go through a period of transformation within the next few years. G.D.H. Cole urged that a Socialist Party of Europe be built. Surely entry into the Common Market would speed its development.

It is true that at the moment the Common Market countries are committed to N.A.T.O. So, too, are some E.F.T.A. countries and Britain herself. Actually, inside the E.E.C., with a Labor government in Britain, we could influence E.E.C. countries towards a policy of disengagement which basically is the only real solution to Europe's political problems. With Britain in E.E.C., she could offset the growth of West German military and economic domination of Europe which is a decided danger at the present time.

British socialists could work towards E.E.C. becoming a neutralist European force, a third bloc which would keep the two present Cold War blocs apart. As socialists we should face the facts of life.

Capitalism has not collapsed, either economically or politically, as predicted by most Marxists at the end of the Second World War. In fact, it has gained a new lease on life. The growth of world trade has increased the volume of trade between the highly developed countries, and has increased expansion within the countries which have participated. The European Common Market has clearly shown that there is a group among highly placed bourgeois economists who recognize that modern productive powers cannot be fully developed within national boundaries. They require a larger market area, which is forthcoming in such projects as the European Common Market.

What should be the attitude of socialists to this? The same as our attitude to the change within capitalism from competition to monopoly. Monopoly was an inevitable development of competition. So, too, is the demand for European economic integration an inevitable development of the continual existence of capitalism in Europe. Europe cannot continue to exist under modern terms, as national states; the productive requirements will not allow this. Britain in the past, because of her peculiar position as the dominant country of a huge colonial Empire, was able to extract from its possessions cheap raw materials which it later converted into manufactured goods and sold back to its colonies at a high rate of profit. With its previous colonial possessions achieving both political and economic independence, Britain's economic position naturally deteriorated.

BRITAIN IS ACTUALLY FACED with four alternatives:

(A) It can lose its identity by completely linking up with the U.S.A. — becoming a satellite of that country. (Some say this is already true, but that is an overstatement.)

(B) It can become part of the Soviet bloc (which is what the C.P. would like, and what their East-West Trade demand has as a first step),


integrating its economy with theirs, and ultimately becoming politically subjected to Soviet policies.

(C) It can hope to continue as the head of a Commonwealth, which is rapidly disintegrating and when African countries, in particular, gain freedom they look to solutions for economic and political problems outside of Commonwealth relations. It should be obvious to all that as the Pan-Africa idea grows new African states will begin to develop an African Common Market, with their internal customs arrangements and external protective tariffs.

(D) Britain can enter the European Common Market, become part of the vast Market of over 200 million and play a part in influencing European politics, perhaps decisively.

As a socialist and internationalist, I favor the last. The path is not likely to be easy, but it does offer hope for the revival of European socialism as a serious force. Some of us have long argued that a United Socialist States of Europe is a necessity. Certainly the Common Market falls short of our requirements; it is neither a United States nor socialist, but it does present the possibilities of an advance toward our goal. We can begin to get the people of Europe to think as Europeans, and the working class to recognize their identity of interests. It is because I believe that to oppose entry to the Common Market is an abdication of responsibility as a socialist and a retreat from political realism, that I support entry, and urge that our starting point begin from there. This is not to accept the Rome Treaty as sacrosanct, or capitalism as the permanent society, but as the point of departure, so that finally Europe is socialized and the tragedy of two world wars not repeated.

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Bertie Brecht In New York

BROADWAY IS NOT REALLY a theatrical star of the first magnitude, for it fails to generate sufficient heat and light. Certainly enough there are occasional eruptions when shadows are cast abroad but this is rare. New York rather depends upon the occasional arrival of foreign meteor showers which, passing briefly through its heavy atmosphere, brightly blaze. The Brecht Comet has most recently blazed into view and the natives seem assured of night observations for some time to come.

To become specific, a showcase presentation of the playwright's work and personality opened on the third of January. Actually *Brecht on Brecht* had been tried out by ANTA the preceding November but the January date marks the beginning of an impact and tremor which may eventually be recorded on seismographs throughout the land, perhaps in Hollywood too.

All of New York's producers and directors seemingly had gathered in the little Theatre de Lys to have the fabled German author's work read and sung to them, and having heard it, they must have rushed from their seats to the nearest phone booth where they rang up Brecht's agents and demanded an option, any option. The modestly mounted production surely marks a watershed in the history of Brecht plays on the New York stage. *Mother Courage*, *Arturo Ui*, *Mahagonny* and *A Man's A Man* were already said to be waiting in the wings to make their entrance and



brush the exhausted talents of an Anouilh or Rattigan from Broadway boards. While earlier productions of *Jungle of Cities* and *The Threepenny Opera* were successful, the showcase was special for it was aimed at the American theatre's power elite. It was intended as the nudge which would bring the problematic Brecht in from the prairie university stages, and up from the cramped Off-Broadway houses, into the plush dens of Broadway itself. The aim seemed achieved, for Brecht almost immediately became the hottest property in town. Whereupon it became essential to ask: what did the big Broadway money see in *Brecht on Brecht*? What was the "image" they received and will be likely to perpetuate? What had Brecht been made to say about Brecht?

The little platform stage on Christopher Street was bare of curtains. One entered to see the technicians seated exposed on the constructivist stage, if that is what we should call a simple carpentry job. From one side of the acting area a huge photo of Brecht stared uninterruptedly at the audience, the visage ironic and shrewd. Elsewhere were crudely lettered signs, which, when lowered, bore titles and translations for scenes and songs. There were simple benches and a table. A technician cried out, in a commanding

and presumably a disillusioning or alienating voice: "Actors!" and the show began.

When Brecht's voice was not heard singing or speaking a halting English from the tape machine (visible, of course) the actors read and sang brief songs, poems, tales and scenes. Lotte Lenya performed magnificently as she always does, with her gestures perfectly chosen and infinitely refined, with her biting intonation and the adult glamor of her back-to-the-wall romanticism. She performed those songs from *The Threepenny Opera* with which she has become identified and crowned her performance with the Mother Courage Song, her limbs simulating the gait of unrelieved suffering in an unforgettable image.

The remainder of the cast was less successful yet perhaps more representative of the future awaiting Brecht on the Broadway stage. There was the undistinguished but unpretentious competence of George Voskovec and Anne Jackson, and the total unsuitability of Michael Wager. In general, however, the climate of America appears to engender the following aberrations in Brechtian functioning:

Onslaught of Sentimentality. This was most evident in the gaspingly tearful rendition of the Jewish Wife scene by Viveca Lindfors, which was the evening's inept grand finale. It was notable elsewhere in the frequent pauses which the actors enforced upon the evening as they awaited the audience's emotional assent to this or that sentiment.

Destruction of Distance. A Brecht song or poem ought to retain its difficult and alien contours. Like a painting it must also be displayed

at sufficient distance and in its proper frame, away from other distracting art works. One must make the effort of coming to this work on its own terms. Yet the aesthetic distance and uniqueness were crudely trampled by all save Lenya. The material was gotten out in small-talk conversational tone, often enough with an ingratiatingly intended grin, making one feel at a cocktail party and talking to someone very intent upon making an impression. The intent was to disarm with mawkish naïveté. "Yissir folks," one could almost hear, "we's here to repre-sent for you that genial feller from upstate Germany, that there lovable shy laughable sly old fox Bertie Brecht."

George Tabori's translations did not help. Wrongly meant to conversationalize and perhaps hipsterize Brecht, they ended in trivializing him. The playwright must be embraced at arm's length, for he cuts his coat jaggedly and leaves in needles, and those who ignore this do us no service. The cast was not without forewarning on the matter of reducing Brecht to the everyday, for early in the evening they read Brecht's letter to American actors (without mentioning that it was to the left-wing Theatre Union concerning their mistreatment of *The Mother* in United Front days). In this letter Brecht warned against some of the very vices practiced by director Gene Frankel and his cast. Could they not apply the lesson? Or was the temptation to accommodate potential buyers too strong, to the point when only the label "Bertolt Brecht" might remain of the original product?

Ideological Tampering. Brecht's ideology was tailored for American

consumption by means of strategic omissions. Brecht had himself made Marxism the cornerstone of his opinion and his artistic vision. Though he was a sly one in getting his work communicated, it was extraordinary to hear how uninformative *Brecht on Brecht* was on certain aspects of Brecht. The genuine article was once subpoenaed by the Un-American Activities Committee, chose East Germany over West Germany to live in, would have been called in current parlance a consymp, and frequently sent cold shivers down the spines of his informed liberal admirers.

The Americanized Brecht emerged from this production as someone sympathetic to the downtrodden but hell on commissars, a commiserator with Hitler victims and foe of the warmakers, and certainly a man who never would employ such indiscreet words as Class Struggle, Socialism, Communism, Exploiter, Colonialism, Strike or Revolution. It was with wonder that one saw Brecht made out to be, of all strange beasts, a liberal. No one slipped and gave the awkward truth away either by spoken word or in the program. No one said that the recording of Brecht's voice was made at Washington Communist hearings. The most innocuous of poems and scenes from plays were selected. Brecht also had written, of course, the sharp words on commissars and it was good to have them—as it would have been good to have his sharp words on capitalism.

With reluctance one has to fore-

cast that more of the same Americanizing of Brecht is to come. The investors' cash must be protected, and beyond that, sentimentality and a resistance to mature treatment of politics have long been characteristic of the American stage. It would be absurd to think that it will happen differently for this single socialist playwright. The process will not be difficult and many people around the American theatre are past masters of deradicalization, having practiced it upon themselves; it will be simple enough to pass on the benefits to Herr Brecht, should the Brecht heirs prove complaisant. One noted the presence of numerous such adaptive spirits in attendance at *Brecht on Brecht*. Thanks to them, the evening's great laugh of self-recognition greeted the tale of one Herr Keuner, a fellow who for years accommodated himself to Authority in servile fashion and practiced, to justify himself, what is euphemistically called inner emigration. The tale found receptive ears; it was what these spectators wanted to hear.

Brecht would perhaps have smiled quizzically at the idea of casting Anthony Quinn in the lead role of *Arturo Ui* (which, one hears, will indeed come to pass). Perhaps Brecht would even have okayed the scheme.

For he well knew that the truth can be purveyed by unlikely means. To get across was the important thing. Yet it would be well if the version of Brecht given to America proves not too compromised.

LEE BAXANDALL has previously written on Brecht for *The Tulane Drama Review*, *Studies on the Left* (of which he is an editor) and elsewhere. He has recently returned from a six week visit to the Brecht Theatre in Berlin.

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Paul Jacobs

A Political Baedeker To Israel

THE FIRST RED FLAG I saw was flying over the door of a building in Acco, the ancient walled city on the Mediterranean, north of Haifa. "I'm glad to see that socialism is still alive in Israel," I said to the humorless man who was taking me on a tour of the area.

"Mr. Jacobs," he said worriedly, "please don't write that Israel is a socialist country. We need to attract outside investments and that kind of talk just frightens people away."

I don't know whether my guide's worry was legitimate, but, in any case, despite the red flag, it would be wrong to write that Israel is a socialist society. It is not. And yet, neither is it capitalist in the tradi-

tional sense. Like everything else about the country, its economy, too, is confusing, and not easy to define or explain.

Of all the many confusions in Israel, the most difficult for an outsider to understand is the country's politics. I went there better equipped than most visitors because I once was an organizer for the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, and since Ben Gurion runs Israel the same way that Dubinsky runs the ILG, I was on somewhat familiar ground. Perhaps an even more helpful part of my past were the years I spent in various Trotskyite groups, whose sliver group polemics were good training for learning something about the complicated politics of Israel.

NORMALLY, AT LEAST A DOZEN political parties, including three small Arab groups, compete for the Israel citizens' allegiance. The competition is carried on either through the party organizations or with the great number of institutions they control.

The spectrum of opinion represented by the political parties and unions is not a nice neat one, with clearly defined left to right groups. The first division that must be made is between the secular and religious parties, but even that is not simple. Generally, the three religious parties are united in their desire to make Israel more of a clerical state, but they differ somewhat in their economic stands. Two of the religious parties, the Mizfahi and the Agudat Israel, have their own labor wings, too, which is very confusing because the Agudat Israel, is, by socialist standards, militantly

reactionary on economic questions as well as religious ones. Thus, there are conflicts not only between the Agudat Israel and the non-religious parties but also between the party and its more labor-oriented division, the Poalei Agudat Israel.

Among the non-religious parties, the divisions are a little clearer, at least, and so a little easier to understand. At the extreme right is the Herut, whose supporters come from the dissolved Irgun and Stern terrorist groups, followers of the old Revisionist movement that had been led by Jabotinsky and those new immigrants to Israel who believe they are victims of discrimination. Herut opposes strikes, the Histadrut, and favors unfettered free enterprise and active expansion in foreign policy. At one point, Herut wanted a preventive war against the Arabs. In the last election, Herut received the second highest number of votes.

Very close behind Herut in the number of votes cast for it, but quite far away from it politically, is the new Liberal Party, organized in 1961 as a fusion of the Progressive and the General Zionist. The General Zionists were in favor of "free private enterprise and the achievement of economic independence through increased attraction of investment capital" while the Progressive Party called itself a "non-Socialist liberal party with both middle and working class membership . . ." The new Liberal Party has a little of both its parents' programs, but not yet much of its own. It received only 1300 less votes than Herut in the 1961 election, and has the same number of seats, 17, in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament. It is vaguely comparable to the Liberal Party of England.



Next, just left of center, is Mapai, the largest party in Israel—the one that dominates all the country's institutions. This is the party of Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Ben Zvi, and most of the other Israelis whose names are familiar outside the country.

Mapai was founded in 1930 when the Poale Zionist organization, originally Marxist in orientation, joined with the Hapoal Hatzair, a non-Marxist labor group committed more to a religion of the land. Even before the merger of the two groups, the bulk of the Poale Zionists had gradually moved from a Marxist view of the world to one not precisely identifiable in such terms. Today, Mapai's political position in an American context, is roughly like that of *Americans for Democratic Action*, and because Mapai sets so much of the country's tone, Israel could be described as ADAland.

Achdut Ha'Avoda, the smallest of the three labor parties in Israel, originally was the left wing of Mapai but then split from Mapai in 1944 and four years later joined with the much more doctrinaire Hashomer Hatzair to form the Mapam Party. Inside Mapam, Achdut Ha'Avoda found itself acting as an ineffective right wing fighting the pro-Soviet orientation of the Hashomer group, and so it finally split again from Mapam as it had from Mapai. On most domestic questions, Achdut Ha'Avoda is hardly distinguishable from Mapai, although its trade union

and foreign affairs orientation has grown closer to Mapam's after that party, under the pressure of Soviet anti-Semitism, shifted uneasily from its former pro-Russian position.

At the far left of the spectrum is Mapam, which calls itself "a left wing Zionist Socialist Party, aiming at the ingathering of the Jewish people, the realization of socialism and the training of Jewish youth in Israel and the Diaspora for pioneering settlement." Mapam is still a class struggle party, still committed to Marxism and Leninism, and rather unhappy that it cannot defend more vigorously the Soviet Union. Almost all of Mapam's strength comes from its kibbutzim, which were settled in the 1920s and 1930s by the Hashomer Hatzair youth groups, including some from the United States. Mapam still has a firm commitment to the theory that the agricultural kibbutz workers will lead the urban proletariat to socialism. In Mapam, the contradictions of labor and socialist Zionism are found in their sharpest form.

The Communist Party can be quickly dismissed although its vote rose from 2.8% to 4.1% due primarily to the response of Arab dissatisfaction with Mapai and not a reflection of an increase in conscious Communist strength in the country. In a country based on Zionism in some form, no party can overcome the handicap of being saddled with defending the Soviet Union's anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish position.

The Arab parties, too, do not represent a significant force in Israeli politics, although 60% of the more than 250,000 Arabs in the country usually vote for them. But the three Mapai-affiliated Arab parties usually get about 90% of the Arab vote, and so it is that acquiescent rather than dissident Israeli Arabs sit in the Knesset. In a land where biting political jokes are directed against everybody, the Mapai Arab Knesset members are frequently the butt of such stories as that of the member who fell asleep in his Knesset seat and was awakened after the session had ended by the cleaning woman. "I vote yes," he mumbled.

I THINK IT IMPORTANT to deal at this point with some fundamental, overall problems of ADAland growing from the attempt in Israel to combine socialist principles with Zionist methods.

From its birth in the late 1890s, labor Zionism, a broad heading covering a wide range of socialist and semi-socialist ideas, was in conflict with Marxist orthodoxy. The absence of a Jewish peasantry and proletariat was a clear demonstration to the orthodox Marxists that no Jewish nation existed. But "Socialism will solve the Jewish problem only in the remote future," wrote Nachman Syrkin, a Russian Jew who was the founder of the Zionist Socialist Party. "First of all, the Jews suffer from a hatred which is unique; secondly, the class struggle cannot help the Jewish middle class or intelligentsia. The only practicable alternative for the Jews is emigration, especially from Eastern Europe. Zionism can be accepted by all Jewry in spite of class differences. The form of the Jewish state is the only debatable issue involved in Zionism and we must struggle to see that it is a socialist state."

Labor Zionism simultaneously was a puzzle and a challenge to the

Marxists of the early 20th century years. "We were surprised to learn that the whole trend of their social mind was directed on idealistic lines," wrote Lev Martov in his *Memoirs* describing the Jewish socialist youth. Martov then pointed out "that their socialism bears the imprint of abstract utopianism, and that the idea of the class struggle was absolutely alien to them. While we looked upon them as men who had to move the whole working class, as a tool in the hands of the revolutionary organization, they considered themselves as individuals who have outgrown the masses and created a new cultural milieu."

Martov's reaction of surprise at these young East European Jews' "trend of social mind" was not shared by the leaders of the Bund, the militant Jewish socialist organization established in 1893, the same year that Herzl called the first World Zionist Congress together. Thousands of East European Jews joined the Bund, especially in the Polish and Russian towns where Jewish industrial workers labored 14 and 16 hours a day in filthy, dark factories. The Bund scorned Zionism, taking the position instead that Jewish socialists should stay in the countries where they lived, to fight there for the establishment of the socialist state.

"Farewell and don't look back," Medem, a Bund leader bitterly said to the Jewish youth who had started emigrating to Palestine early in the 1900's. "Turn your back on our life, on our struggle, on our joys and sorrows. You have decided to desert the Galuth."

Before World War I began, nearly 30,000 labor Zionist pioneers, most of them young, infused with different degrees of socialist ideology and spurred on by the pogroms of the period, made their trek to Palestine. Many of them stayed only a little while, appalled by the little promise the promised land seemed to offer. Palestine was an arid, underdeveloped, poor, colonial country—a land strewn with huge boulders and gashed by dry gullies. Jaffa, the port city at the time was a crowded, filthy slum, and Jerusalem, beautiful in the distance, lost a great deal of its attractiveness at closer view. Down in the south, there was only an ancient, brutally hot desert, inhabited by wandering Beduin tribes.

Politically, the country was also a desert, under the corrupt rule of the Turkish sultans who for more than 400 years had exploited Palestine to help maintain the Ottoman empire. Most of the Arabs in the country were uneducated illiterates, living in a village feudal system dominated by their chieftains. The Jews who were in Palestine before the labor Zionists came were either planters, settled in agricultural villages and concerned only about their crops, or the orthodox, religious Jews of Jerusalem and Safed who turned blank eyes to anything political before returning to croon over their Talmudic studies.

It is hard to exaggerate the physical difficulties faced by these youthful pioneers of the Second Aliyah ("Aliyah" literally translated means a "going up," but to the Zionists it means only emigration to Israel.) But the physical handicaps under which they suffered, because of their inexperience and the bad living conditions, were not as important to them as those political handicaps inherent in their emigration to Palestine.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN the new Jewish settlers and the Arabs is an important example of a dilemma that has never ceased tearing at labor Zionism, one which has had important consequences for the state of Israel and world peace. As socialists, either of a Marxist orientation or influenced more by Rousseau and Tolstoy, the political missionaries from Eastern Europe were believers in the brotherhood of man, including the Arab man. As labor Zionists, they were equally committed to creating a Jewish working class, rooted to the land, in the physical as well as the political sense.*

The effort of the labor Zionists to till the soil with their very own hands led them into direct and immediate conflict with the Arabs, from whom they were separated by gulfs of culture, language, religion, and tradition. Since there were very few jobs available, the new settlers had to compete with Arab workers, who generally were employed at less pay and so were more frequently hired by Jewish and non-Jewish employers. This continuous economic competition frequently ended in direct physical clashes between the Arab workers and the labor Zionists who were committed to "Kibbush Avoda," the "Conquest of Work." "Work" as it was used in the phrase was a euphemism for jobs.

Just as the desire to create a Jewish working class led to a permanent strain with the Arab workers, so, too, did the labor Zionists' deep, almost religious commitment to the land create another set of conflicts with much more of the Arab world. The Arabs of Palestine believed the land was theirs and resented bitterly what they believed to be a Jewish encroachment upon their territories. And they did more than resent—the Arab villager and the Arab chief frequently joined together to fight the Jews, both in the old orange grove villages of the planters and in the strange new settlements of the labor Zionists, the collective kibbutzim, where there was no private property and the moshavim, which were agricultural villages operating on cooperative principles.

AS A COROLLARY TO the Arab-Jewish conflict, it was only a few years after the emigration started that the labor Zionists took up their own arms against the Arabs in defense of what they believed to be Jewish rights to and on the land. From the first group of 100 Jewish guerrilla fighters called HaShomer, The Watchmen, has grown a national military tradition that can be traced through the Haganah, the Histadrut's underground army, and the Palmach, the Haganah's Rangers, to the present highly effective modern Israeli military establishment. There is very little socialist brotherhood of man theory taught the tough, Israeli soldiers; instead, there is far greater emphasis on nationalism and defense against the Arab states still formally at war with Israel.

* "Work will heal us," prophesied Aaron Gordon, a non-socialist labor Zionist, who came to Palestine in 1903 at the age of 48 and became a legend there. "In the center of all our hopes, we must place work; our entire structure must be founded on labor . . . if we do not till the soil with our very own hands, the soil will not be ours—not only ours in a social or in a national but not even a political sense. The land will not be ours and we shall not be the people of the land. Here, then, we shall also be aliens, just as in the lands of the Diaspora where, too, there are Jews who rent land, who buy fields, gardens, orchards and traffic in the fruit of the labor of others."



it may be that there is none possible in the immediate future. If this is true, the unfortunate split in the Israeli socialist personality will continue; for them, the brotherhood of man, in a practical way, cannot include Arabs.

The labor Zionist devotion to achieving Jewish state power in Palestine forced the movement to reject other socialist concepts. The international socialist movement was sundered internally by the fight over whether or not to support the capitalist states embroiled in World War I; this was no problem at all for the labor Zionists. Before the war began, Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi first became Turkish citizens in an effort to win friends for the Jews among the young Turks who had taken over from the Sultan. After the war had started, but before Turkey had picked its side, they asked that a Jewish militia unit be set up in the Turkish Army. After Turkey had decided to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers, Ben Gurion, and Ben Zvi, together with hundreds of other Palestinian Jews, joined the Jewish Legion formed by Jabotinsky inside the British Army.

World War II, of course was immediately assumed by the labor Zionists to be a death struggle against the Nazis, so that once again no issue arose. After World War II, Ben Gurion fought against the group in Mapai, which later joined Mapam, over whether labor Zionist resources were to be poured into the fight for uncontrolled immigration or for getting state power.

The opposition wanted to use the cutting off of immigration by the British to build up world sympathy for Jews and demonstrate the bankruptcy of world imperialism, especially the British variety, while the Ben Gurion group fought successfully for state power first, and then opening the country to immigration.

The pattern that emerges from the commitment of labor Zionism to creating a Jewish state is one of willingness to forego ultimate socialist principles for the sake of tactical advantages in achieving state power. And if a choice had to be made between the possibility of sacrificing the achievement of power because of socialist principles, the leadership of the labor Zionists opted against the principles.

THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT HAS ALSO presented a major paradox, first to socialist Zionist theory and now to the state of Israel. The first successful kibbutz was Degania, a completely socialist settlement, up in the Galilee. There was no private property of any kind, and no wages were paid any of the kibbutz members. But Degania came into existence and survived during its early years only through the assistance given it from the outside, through funds collected from non-socialist or even anti-socialist Jewish sources in Europe and America.

Degania's dependence upon outside support, was a characteristic fact of Jewish life in Palestine. And in a larger matrix, Israel itself is Degania, for despite all the agonizing effort made by the pioneers there, it probably would not have survived either without outside aid. But there are many Israelis who resent their dependence upon the Jews outside of the country, and yet know, realistically, that for a long time in the future they will have to continue living in a state of charity.

Here, too, as with the Arab question, the socialist movement of Israel has no workable answer. Mapam wants unlimited immigration into Israel but opposes aid from abroad, including being against the German reparation payments. It offers no economic program to substitute for the foreign aid essential to the large-scale expenditures involved in immigration. Achdut Ha'Avoda is more ready to accept assistance from the outside "with no political strings," an equally unrealistic approach.

The same backwardness and underdeveloped nature of Palestine that brought about the creation of the kibbutzim and forced the socialists in them to accept help from Jewish capitalists, brought about another very important variation in socialist doctrine: the establishment of the Histadrut in 1920. The Histadrut, now a giant dominating the entire economic life of the country, came into existence because there were not enough employers in Palestine to hire all the Jewish workers who had emigrated. The only alternatives open at the time was either to bring somehow an owner class into existence or have the labor movement itself act as the employer of its members. The latter technique was chosen and the phenomena of the hybrid union-employer was created.

Today, an Israeli worker can live out his entire life, and death, too, beneath the Histadrut umbrella. He votes in a Histadrut election for most of the same parties that run candidates in the Knesset, works for a company owned by Histadrut, at a wage scale set by a union affiliated to Histadrut, lives in a housing project developed by Histadrut where he eats foods marketed by Histadrut, spends his vacations in a Histadrut rest camp, while his children participate in a Histadrut youth organization's activities, and when he is sick, he is taken care of by a Histadrut doctor in a Histadrut hospital. If he dies, his death benefits are paid by Histadrut.

But the Histadrut's great success has also created a great difficulty for the organization and the country. Histadrut plays so strategic a role in national life that its actions have immediate consequences for the whole society. As the biggest union, Histadrut seeks to raise the standards for all workers it represents, not just the 30% it employs.

But since Histadrut is so deeply involved with the government, it must consider whether its wage policy will create inflation. As an employer, too, Histadrut must consider what wages it can pay in its own enterprises without putting an uneconomic burden upon them. Wage problems didn't exist in the first days of the Histadrut because the egalitarian tradition of socialism was still very strong, and there was only a small differential between the wages of the higher and lower skilled workers.

But as the flow of refugees to Israel increased, and more people came, not so much from conviction as from necessity, the socialist egalitarianism of the past was gradually superceded by a drive for more personal rewards. The Histadrut has been fixed on the horns of this dilemma for some years now, unable as yet to find a way to wriggle free of them. The professional groups in Israel, especially the doctors, teachers, and now the engineers, have been attempting to force higher pay scales for themselves and have met with great resistance from both the Histadrut leadership and the government. Here, too, the labor Zionist parties find themselves in a painful paradox: as a socialist group, Mapam, for example, might want to support a push for higher wages, except that increasing wage differentials is contrary to its egalitarian beliefs. Achdut Ha'Avoda, which entered the coalition government with Mapai, and the National Religious Party also finds itself in an awkward position for somewhat the same reasons. Even Mapai, which in the past has most vigorously opposed increasing differentials because of feared inflationary effects, knows that the pressure from the professionals will not ease off.



DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, Israel's internal strains have erupted from below the surface into the open. The Lavon Affair became symbolic of the fight against militarism, censorship and the worship of Ben Gurion. The increasingly tense relationships between the orthodox religious groups and the unorganized non-religious majority have made a literal "crise de Juif" out of the Yossele Schumacher kidnapping. And the recent rash of anti-government and anti-Histadrut strikes has demonstrated how urgent is the problem of wage differentials.

The origins of the Lavon Affair date back to the uncovering of an Israeli spy operation in Egypt when Pinhas Lavon, a Mapai leader, was minister of defense. The secret agents were planning on blowing up some American government buildings, hoping that the U.S. would blame the Egyptians for it, thus creating bad relations between the two governments. But the agents were discovered, by accident or as is far more likely, by betrayal, tried and convicted. Although Israel officially denied knowledge of the plot and accused the Egyptians of a frame-up, Lavon was held

responsible within the government for the debacle and forced to resign, despite his claim that he knew nothing of the plot. For years Lavon, a proud man, smoldered under the public rebuke administered even though Mapai gave him the powerful post of Histadrut secretary-general.

Then in 1958, the dispute about Lavon's responsibility for the security debacle flared up again when charges were made that high Army officers had forged the papers used to prove Lavon's alleged knowledge of the plot. Investigation followed investigation, charges and countercharges flew back and forth until Lavon was finally cleared by a cabinet committee. From the start of the renewed interest in the case Ben Gurion fought Lavon, charging that his actions were anti-Mapai and anti-government. Ultimately, Ben Gurion triumphed but only after resigning as Prime Minister over the cabinet report clearing Lavon. Lavon was removed from his Histadrut post. But the country was torn apart over the Affair, as it was called. There was such serious questioning of Ben Gurion's leadership that new elections were needed.

The issues in the Lavon Affair were confused, as they usually are in such cases. But Ben Gurion's behavior in demanding Lavon's political head, his use of the resignation threat to reverse the cabinet committee report and his blanket defense of the military made the case a focus not only for all the anti-Mapai sentiment in the country, but, more important, for such non-affiliated and even non-political groups as the students, teachers and intellectuals. The case also raised the issue of internal Israeli censorship in a very dramatic fashion for, until almost the end, no one in Israel knew officially the details of the Egyptian episode although it was well publicized in the world press.

Like the Lavon Affair the Schumacher kidnapping has also divided the country into bitter camps. Yossele Schumacher was kidnapped two years ago by his orthodox grandfather and uncle (with the assistance of orthodox Jews living in a moshav) and spirited away from his non-religious parents. For two years, the boy's parents have attempted vainly to get their son back, the grandfather has been in and out of jail, the uncle has fled to England and is now fighting his extradition back to Israel, and some of the villagers involved have also been indicted. This tragedy is not only a personal one for the boy's parents but a political one for the entire country: the orthodox parties have not condemned the kidnapping, the chief rabbi has not condemned it, the orthodox leaders in the Knesset seem far more concerned with the harm the kidnapping has done their public position than with the moral issues involved and the Mapai leaders are forced to support, however reluctantly, their intransigent, intolerant and demanding clerical partner in the coalition government.

The nasty strikes of early 1962 are the index of economic dissatisfaction felt by many groups in Israel, ranging from the highly paid airline pilots to the garbagemen and including the engineers and postmen. However, quite apart from the ideological concepts involved, increasing differentials to favor the more skilled workers or professionals inevitably causes pressure for wage increases from all the workers with consequent inflationary results to the entire economy. And the Histadrut, dominated as it is by

Mapai, must continue walking on a loose tightrope, one end held by its members who clamor for wage increases and the other by the government it supports which opposes wage increases at this time.

No socialist can be really at ease in Israel. It is infuriating for one who believes in religious tolerance and in the value of separating church from state to see even a quasi-socialist party like Mapai cowering in the interests of maintaining power before the arrogance of the intolerant orthodox Jews, many of whom do not even accept the existence of Israel as a state. It is maddening that a society conceived in high ideals should treat its Arab members as shabbily as has Israel in the past. The internal censorship in Israel, justified by the leaders in the name of security, as a censorship is always, is an ugly limitation on freedom, and the excessive adulation of the armed forces puts one's teeth on edge in Israel as much as in any other country. But, and a big but it is too, there are so many admirable features in Israeli life which I have not discussed in this article that the socialist visitor is buffeted continually between the hateful and the magnificent.

However, the Israeli experience with socialism must be evaluated in less passionate terms than "hateful" and "magnificent." Some failures of labor Zionism are inherent in the core of its theory: because of the Zionist belief in a Jewish mission, conflict with Arab nationalism and the development of a military system were unavoidable. Other failures, equally deplorable, were the product of the era; if there had been no Nazism or if the Nazi refugees could have gone elsewhere, labor Zionism would have been saved agonizing choices in achieving statehood. And finally, some of the labor Zionist blunders were avoidable: Ben Gurion is a great man but it was not essential to Israel's development that he be accepted as a Messianic figure, not subject to mortal criticism.

It is conceivable that if the present young generation in Israel continues to display as little interest in ideology as it does at the moment, socialism might someday become a dirty word there. Perhaps we will discover that socialist theory is more acceptable and useful in an underdeveloped society's early period than after industrialization and stability have taken place.

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Labor and Politics

Patrick Gorman

THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF emphasis on politics by the American labor movement, until recently, gave it unique status among the world's democratic unions. Since Gompers' time, American unions primarily have stressed their economic demands. Trade unions overseas, on the other hand, have often considered political activity primary. Today, however, among the trade union movements of the non-Communist, industrial nations abroad, there is clearly a tendency to downgrade politics and place greater emphasis on collective bargaining; while, in the United States, unions are becoming increasingly politically conscious, politically active and politically motivated, although organizing and collective bargaining remain their most important activities.

American trade unionism developed a new dimension in the Thirties with the strengthening of existing industrial unions and the rise of others. Organized labor suddenly became directly involved in national life as economic developments which stimulated the growth of industrial unions also impelled the federal government to play an ever greater role in the economic and social life of the nation. Even those unions which had been most apolitical could no longer afford to turn a deaf ear to the national political arena. When a master politician, Franklin D. Roosevelt, became the workers' hero, John L. Lewis might fume at him, some union leaders might continue to deemphasize political action, but the members were political—they were for F.D.R. Today, F.D.R. is, unfortunately, no longer with us and some major industrial unions are declining, but the trend toward union political action is accelerated by the constantly expanding role of the federal government.

The increased role of the government has made union political activity absolutely essential in two distinct areas of labor interest and concern: one directly involves the very existence of unions, their ability to organize and bargain effectively; the other area concerns the unions' ability to obtain social justice and help solve workers' problems in fields where collective bargaining cannot achieve results.

Since the development of labor's new look in the thirties, Congress has passed three highly significant labor laws. The first, the Wagner Act—truly labor's Magna Carta—was the reward of political action which facilitated the magnificent organizing gains of that period. The second, the Taft-Hartley law, passed by Congress in 1947, was the first set of national restrictions on labor unions. No longer did the federal government play the benevolent policeman, the unions' friend, carefully safeguarding their rights. It was now the tough cop. The third was the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. The cop had become tougher, more hostile.

Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin made dramatic headlines. Far less spectacular, but equally harmful, were the actions of the National Labor Relations Board: those little known decisions, to which only the union professionals pay attention, that spell life or death to organizing campaigns, and sometimes to the existence of local unions. And the McClellan Committee hearings, which helped prepare the nation for the Landrum-Griffin Act, demonstrated how politics can be used to turn public opinion against labor.

A recent and alarming development is the policy of the Kennedy Administration, enunciated by Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, calling for active intervention by the federal government in collective bargaining. No longer will the government be simply a mediator attempting to prevent strikes and helping management and labor to reach agreements. Apparently, it will serve as an active third party in negotiations, urging parties into early negotiations and settling the limits of bargaining as it has already done in the steel negotiations. It may tell the negotiators which terms are "inflationary" and which are not; which terms are "in the limit of public interest" and which are not. The federal government is entering a totally new area and the dangers are great.

The examples mentioned reveal the way in which politics has invaded the basic areas of trade union economic activity. A favorite phrase of union representatives in speeches on behalf of COPE (Committee on Political Education) is, "What we win at the bargaining table can be taken away in the legislative halls." This is more than an aphorism. Organizing, collective bargaining, the economic struggles of American trade unions are critically affected and, to some extent, even determined by governmental political decisions.

Let us look at the other area of union concern involving the role of government—social welfare. Many of us dreamed that we would change American national life, righting economic and social wrongs, through building strong trade unions. We have accomplished a great deal, but we would be fools if we became so smug, so unthinking as to believe that our aspirations have been adequately fulfilled, or will be in the near future. Accompanying the progress made, has been the growing realization that organizing and collective bargaining alone cannot effectuate the "new world."

For example, while millions of workers in some industries were organized, the efforts to organize millions of low-paid, intensively exploited workers in other industries met with either limited success or none at all. Or, perhaps, one part of an industry was successfully organized, but another part was not. This failure serves to undercut the conditions of the unionized segment and meant that millions of workers continued to exist on a miserable living standard which could not be raised by unions through collective bargaining. Collective bargaining could not provide the necessary health protection for the people. Collective bargaining could not do much about the legal manifestations of discrimination, prejudice and bigotry. And collective bargaining could have only limited effect on the problem of unemployment.

Thus, if one believes that the labor movement should be a social force

which battles on behalf of the underprivileged, one must realize that it must grapple with social problems beyond the normal concern of collective bargaining. The labor movement now largely recognizes this, which propels it more forcefully into the political arena. Minimum wage legislation, health insurance, housing legislation, civil rights legislation, unemployment compensation, public works programs—all involve political action.

The fact is that organized labor today has become the champion of social welfare legislation largely preempting the role of earlier middle class reform groups which fought, sometimes bled, for such legislation in decades past.

WHAT IS AMERICAN LABOR'S CURRENT role in politics?

Basically, organized labor makes itself felt as a pressure group upon the existing political parties, operating that way when candidates are nominated, and after the successful candidates are in office.

In this manner it functions within the accepted American pattern of political behavior, similar to business, farm and other "interest groups." It has significant influence in the Democratic Party in the North, the mid-West and the West with comparatively little influence among Southern Democrats or in the Republican Party, although unions do operate effectively as lobbyists with some Southerners and GOP Congressmen.

Unions rarely seek to have their members nominated as candidates representing labor. This, I find regrettable, and look forward to the day in which the American workers will have their own political party.

In those areas where labor is strong and politically effective, responsible trade union leaders generally participate in the selection of Democratic candidates. At the very least, they are consulted and have a veto power. This is true, as well, for the selection of Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. At the quadrennial national convention, labor's voice may not be the decisive one—nor does labor always speak with one voice—but it is one of the three most important groups involved in determining the Party's choice. Since 1924, the Democrats have not nominated any Presidential candidate opposed by organized labor. (Vice Presidential candidates are another matter. For example, most of labor opposed the nomination of Lyndon Johnson in 1960.)

In union strongholds, labor plays a major role in campaigning for Democratic candidates, and occasionally Republicans. Through the instrumentality of COPE, unions provide campaign contributions, volunteers, poll watchers and cars for electioneering. Most important, they attempt to get out the union vote.

COPE has become increasingly effective, coming a long way from the days of big talking and press releases. Unfortunately, a few still talk big and think little. Quiet and hard work by labor is winning elections. Registering voters and personal visits to persuade them of the merits of various candidates may not be as glamorous as making grandiose speeches, but has proved infinitely more effective. Lobbying, too, has become a more professional operation as compared to earlier noisy, amateurish techniques.

However, labor's political and legislative activities have realized only a fraction of their potential effectiveness. Participation is spotty; some unions, international or local, do not participate at all. Others do not throw their full weight into the effort.

Unfortunately, unions lack the strength for their views to carry in the councils of the Democratic Party. Even were there not the unhappy alliance of Northern liberals and Southern conservatives, the Democratic Party would remain a coalition of which labor would be only one part—a vital part, to be sure—but only a part. Nevertheless, labor is becoming increasingly wedded to the Democratic Party. But if it disapproves of the actions of the Kennedy Administration, what action can labor take? It can protest loudly. But what follows after that? Obviously, labor cannot assist a Nixon, a Goldwater, or even a Rockefeller. We would be in a worse situation then. Such is labor's political dilemma, stemming in large part, from the deeply rooted American conception of politics as the balancing and mediating of different, sometimes conflicting, segments of the population. For example, the Kennedy Administration has not taken effective measures against unemployment. Does this mean that labor should abandon the Democrats and the Kennedy Administration and strike out on its own? Such action would lead to less frustration, but probably to political suicide. Instead of half a cake, we would probably get none.

European trade unionists have a ready answer to this problem. Form a Labor Party, they say. Historically, this has proved to be no solution. A number of factors in American life have worked against it. In the first place, union members are unevenly distributed geographically. In some areas millions are concentrated, in comparable areas organized labor lacks the physical resources to carry on effective political activity. If for only this reason, a Labor Party could not elect a majority of Congress. Second, the class feeling which made Social Democratic and Labor parties possible in Europe is absent here. Americans—workers and others—consider themselves middle class. Many union members would not even support a Labor Party. (Interestingly enough, as the European standard of living improves, the Social Democratic and Labor parties suffer significant working class defections.) Third, the American voters seem addicted to the idea of a two party system as the electorate also assumes that each party is a coalition of diverse forces.

These factors have led labor leaders to conclude that a labor party is utopian and that efforts in this direction would be self-defeating with labor's political strength frittered away.

IS THERE NO HOPE THEN? Is labor to continue frustrated and, at times, mutinous? Is America, therefore, to continue following an often arid, middle-of-the-road course when such terrifying international and domestic problems require bold and even radical solutions?

I believe there is a way out. Labor must arrive at the realization that political activity is as important as collective bargaining, and organizing efforts must be intensified. Politicians are impressed by political strength. It is my opinion that where a Labor Party may not succeed, a realign-

ment of the present two party system will. Toward this end, it is essential that the Democratic Party rid itself of the conservatives and join forces with liberal Republicans such as John Sherman Cooper and Jacob Javits. This has actually occurred in Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon and is in process in Texas. The labor movement must not only play a major role in this realignment, but be a driving force behind it on a state and national level. This may cause some major elections losses. But these will be short run losses which will prove to be long run gains.

Until such a realignment is effectuated, the labor movement must maintain its independence. This does not mean cutting ourselves off completely from the Democrats, but it does imply support of any Republican whose record merits it and opposition to any Democrat without a liberal record. It means that we must turn down Democratic Party pleas for labor support to conservative or middle-of-the-road candidates. It also means opposing, to the point of killing, Kennedy Administration proposals which are not in the interest of the overwhelming mass of the American people. Labor must make the Democrats and the Kennedy Administration bid for its support.

In the thirties, the center of American political gravity shifted leftward. Since the forties, it has continued to shift to the right. American politics glorifies the middle-of-the-road course. That is unfortunate. Our nation's economic problems will not be solved by diluted programs.

In this framework, the American labor movement has a vital role to play. It must continue to remind the nation of the massive domestic economic and social problems which must be tackled and support this reminder with political action and power. It must work for the solution of these social and economic problems which sap the strength of our nation and make life miserable for tens of millions. The duty of labor in politics is to become the strong left wing of American democracy and push the center of American political gravity leftward again.

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LEWIS
FEUER

What is Alienation?

The Career of a Concept

EVERY AGE HAS ITS KEY ETHICAL concept around which it can best formulate the cluster of its basic problems. "Duty" summated for Kant the meaning of life in the Prussian bureaucratic and pietistic society; "peace" was the basic longing of Hobbes living in England's time of civil war; "happiness" defined for Bentham the aims of a middle-class England which was challenging the rule of a landed aristocracy. Twenty-five years ago, the concept of "exploitation" was the focus of most socialist and liberal political philosophy. Today many thinkers would replace it with the concept of "alienation," which

has indeed become the central one for the neo-revisionist school of Marxism. By "alienation," says Erich Fromm, "is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself."¹ Thus, neo-revisionism introduces an unusual emphasis into the history of socialist thought. The classical revisionism of Eduard Bernstein aimed to supplant the materialist negation of ethics with a "back to Kant" movement. Where Marx and Engels looked at ethical ideas as the epiphenomenal by-products of class struggle, Bernstein and Jaures sought a universalistic ethic with its formal expression in Kant's categorical imperative.

Neo-revisionism today returns not to Kant but to the youthful Marx who in manuscripts, sometimes unpublished, wrote down an ethical critique of capitalism. Marxism, aged, bureaucratized, and de-ethicized in the Soviet society, is being rejuvenated by young Marxists in Poland and America with the repressed and rejected ethical writings of the young Marx. In the past, the history of socialist thought has shown a certain oscillation between economics and ethics. During times of economic depression and distress, the socialist argument has tended to consist primarily of a demonstration that the economic system was beset by contradictions, disequilibria between production and consumption, which were insoluble in a capitalist society. In times of prosperity and rising living standards, on the other hand, the socialist argument has become primarily an ethical

¹ Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, New York, 1955, pp. 110, 120.

one of the disvalues of human life in capitalist society. Classical revisionism thus reflected the betterment in the life of the Western European working class at the end of the last century. Neo-revisionism today is a critique of both communist and capitalist societies, in their age of co-existent affluence, from the standpoint of the ethical aims of all human society.

In the Soviet Union itself, younger philosophers, evidently restive with the received bureaucratized version of Marxism, are turning to the younger Marx, the philosopher of alienation, to express their own disaffection with the bureaucratized world. An act of publication of Marx's writings in the Soviet Union is a political decision. In this sense, the recent publication in Moscow of Russian editions and English translations of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and his and Engels' *The Holy Family* betokens an interest in the underlying ethical source of Marxism, that ethic from which Marx and the Marxists became "alienated" in later years. The recovery of ethical consciousness in Marxist circles tends naturally, as long as Marxism itself is not rejected, to proceed by way of recovery of the forgotten, repressed ethical writings of Marx. It is a devious, tradition-bound avenue to the recovery of ethical consciousness, especially since the socialist ethic emerges with greater purity in the writings of such men as William Morris. Neo-Marxism throughout the world is clearly, however, finding a temporary conceptual half-way house in "alienation."

TO EVALUATE THE SIGNIFICANCE of the revival of "alienation," let us ask the following questions:

- (1) What was the meaning and use of "alienation" in Marx's thought?
- (2) What accounts for the appeal of the concept "alienation" among American intellectuals?
- (3) What does "alienation" signify today? Is it a useful concept for understanding societies?

The concept "alienation" has a lineage which one can trace right back to Calvin who saw man alienated through all time from God by his original sin.² Calvin wrote with eloquence that "spiritual death is nothing else than the alienation of the soul from God, we are all born as dead men, and we live as dead men, until we are made partakers of the life of Christ."³ Hegel imbibed the concept of alienation from pessimist Protestant theology and the early Marx in turn like his fellow Hegelians, regarded man's history as one of alienation. His youthful *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* depicted alienation as the essence of the capitalist order: "Private property is therefore the product, the necessary result of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself." Alienated man experienced himself not as an agent but as patient, not as creator but creature, not as self-determined but other-determined. The products of man's labor were transformed "into an

² Erich Fromm in his stimulating *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York, 1961, mistakenly says that "the thinker who coined the concept of alienation was Hegel." Cf. p. 47.

³ John Calvin, *Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians*, transl. Rev. William Pringle, Grand Rapids, 1948, p. 219; *Commentaries on the Catholic Epistles*, transl. Rev. John Owen, Grand Rapids, 1948, p. 162.

objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations . . ." Because he was alienated from the product of his labor, man also became alienated from other men.⁴ This estrangement from the human essence leads, in Fromm's words, to an "existential egotism," or as Marx stated it, man becomes alienated from "his own body, external nature, his mental life, and his human life."

Now the evidence is strong that during the latter 1840's, Marx and Engels came to reject emphatically the use of the concept "alienation" as the foundation for their socialism. Their *Communist Manifesto* ridiculed in scathing terms the German True Socialists who refurbished the economic sense of the French Socialists with their metaphysical nonsense of "alienation": "They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money they wrote *Alienation of Humanity* . . ."⁵ For the fact of the matter is that "alienation" as first used by Marx, Engels, and their fellow young Hegelians and Feuerbachians was a romantic concept, with a preponderantly sexual connotation. It was the language of a group which made a protest of romantic individualism against the new capitalist civilization, but which soon went on to its post-adolescent peace with bourgeois society. Marx and Engels discarded a concept which became alien to their own aims.

To have developed the concept "alienation" would have meant for Marx and Engels to have taken a direction which Freud later took; they would have had to study the forms of alienation, that is, neuroses, of bourgeois society, and, if "alienation" proved to be a universal concept, the modes of alienation common to all societies. "Alienation," however, was too much the catch-word of the romantic intellectuals with their personal drama of temporary estrangement in an industrial civilization. Alienation moved a handful of poets and professors, who achieved their therapy with a few poems and treatises. The masses of men, on the other hand, were moved to action by exploitation.

The concept "alienation" expressed the striving of the Romantic movement, the recovery of spontaneous emotional life. There was a revulsion against sexual asceticism, a re-discovery among the German intellectuals of physical pleasure. German philosophy, the product of theological seminaries, had negated the human body; the new philosophers, disciples of Ludwig Feuerbach, affirmed it. The root meaning of "alienation" for Feuerbach was, it must be emphasized, sexual; the alienated man was one who had acquired a horror of his sexual life, and whose whole way of thinking was determined by this repression of sexuality. The critique of religion was so important for Feuerbach precisely because religious dogma was the manifestation of this sexual alienation. We might cite a few passages in which Feuerbach states the primary, sexual meaning of "alienation":

⁴ See the various passages from Marx cited in Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, pp. 52-53.

⁵ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer, New York, 1959, p. 33.

The more man alienates himself from Nature . . . the greater the horror he has of Nature, or at least of those natural objects and processes which displease his imagination, which affect him disagreeably. . . . That which does not please him, which offends his transcendental, supranatural, or anti-natural feelings ought not to be. . . . Thus the idea of the pure, holy Virgin pleases him; still he is also pleased with the idea of the Mother. . . . Virginity in itself is to him the highest moral idea, the *cornu copiae*, of his supranaturalistic feelings and ideas, his personified sense of honour and of shame before common nature. . . . Even the arid Protestant orthodoxy, so arbitrary in its criticism, regarded the conception of the God-producing Virgin as a great, adorable, amazing holy mystery of faith, transcending reason. . . .

Now if abstinence from the satisfaction of the sensual impulse, the negation of difference of sex and consequently of sexual love,—for what is this without the other?—is the principle of the Christian heaven and salvation; then necessarily the satisfaction of the sexual impulse, sexual love, on which marriage is founded, is the source of sin and evil. . . . The mystery of original sin is the mystery of sexual desire.⁶

Alienation in a philosophical sense, that is, the denial of the reality of the material world, was the consequence of the religious alienation from sexuality. As Feuerbach stated it: "Separation from the world, from matter, from the life of the species, is therefore the essential aim of Christianity." Sexual asceticism was the source of the idealist metaphysics: "Pleasure, joy, expands man; trouble, suffering, contracts and concentrates him; in suffering man denies the reality of the world . . ." ⁷

To overcome alienation signified for Feuerbach the overcoming of the Christian heritage of masochism and the emotions and thought-ways of clerical celibacy. To Marx, writing in 1844 as a Feuerbachian, the sexual meaning of "alienation" was still central. The ultimate human relationship which provided the criterion for the evaluation of societies was for the young Marx the sexual:

The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the *relation of man to woman*. . . . In this relationship, therefore, is *sensuously manifested*, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man. From this relationship one can therefore judge man's whole level of development . . . ; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being.⁸

The alienation of man from himself signified that his natural human emotions had been distorted. *Alienation signified a mode of life in which man was being compelled by social circumstances to act self-destructively*, to cooperate in his own self-mutilation, his castration, that is, the destruction of his own manhood. The economy which men had created presumably to satisfy their needs was finally warping their deepest instincts. Repeatedly the young Marx and Engels characterized the bourgeois society

⁶ Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, transl. George Eliot, reprinted, New York, 1957, pp. 136-138, 311.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 185. Feuerbach, the precursor of Freud in the psychology of religion, probed into the origin of religious dogmas in sexual asceticism. Cf. William B. Chamberlain, *Heaven Wasn't his Destination: The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach*, London, 1941, pp. 60-61. Engels, in his old age, wrote energetically against Feuerbach's philosophy of "self-love." Cf. *Basic Writings*, p. 216 ff.

⁸ Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, transl. Martin Milligan, Moscow, p. 101.

in metaphors and actualities of sexual alienation. Economic exploitation eventuated in the mutilations of sexual alienation. Thus Engels wrote in his *The Condition of the Working-Class in England* how bourgeois society "unsexes" the human being:

And yet this condition which unsexes the man and takes from the woman all womanliness, this condition, which degrades, in the most shameful way, both sexes, and through them, Humanity, is the last result of our much-praised civilization . . . ; we must admit that so total a reversal of the position of the sexes can have come to pass only because the sexes have been placed in a false position from the beginning.⁹

In these early writings, Marx and Engels, as Freudian fore-runners, regarded love, not work, as the source of man's sense of reality. They wrote in *The Holy Family* against the idealistic subjectivists who could not recognize "love, which first really teaches man to believe in the objective world outside himself, which not only makes man an object, but the object a man!"¹⁰

THE GERMAN IDEALISTIC INTELLECTUALS, whom Marx called the "Critical Critics," were estranged from reality, precisely because they repressed the natural sexual senses of love and tried with all sorts of metaphysical devices to spiritualize its reality: "Critical criticism must first seek to dispose of love. Love is a passion, and nothing is more dangerous for the calm of knowledge than passion." The alienated intellectuals use linguistic tricks to transform love into "a theological thing":

by making "love" a being apart, separate from man and as such endowed with independent being. By this simple process, by changing the predicate into the subject, all the attributes and manifestations of human nature can be Critically transformed into their opposite and *estrangements*.¹¹

Underlying the philosophers' misuse of language, according to Marx and Engels, were psychological motivations to repress the world of flesh and material reality. Socio-psychological analysis, in psychoanalytical fashion, established when a linguistic estrangement from reality was taking place. Critical Criticism eventuated in alienation because its masochistic motivation sundered man from himself and the external world: Critical Criticism was thus "a Moloch, the worship of which consists in the self-immolation and suicide of man, and in particular of his *ability to think*." "But love is an un-Critical, un-christian materialist," continued Marx and Engels. Sexual repression led to the impairment of the sense of reality, and consequently to ideological devices which substituted abstractions for things; the liberation of love led to a renewed sense of citizenship in the universe.

⁹ Frederick Engels, *The Condition of the Working-Class in England*, transl. Florence Kelley Wischniewetzsky, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953, p. 179.

¹⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique*, transl. R. Dixon, Moscow, 1956, p. 32.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

With heavy-handed humor, Marx and Engels satirized the critical ideologists who substituted the idealistic category of Dancing for the frank sensuality of the *cancan*:

The reverend parson [Szeliga] speaks here neither of the *cancan* nor of the *polka*, but of dancing in general, of the *category* Dancing, which is not performed anywhere except in his Critical cranium. If he saw a single dance at the Chaumière in Paris his Christian-German soul would be outraged by the boldness, the frankness, the graceful petulance and the music of that most sensual movement.

The dancers "give the spectator the inspiring impression of frank human sensuality;" they "can and must necessarily be frankly sensual human beings!" The anti-sensual Critic substitutes an essence for existence: "The Critic introduces us to the ball for the sake of the *essence of dancing*,"¹²

Marx's tribute to the *can-can* would have outraged Khrushchev who with Bolshevik virtue railed at Hollywood for the *can-can* immorality.

The idealistic metaphysicians, according to the young Marx and Engels, aim to deprive love of its bodily reality:

As soon as there is no more nervous current and the blood in the veins is no longer hot, the *sinful body*, the seat of sensual lust becomes a *corpse* and the souls can converse unhindered about "general reason," "true love," and "pure morals." The parson debases sensuality to such an extent that he abolishes the very elements which inspire sensual love—the rush of the blood, which proves that man does not love only by insensitive phlegm; the nervous current which connects the organ that is the main seat of sensuality with the brain. He reduces true sensual love to the *mechanical secretio seminis* and lisps with an ill-renowned German theologian: "Not for the sake of sensual love, not for the lust of the flesh, but because the Lord said, increase and multiply."¹³

Eugene Sue, the author of *Les Mystères de Paris*, had similarly mystified over the sexual attraction of one of his characters, Cecily, a slave. Marx and Engels saw no point in mystifying about this attraction: "The mystery of Cecily is that she is a *half-breed*. The mystery of her sensuality is the *heat of the tropics*."¹⁴ Behind every religious and philosophical mystery was an alienation of man's sexual nature from himself. Thus Marx and Engels rail against the "puritan sermon" which spins its unreal web of "the mystery of the mystery, the essence of the essence" of love.¹⁵

AT THIS TIME MARX AND ENGELS did not regard class struggle as humanity's lever for the achievement of communism. Their definition of communism omitted any reference to class struggle. Communism, they defined as the "complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being—a return become conscious . . . it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species."¹⁶


¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-88.

¹⁶ *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 102.



Communism for Marx and Engels constituted at this time the over-coming of all alienation. The sexual overtones of "alienation" persisted as they tended to generalize the concept to signify the subjective state which accompanies any situation of emotional frustration which is the outcome of man's own misconceived social behavior and social arrangements. They expressed the hatred of commercialism common to the Romantic School, which regarded bourgeois society as having alienated man from his sexuality; money, in Shakespeare's words, was the "common whore of mankind." "Money is the alienated ability of mankind,"

and it enables the ugly man, contrary to nature, to secure the loveliest woman: "I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most *beautiful* of women. Therefore I am not *ugly*, for the effect of *ugliness*—its deterrent power—is nullified by money."¹⁷ Money is an "overturning power," a destroyer of "individualities." Money makes man's love impotent: "Assume *man* to be *man* and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc." But, "if you love without evoking love in return . . . then your love is impotent—a misfortune."¹⁸ In short, when love is transformed into a self-destructive experience which gives masochist traits to the character, man has been alienated, self-estranged from his essence, by the rule of money. For in bourgeois society, "you must make everything that is yours saleable;" the tyranny of the competitive market crushes "all sympathy, all trust." Political economy wars with human nature, "the ontological essence of human passion." Political economy castrates both capitalists and workingmen. The workingmen are asked by bourgeois economy to give up sexuality altogether. The Malthusian ideologists with their anti-sexual motivation propose that the workingmen "prove themselves continent in their sexual relations . . . Is not this the ethics, the teaching of asceticism?"¹⁹ Bourgeois political economy and a humanist ethics are at loggerheads. Political economy becomes the anti-human ideology of asceticism:

The science of marvellous industry is simultaneously the science of asceticism . . . Self-denial, the denial of life and of all human needs, is its cardinal doctrine. The less you eat, drink and read books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public-house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you *save*—the *greater* becomes your treasure, which neither moths nor dust will devour—your *capital*. The less you *are*, the more you *have*; the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life—the greater is the store of your estranged being.²⁰

¹⁷ *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, pp. 136-138.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-141.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

Alienated from his own activity, the worker's life is "activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, . . ." ²¹ The worker is transformed, as one would say, into a masochist.

As Marx and Engels drew closer to the realities of working-class life and social struggle, they became disenchanted with the friends of their first circle, the Young Hegelians and the Feuerbachians. Their erstwhile philosophical associates seemed to them to make their preoccupation with "alienation" the basis for ridiculous gestures against society,—an adolescent sowing of philosophical wild oats. The revolutionary activity of the Young Hegelians in the Society of the Free consisted of buffoonery, wild processions in the streets, "scandalous scenes in brothels and taverns," the taunting of a clergyman at a wedding. ²² They tended to be indifferent in 1844 to the revolt of the Silesian weavers; not so Marx, who was stirred by their song of protest, and saw the emergence of the proletariat to the dignity of a self-conscious class. Arnold Ruge, spokesman of the Young Hegelians, mocked at the "meagre handful of artisans" in the workingmen's club, the League of the Just, and was appalled by their communist ideas, but this group moved Karl Marx into an intensity of thought and action he had never experienced in the literary-philosophical circle. The workingmen's leaders impressed Marx and Engels as "three real men," and Marx pondered their ideas deeply.

THERE ARE SCHOLARS WHO maintain that Marx and Engels came to their socialist standpoint and materialist conception of history through a study of Hegelian and Feuerbachian texts. The truth is rather that they imbibed a certain terminology from the philosophers, but the impelling force was their own sensitivity to social movements and their own deep sympathies for the workingmen. Engels did not learn the significance of economic reality from an internal criticism of Hegelian texts. Rather, he tells us, "while living at Manchester, I was made painfully aware that economic factors, hitherto assigned an insignificant role or no role at all by historians, were, at least under modern conditions, a decisive power in the world." ²³ And Marx was led to considering communist ideas by his experiences as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*. He had to write editorials in 1842 on the encroachments of rich landowners against the peasants' common lands and the peasants' recourse to wood theft from the landowners' forests. In this pre-industrial situation, Marx undertook to plead the cause of "the unpropertied masses without political and social rights," the dispossessed peasants and pre-proletarians. In the course of this controversy, he announced that he planned to study the communist ideas of Leroux, Considérant, and Proudhon. "There was no provision in Hegel's ideological system," said Marx, for dealing with such socio-economic problems. ²⁴

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

²² Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx*, transl. Edward Fitzgerald, New York, 1935, p. 72. Several generations later, in the Greenwich Village of the twenties, Joseph Freeman observed, from a Marxist viewpoint, the philosophy of the Villager was that of Feuerbach, that "sex love was the highest activity of man, . . . a philosophy of life." Alienation was conceived as having basically a sexual referent. Joseph Freeman, *An American Testament*, New York, 1936, p. 286.

²³ Frederick Engels, *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, New York, 1933, p. 126.

²⁴ Otto Rühle, *Karl Marx: His Life and Work*, transl. Eden and Cedar Paul, New York, 1929, p. 40.

This was a journey the Young Hegelians did not make; Bruno Bauer, their leader, ridiculed the masses as in everlasting opposition to intellect, that is, the intellectuals. Logic follows on emotion, and where the social emotion was absent, the Young Hegelians wallowed in the masochistic joy of their "alienation." Marx and Engels finally discarded the vocabulary of the school, and spoke in the direct language of social realities which needed no romantic metaphor.

With their abandonment of the concept of alienation, Marx and Engels made central in their political philosophy the concept of struggle. German ethical socialists, with their humanistic talk of love, seemed indeed to Marx and Engels akin to masochist ascetics with their lack of aggressive vitality and energy. Moses Hess, the "communist rabbi," who, besides introducing Marx and Engels to communist ideas, was their precursor in using "alienation" as the ground for the criticism of capitalist civilization, was a saintly figure. To Marx and Engels, however, his compulsion to undo justice which led him to marry a prostitute, must have seemed guilt-tormented and self-immolating.²⁵ The workingmen of the League of the Just looked with suspicion upon the "humanism" of such intellectuals.²⁶

What emerged in Marx was a socialism founded on aggression, not on love. It must not be forgotten that force, not love, was for Marx "the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new," and Engels wrote eloquently of the therapy of violence, which, in Germany, "would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness . . ." To reject violence, according to Engels, was the "parsons' mode of thought—lifeless, insipid, and impotent . . ."²⁷

This insistence on the primacy of hatred, aggression, for the socialist movement was a reiterated theme in Engels' writing. To Lavrov, the Russian Populist sociologist, Engels wrote in 1875: "In our country it is hatred rather than love that is needed—at least in the immediate future—and more than anything else a shedding of the last remnants of German idealism . . ."²⁸ He and Marx feared that the entry of ethical intellectuals into the workers' movement would "castrate" the Party. One must avoid the mood, they said, which makes for "humble submission and confession that the punishment was deserved."³⁰ Not talk of "'true love of humanity' and empty phraseology about 'justice'" but class struggle was required.³¹ There was a concern always for the maintenance of the masculinity of the movement, a fear that a dwelling on concepts such as "alienation" would indeed masochize the workers' movement as it had the intellectuals.

Engels in later years regarded the writings on alienation as philosophic juvenilia which scarcely warranted the interest of the developed socialist

²⁵ Isaiah Berlin, *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess*, Cambridge, 1959, p. 10. Auguste Cornu, *The Origins of Marxian Thought*, Springfield, 1957, pp. 70-71.

²⁶ Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen, *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter*, Philadelphia, 1936, p. 76.

²⁷ Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, transl. Emile Burns, New York, undated, pp. 209-210.

²⁸ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, Ed. 1953, pp. 367-368. Also, *The German Ideology*, ed. Roy. Pascal, New York, 1939, p. 69.

³⁰ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, p. 395.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

movement. When a young Russian Socialist in 1893 asked about them, "Engels was embarrassed," he later recalled.³² Both Marx and Engels still continued to entertain great hopes for a basic transformation of the character of work and the family; nevertheless, they did not make use of the concept of alienation to formulate these hopes.³³ The word "alienation" was absent from Marx's mature analysis.

Thus Marx and Engels veered to an opposite extreme as they extirpated "alienation" from their ideas and made "struggle" central. They left a tremendous gap in their theory of socialism by simply ruling out ethical ideas as "modern mythology." They made it all the easier for the Stalinist perversion of their philosophy to justify itself with appeals to technological necessity, the historical mission of hatred, and the meaninglessness of absolute justice. Whether the basis for a liberal ethic, however, can be provided by a return to the Calvinist-Hegelian concept of alienation seems doubtful. Its root-metaphor, as we shall see, is not a helpful one for the understanding of the world's problems.

ENGELS' RELUCTANCE TO PUBLISH Marx's and his early writings has called forth contrary explanations from various scholars. A few years ago, I called the attention of Mr. Daniel Bell to these passages, and he made extensive use of them in his well-known essay "Two Roads from Marx." Then Robert Tucker in his erudite study *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* tried to explain Engels' embarrassment at the mention of these early works. Marx and Engels, according to Tucker, always continued to hold to their youthful concept of alienation, but felt constrained to be "secretive" about their early writings because to publish such philosophical material "would confuse and disorient the always unsufficiently class-conscious workers."³⁴ Tucker's theory seems to me singularly unconvincing. For Marx and Engels never hesitated to follow what seemed to them the scientific course, and to publish the most technical and abstruse analyses. The proletariat had to struggle the best it could with the volumes of *Capital* and *Anti-Dühring*. No, "Engels was embarrassed," as the young Narodnik Voden put it, because he was being reminded as an old man of youthful writings which were filled with sexual and romantic language and yearnings. His paragraphs on *can-can* dancing, tropical love, sexual secretions, and his sexual invective against money were juvenilia which embarrassed him. Moreover, as he told his translator, Florence Kelley Wischnewetzky, in 1886, "the semi-Hegelian language of a good many passages of my old book is not only untranslatable but has lost the greater part of its meaning even in German."³⁵ To have put them forward seriously, and to have had them therefore taken by naïf disciples and hostile critics as the philosophical basis of the socialist movement probably seemed to him to run a needless risk of exposing Marx, himself, and the movement to considerable ridicule. So Engels classified these writings in the same category with the love lyrics Marx wrote as a student.

³² *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels*, Moscow, undated, p. 330.

³³ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 329, 346. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Modern Library Edition, p. 534.

³⁴ Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, Cambridge, 1961, p. 173.

³⁵ Karl Marx, *Letters to Americans: 1848-1895*, New York, 1953, p. 151.

II

LET US TURN NOW to the varieties of usage of "alienation" in contemporary social analysis.

The great problems of contemporary society have all been described as arising from different modes of alienation. We can distinguish six different principal modes in which, from the sociological standpoint, alienation is said to characterize the experience of modern people. These modes of alienation are:

- (1) the alienation of class society
- (2) the alienation of competitive society
- (3) the alienation of industrial society
- (4) the alienation of mass society
- (5) the alienation of race
- (6) the alienation of the generations.

These modes of alienation are independent of each other. A class society need not be a competitive one; there have been competitive economies which were founded on handicrafts, and mass societies, such as the Indian and Chinese, which were pre-industrial. A strict class society, carried to caste extremes, brings with it relief from competitive tension, but it aggravates the frustrations of initiative and choice of one's own work; in addition, the man of the lower class must internalize feelings of inferiority, and cultivate a degree of self-hatred and contempt. In this sense, he is internalizing feelings and attitudes towards himself of self-destruction.

A competitive system makes for a mode of alienation, distinct from that in which classes are more fixed. In the United States during World War II, the men in the Air Force were found to be more discontented with their rank than were the men in the Military Police. This, despite the fact that the Air Force was full of corporals and sergeants, whereas the Military Police were mostly privates. Indeed, the very plentifulness of opportunity in the Air Force deepened the sense of disappointment, personal inadequacy, and resentment in the minds of those defeated in the competitive struggle for stripes. On the other hand, the M.P. felt less relatively deprived, since most of his friends shared his own lowly status.³⁶ Competition exacts this toll; from the standpoint of the deepest feelings, there is no "good loser."

Industrial society brings its characteristic mode of alienation to the man on the assembly line. Ely Chinoy found that nearly four-fifths of his sample of automobile workers cherished the dream of leaving the factory forever. Mostly they longed for the independence of small business men. As he approached middle age, the worker sadly renounced his dream, and resigned himself to the assembly line.³⁷ This alienation of man from the machine, which stands against him, imposing its rhythm on him so that he is a satellite to its motions, is something which is common to all indus-

³⁶ Cf. Samuel A. Stouffer, "A Study of Attitudes," *The Scientific American*, Vol. CLXXX, (1949), p. 13. Samuel Stouffer, *The American Soldier*, Princeton, 1949, Vol. I, p. 251.

³⁷ Cf. Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream*, Garden City, 1955,

trial societies, whether they be capitalist or socialist. As automobile workers told Walker and Guest:

The work isn't hard, it's the never-ending pace . . . The guys yell "hurrah" whenever the line breaks down . . . You can hear it all over the plant.

The job gets so sickening—day in and day out plugging in ignition wires. I get through with one motor, turn around, and there's another motor staring me in the face. It's sickening.³⁸

The different segments of modern industry vary greatly in the extent to which their work-processes give their respective workers a sense of alienation. Where the worker has a greater measure of control over the pace of his job, where he is relatively freer from the overseeing eye of a supervisor, where, above all, the character of the job makes possible the mutual aid, solidarity, and friendships of an on-the-job working group, to that extent job satisfaction rises.³⁹ Manual workers of all kinds, however, derive far less satisfaction from their work than men in the professions. Labor still remains for the bulk of mankind affected with the curse of alienation from nature which Adam and Eve sustained when they were ousted from the Garden of Eden: "Cursed is the ground for thy sake; . . . In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, . . ." No wonder that a neglected socialist classic is entitled *The Right to be Lazy*.

The alienation of race is distinct and irreducible to the other modes. Negro writers have told of the Veil which exists between them and white men. "Within the Veil was he born, said I; and there within shall he live,—a Negro and a Negro's son," wrote W. E. B. Du Bois of his first-born.⁴⁰ This racial alienation could co-exist with a planned socialized economy; it has found its place in socialist parties and labor movements. The alienation of generations appears especially in the gerontocratic societies of the Far East. The youth in the Japanese Zengakuren, for instance, find little to admire in the older generation; they must look for their inspiration to persons outside their national history or create their own ideas.

Is "ALIENATION," HOWEVER, a useful concept for the analysis of these modes of human unhappiness and frustration? Is it more than a dramatic metaphor which for reasons peculiar to intellectuals' experience has become their favorite root-metaphor for perceiving the social universe? Is it less, however, a tool for understanding than a projection of the psychology of intellectuals disenchanted with themselves?

It would be a major blunder to regard alienation as characteristically a phenomenon of modern society.⁴¹ For what stands out from an historical and comparative standpoint is the omnipresence of alienation; it takes different guises in all societies. There are modes of alienation in small, egalitarian, cooperative, and agricultural societies. The countries of New Zealand and Sweden have achieved a high egalitarian standard of living,

³⁸ Charles R. Walker and Robert H. Guest, *The Man on the Assembly Line*, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 51, 52, 55.

³⁹ Robert Blauner, "Work Satisfaction and Industrial Trends in Modern Society," *Institute of Industrial Relations*, Reprint No. 151, Berkeley, 1960, pp. 346-350.

⁴⁰ W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, reprinted, New York, 1953, p. 209.

⁴¹ Nathan Glazer once described "alienation" as "an omnibus of psychological disturbances having a similar root cause—in this case, modern social organization." "The Alienation of Modern Man," *Commentary*, Vol. IV, (1947), p. 380.

but qualified observers have complained of the drab and dull character of their lives. Margaret Cole, doing research on *Democratic Sweden* for the New Fabian Research Bureau, couldn't wait to leave the Scandinavian social democratic tedium, while Leslie Lipson found an oppressive "like-mindedness" among the New Zealanders, a "cultural homogeneity," the offspring of equality and security, which led New Zealanders to be suspicious and intolerant of intellectuals, foreigners, and free thinkers, in short, a world "made safe for mediocrity" in a "small and culturally homogeneous milieu."⁴²

The agricultural cooperative societies of Israel, the *kibbutzim*, inspire their own corresponding mode of alienation; a typical novel of kibbutz life depicts the "interminable vacuity" of its existence, and portrays characters who, becoming desperate in this collective microcosm for a sense of their own individualities, flee to their tents which shut out a world, "petty, noisy, full of shadow and darkness." "He reacted to communality by going off by himself, by standing aloof. . . . Then people show up as petty, ludicrous, selfish, malicious, cruel: You fall into an attitude of general contempt; you hate and become still further alienated from your fellows. It is a closed circle, a squirrel cage from which there is no release . . . Pettiness and selfishness creep in, even into the midst of their community based on equality and fraternity."⁴³ Carol Kennicott in Sinclair Lewis's *Main Street* discovered the tyranny of the disanonymous small society, while in lonely hamlets in Vermont, farmers built their houses on hills to catch a glimpse of a neighbor; living in individualistic outposts, far from mass societies, they became ridden with incest and neurosis.⁴⁴ Those who think alienation was born with modern technology might ponder the picture of the peasant which La Bruyère gave in the French traditional society of the seventeenth century:

Certain wild animals, male and female, are scattered over the country, dark, livid, and quite tanned to the sun, who are chained, as it were, to the land they are always digging and turning up and down with an unwearyed stubbornness; their voice is somewhat articulate, and when they stand erect they discover a human face, and, indeed, are men.⁴⁵

IF ALIENATION THEN IS SO MULTIFORM, can it be given a precise operational meaning which would be useful in social analysis?

Able social scientists have tried in recent years to define the dimensions of alienation, and to construct scales which would enable one to measure statistically a person's degree of alienation. Melvin Seeman, for example, has tried to distinguish between five variants in "alienation,"—powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. Seeman wishes to remove "the critical, polemic element in the idea of alienation," and to translate what it has to say into the language of the

⁴² Margaret Cole, *Growing up into Revolution*, London, 1949, pp. 177-178. Leslie Lipson, *The Politics of Equality: New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy*, Chicago, 1948, pp. 491-493.

⁴³ Lewis S. Feuer, "Leadership and Democracy in the Collective Settlements of Israel," in *Studies in Leadership*, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner, New York, 1950, p. 375. David Maletz, *Young Hearts*, transl. Solomon N. Richards, New York, 1950, pp. 43, 46.

⁴⁴ Harold Fisher Wilson, *The Hill Country of Northern New England: Its Social and Economic History, 1790-1930*, New York, 1936.

⁴⁵ *The Characters of Jean de la Bruyère*, transl. Henri van Laun, London, 1929, p. 318.

psychological theory of learning. But the will to criticize and polemize is precisely the essential intent behind the idea of alienation, and a multitude of alienated persons would be dissatisfied equally with conditions of power-possession, meaningfulness, norm-orientedness, involvement, and self-acknowledgment.

Alienation has a way of eluding a fixed set of dimensions because it is as multi-potential as the varieties of human experience. Seeman, for instance, gives an operational definition of "meaninglessness;" it is a mode of alienation which is characterized "by a low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of behavior can be made;" the person senses that his ability to predict behavioral outcomes is low.⁴⁶ But, contrary to Seeman's standpoint, a great deal of contemporary thought finds a state of alienation precisely in those ideologies which profess to predict with high confidence the outcome of people's behavior. What is "historicism" in modern terms if not a theory which aims to foresee the broad social resultant of the sum of individual actions? Historicism is assailed by thinkers such as Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin exactly because they find themselves alienated in a world of social determinism; they wish for a world in which the degree of social predictability would be low. In such a world, they would feel less alienated.

Again, the alienated man is a person, according to Seeman, who finds himself at odds with popular culture. He does not read *Reader's Digest*, and like many intellectuals, attaches a low value "to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society." Yet the plaint is often precisely in the other direction. The artist, the writer, the poet, complain how quickly they become successful, how rapidly the public now accepts them. The avant-garde cannot now long enjoy the pleasures of the vanguardian; *Holiday*, *Mademoiselle*, and *Esquire* compete for the most experimental poems and stories. Peter Viereck has spoken eloquently of how the artist finds quickly the accolades of popular culture, and he has protested against the very loss of loneliness and pride in isolation which was once the artist's.

Today the forces of mere prestige—the Rotarianism of the highbrows—have a more effective method than the stake. They make him chic.

Every new philosophical, literary, or religious insight (emphatically including the new conservatism) soon finds itself adopted, adulterated by the Overadjusted Man . . . Today the lonely crowd rushes to buy an abridged pocketbook of *The Lonely Crowd* or, easier still, to read the still more abridged abridgment that appeared in a popular weekly.⁴⁷

The avant-garde is separated now only by a few issues of a little magazine from acceptance into the big. But the artist then voices an altered mode of alienation. He dislikes acceptance even on his own terms. In retrospect, he finds values in isolation which are lacking in acceptance and identification. Whichever direction one takes on the social compass, one finds alienation.

The alienation of self-estrangement is equated by Seeman with the notion of "other-directedness" made famous by David Riesman. Yet here,

⁴⁶ Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXIV, 1959, p. 786.

⁴⁷ Peter Viereck, *The Unadjusted Man: A New Hero for Americans*, Boston, 1956, pp. 16, 52.

too, we find that directions go awry, and that inner-directed and other-directed both share the alienated status. The child, says Riesman, is conditioned to other-directedness when it learns that whatever it does must not be valued for itself, "but only for its effect on others," and this Seeman translates as making one's behavior dependent upon anticipated future rewards; the person becomes self-estranged because he enjoys nothing for its own sake. There is a sound insight in this formulation, but it has nothing to do with other- and inner-directedness. For a Calvinist, inner-directed person, who serves his conscience and not public opinion, can be every whit as alienated as the other-directed person.

When the young John Dewey found an "inward laceration," a sense of "divisions and separations," which were "a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God," he was defining exactly the inner-directed mode of character from which he sought liberation.⁴⁸ The person with a strong internalized super-ego can feel alienated from himself, and long, as a matter of fact, for more "other-directedness" as a way of overcoming his inner tension. Thus Dewey looked to "shared experience," to "social" experience as the highest, as an almost mystical deliverance from alienation.

Indeed, it soon becomes evident that the categories "inner-directed" and "other-directed" are limited in clarifying the modes of alienation. For what is omitted is the quality of the feeling experienced towards the self, others, family, God, nation, or tribe. To describe an emotional vector, the kind of feeling and its intensity are dimensions as well as its direction. A man who follows the Golden Rule is, from one standpoint, other-directed; if he does so from dictate of conscience, he is inner-directed; but if he acts from motives of calculation, probably it would be most accurate to call him narcissistic. For whatever warm feelings he has are directed towards his self.

Dale Carnegie in his tract for the times *How to Win Friends and Influence People* which sold five million copies proposed some excellent precepts: "Be a good listener. Talk in terms of the other man's interests. Make the other person feel important." If this "other-directedness" were the outcome of a genuine affection for others, it would not signify alienation. But where it is simulated behavior, where the underlying motive is hatred and aggression toward others, then this behavior, even when successful, gives rise to alienation. For the person is then repressing his deeper feelings, and acting in ways which run contrary to what he would express. The schematic terminology of means and ends fails to state clearly the crucial significance of the underlying emotion. What matters is not that you are using others as a means but rather that your basic emotion towards others is one wishing to debase them, to use them in order to degrade them. You may treat a person as an end because of your stern conscience; you will still remain alienated because the underlying emotion remains one of hostility towards him. In any case, Ries-

⁴⁸ John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, ed. G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague, New York, 1930, Vol. II, pp. 13, 19.

man's terms, with their directional emphasis, do not clarify the emotional source of alienation.

In another noteworthy effort to measure alienation, Dwight Dean has devised several scales to measure three components,—powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation.^{48a} Yet his attempt, too, fails as a measure of “alienation” precisely because that experience can be found in every direction of human experience,—among the powerful as the powerless, the normful as the normless, the socially involved as well as the isolated. For instance, consider the item in the measurement of powerlessness:

“We are just so many cogs in the machinery of life.”

The human switch or lever can, however, be as alienated as the human cog. A power-driven Stalin, aware of his own tyrannical power, but caught and haunted by never-ending anxieties, in a domain of paranoid self-aggrandizement, is an alienated man, estranged from the mankind around him and the socialist aspiration which once had partially moved him. The superpotent man is complementary in his alienation to the impotent.

Or consider again the items designed to help measure normlessness:

“The end often justifies the means.”

“I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.”

Leon Trotsky felt that the Bolsheviks gave meaning to their lives because they pursued an end which at least partially justified their means. By the sociologist's standards, the Bolsheviks, however, were normless.⁴⁹ Again, what of the philosophical individual who is agnostic as to norms and ultimates? Is he more an alienated man than the person who is indifferent to such questions? Many persons, however normless in an ultimate sense, find fulfillment in their human affections and their own chosen loyalty to a job. Life can provide the identification of provisional, pre-ultimate goals. “And pursue the unknown end,” said Justice Holmes in his final aphorism of life, and one would hesitate to place him, therefore, among the alienated. Ignorance as to the meaning of life can be the basis for a cultivation of human experiences which become their own justification; indeed, the world of human facts may then be all the more closely sought. John Dewey, as he turned from religious metaphysics to agnosticism, found a more effective device against alienation (“dualism” and “separation” he called it) in political, social, and educational activities.

To measure the extent of social isolation, Dean proposes such items as:

“Sometimes I feel all alone in the world.”

The image of “the lonely crowd” is most influential in social criticism today. The child deprived of affection or threatened with its loss finds an inner emptiness within himself, and sometimes, as he sees the world pervaded with hostility, wishes to have it all over with. At the same time, however, we have the revolt against the cult of “togetherness,” against what Whyte calls the “social ethic.” The right to privacy, as Brandeis named it, becomes re-discovered in a society which emphasizes collec-


^{48a} Dwight G. Dean, “Meaning and Measurement of Alienation,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 26, (1961), pp. 753-758.

⁴⁹ Leon Trotsky, “Their Morals and Ours,” *The New International*, Vol. IV, 1938, p. 164.

tives, committees, and cooperative achievements. If there is an alienation in loneliness or anomie, there is a corresponding alienation in togetherness and over-identification. The Hegelian philosophers reduced the individual into an adjective of the Total; there was no loneliness here, only an oppressive perpetual absorption in which the individual longed to become an independent noun.

This recovery of the sense of one's individuality, as distinct from the roles which party, class, organization, or group imposes, is what lies behind what is often called "the quest for identity." Alienation lies in every direction of human experience where basic emotional desire is frustrated, every direction in which the person may be compelled by social situations to do violence to his own nature. "Alienation" is used to convey the emotional tone which accompanies any behavior in which the person is compelled to act self-destructively; that is the most general definition of alienation, and its dimensions will be as varied as human desire and need.

Why, however, should the word "alienation" be used to describe the subjective tone of self-destructive experience? The metaphor of "alienation" overlays this experience with a quality which is peculiar to the drama of contemporary intellectuals in their most despondent mood. The contemporary intellectuals' experience of alienation is concretely one of his withdrawal from political movements; he has disavowed identifications. The existentialist's insistence on a chosen individuality which will not partake of any class, group, or party identification involves necessarily a sense of alienation. Alienation is the dramatic metaphor of the intellectual who has left the Political Garden of Eden and projects his experience as the exemplar of all human frustrations. The frustrations are immense and universal, but are they not misdescribed in this projective metaphor of a very small section of humanity?



THE FONDNESS OF THE CONTEMPORARY intellectual for the concept "alienation" has little to do with the modes of alienation associated with mass, class, competitive and industrial societies. The intellectual's alienation was in part a self-alienation which arose as he discovered the character of his own underlying aims. Self-discovery brought the reproaches of conscience; there was also the realization that the movement, class, or party with which he had identified himself could become evil-ridden as the society which he had hoped to help redeem. The sustaining sense of

the intellectual's mission all but vanished during the last two decades; the disruption of the labor-intellectual alliance has left the intellectual, at least for a time, without the sense of a supporting identification which gives meaning to his efforts. The words, meaninglessness, powerlessness, normlessness, which are used to characterize the dimensions of alienation, have a special application to the experience of the contemporary intellectual; the meaninglessness of his life is its lack of a social goal; his powerlessness reflects the intellectual's self-description: "we have no social class with which to work;" his normlessness is the fact that his socialist ethic is gone, and the recognition that it's all careerism.

Every movement of social reform has been characterized by a "back to the people" ethos; correspondingly, the end of such a movement has always been accompanied by an "away from the people" mentality. During the thirties, the American intellectual experienced an identification with the working class movement, and regarded himself as united with labor to achieve a more just and civilized society. A few years after the Second World War, however, he was alienated from a working class which seemed to him devoid of a sense of historic mission; "we disaffiliate, we disinvolve, we disengage," said the intellectuals frankly. "We were right, but they [the masses] wouldn't listen," writes Dwight Macdonald. "Nothing is more frustrating for an intellectual than to work out a logical solution to a problem and then find that nobody is interested."⁵⁰ Another writer described this experience of alienation in the sexual idiom of contemporary fiction:

This gentleman, and others like him, decided they'd been stood up by history for the last time. They're through with her; she seemed attractive, but has proven to be a bitch. No respectable girl would turn down clean, handsome Marxists who love her for herself, then go to bed with triflers. . . . The logic of the clean, handsome Marxists of the 1930's demands that they renounce such a promiscuous slut, and search for a good virgin. . . .⁵¹

Prosperity came to the generation of leftist intellectuals. Thirty years ago Walter Weyl spoke of his generation of "tired radicals." The alienated intellectuals, however, were not tired; they were filled with creative energy and helped to research and work by the unprecedented Research Revolution in the universities and the efflorescence of magazines and television. The alienation was not weariness but a sense that they themselves were not as fine persons as once they had been, that love had left their hearts. There were those intellectuals who discovered that power, possessions and status were what they had wanted all along, but their newfound narcissism and reconciliation with their selves did not banish completely the self-reproach they call "alienation." And like a true metaphysician, the intellectual projects his "alienation" upon every facet of discontent in the social universe. A universal indictment, however, provides no lever for social action; it expresses the mood of disaffiliation. The most remark-

⁵⁰ Dwight Macdonald, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, New York, 1957, p. 24.

⁵¹ Calder Willingham, "Politics and the Artist," *New Internationalist*, Vol. XIII, (1947), p. 222. Irving Howe, "Intellectuals' Flight from Politics," *Ibid.*, p. 241.

By way of addendum, we might note that in 1899 the American philosopher, Alfred A. Lloyd, made the concept of "alienation" the basic one in his *Philosophy of History*. Lloyd was indeed the first American philosopher of man's alienation.

able film of the fifties was thus a drama of high alienation, "High Noon," in which the former leftist intellectual, speaking through the allegory of a Western story, expressed his disillusionment and ultimate rejection of every aspect of American society.

"Alienation" thus lends a distinctive emotive-dramatic metaphor to experiences of social frustration. It imposes on them the metaphor of the prophets who failed. It conveys a mood of pervasive tragedy rather than the possibility of effective action. The socialist movement proposed to eliminate economic exploitation and to abolish the class system. These were relatively definable goals. A movement cannot, however, very well propose to alienate the alienators as it did to expropriate the expropriators, for the alienated mood is so multi-form in its expression, so unlocated in any specific social form, that it does not delineate the clear goals and foci for action which a political movement requires. The career of this concept, from Calvin's depiction of man, the original sinner, alienated from God for all time, to the modern notion of man alienated somehow in every form of social organization, indicates indeed that its dominant overtone is social defeat.

One sympathizes with the effort of such thinkers as Erich Fromm to restore the full ethical consciousness to the socialist philosophy. For Stalinist sadism found its theoretical apology precisely in the repression of ethics from the Marxist standpoint. The life-history of the concept "alienation" suggests, however, that what it says can be better said without it; human self-destructive behavior is better dealt with without this metaphor. Some writers indeed seem to have a "will to alienation," and to revel in their perpetual alienation. An irreverent humorist indeed proposed some time ago the organization of "Alienated Anonymous."

From another standpoint, the emphasis on "alienation" is an indication how the politics of the superstructure has in the last decade replaced the politics of the economic foundation. The advent of prosperity has meant the shelving of any mood for basic economic reconstruction. The concern shifts from the production and distribution of wealth to the question of the ends and goods to which wealth shall be devoted. Whether "alienation" however provides an adequate basis for the definition of human good seems to me doubtful. "Alienation" remains too much a concept of political theology which bewilders rather than clarifies the direction for political action.

LEWIS FEUER is *Chairman of the Social Science Integrated Course and Professor of Philosophy at the University of California. He is the author of Psychoanalysis and Ethics (1955); Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (1958); Editor of the anthology, Marx and Engels: Basic Writing on Politics and Philosophy (1959).*

The following exchange stems from an article by Herbert Hill—Organized Labor and the Negro Wage Earner—which appeared in our last issue (Winter 1962). Seymour Lipset teaches sociology at the University of California; William Gomberg is on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and Commerce; Tom Kahn is a student at Howard University and author of The Unfinished Revolution; Herbert Hill is National Labor Secretary of the N.A.A.C.P. We hope to continue the discussion in coming issues.—The Editors

AN EXCHANGE:

Negroes and the Labor Movement

Seymour Lipset:

There can be little doubt that Herbert Hill is correct when he points to various facts which indicate that large sections of organized labor are sustaining racially discriminatory practices, and that those segments which oppose such discrimination are not doing very much to bring their recalcitrant or prejudiced brethren into line. The facts are not at issue, but the causes and prospective solutions to the problem are.

In so far as Hill suggests a cause, it would seem to be the growth of bureaucratic conservatism, especially among the leaders of the old CIO unions who seemingly no longer strongly care about or support the liberal or radical objectives of their earlier days. The blame is placed on a change in the perspectives or situation of the leadership. I would question this interpretation.

All the available information gathered in diverse surveys indicate that on both economic (welfare state, government planning, social policy) and non-economic (civil rights, civil liberties, internationalism) issues, the leaders of organized labor are more liberal or radical than are their members. For example, when comparing the opinions of leaders and followers, the officials are less likely to be Republicans, more likely to favor the need for a labor party or systematic

labor political action, more disposed to support government medicine, government planning, public ownership of natural resources and utilities, support of trade unions abroad, and so forth. The leaders are also more prone than their members to favor civil liberties for unpopular minorities even Communists, and are more favorable to equal rights for minority groups, particularly Negroes. The greater liberalism of the leadership would seem to be derivative from aspects of the leadership position itself, the fact that it involves them in many activities which lead them to understand the relationship between the needs of organized labor and these political policies, as well as a certain degree of self-selection for union leadership posts of those who initially are more disposed to believe in the social movement values of the labor movement.

Although former CIO men are somewhat more liberal than former AFL men, the difference is not as large as it is between each group of leaders and their followers. Far from the image of conservative leaders restraining a progressive rank and file, the true picture more clearly resembles the opposite. This is not to deny that in many unions there is an active minority of rank and filers who are more liberal or radical than their officers. This more leftist minority is often disproportionately represented

among the union activists, those who attend meetings, and hence sometimes create an illusion of a more radical membership. And it is, of course, also true that some unions are led by men who can properly be described as reactionaries.

The fact that the members generally are more conservative or bigoted than their leaders ironically often means that the more democratic unions exhibit more prejudice. For example, if one compares the behavior of the two sailors' unions, there is no question that the former CIO affiliate, the National Maritime Union, has a much better record on Negro rights than do the units of the Seafarers International Union, which belonged to the AFL. But the origin of this difference lies in the fact that the NMU was dominated for many years by a powerful dictatorial Communist apparatus which instituted the practice of racially mixed crews without giving the membership the option of objecting.

The Sailors Union of the Pacific, the major founding unit of the SIU, on the other hand, was led by an old Wobbly, Harry Lundeberg, who believed in frequent consultation of the membership as well as in few paid officers, and low pay for them including Lundeberg, himself. The membership of the SUP refused to adopt policies requiring racially integrated ships. A major difference between the CIO and AFL unions rested in the fact that the former were largely industrial unions which bargained nationally, while the AFL unions were in large measure craft organizations with decentralized local bargaining and authority. Thus the very fact of a strong national administration with tremendous power over local unions meant that the leaders of the industrial unions could ignore membership sentiment as expressed in the locals or plants, while those organizations in which local unions retained a great deal of power more clearly reflected membership sentiments and prejudices.

It is a well known fact that union government is much more democratic in the local than in the national administration. There are many more contested elections and turnovers in office on the local than on the national level. The Carpenters' Union, one of those cited for an unsavory race relations record by Hill, is oligarchic and dictatorial nationally, but many of its affiliated locals are extremely democratic. The same is true for others of the generally prejudiced building trades unions. The International Typographical Union which is democratic on both the national and local level has very few Negro members. The paucity of Negro printers reflects the fact that admission to the union sector of the industry is largely in the hands of the union members, themselves. Men generally become apprentices through being brought into the shop by union members, and the white members of the union, whether consciously prejudiced or not, are not likely to bring Negroes into the trade.

The supporters of Negro rights must face up to the fact that unions remain one of the more discriminatory sectors of American life precisely because they are one of the more democratic sectors, particularly on the local level. Union leaders are relatively free to express their generally liberal personal sentiments in public policy resolutions at state and national federation meetings since such resolutions do not affect what goes on in the shop, or at the local union meeting. But those dependent on support in the shop or local feel inhibited about trying to force union members to change their behavior. An employer sometimes can be more liberal precisely because legally he is a dictator, he is not up for re-election in the local.

If the general tenor of my argument is correct, then it follows that any basic solution is not to be found within the structure of organized labor acting unilaterally. Unions and union members must be forced to accept job

rights for Negroes by public action, by legislation, by strong enforcement of Fair Employment Practices legislation. And here, of course, is the rub. For obvious reasons, unions generally oppose any legislation which gives government agencies power over union admission policies as well as other aspects of their internal affairs. In the past, liberal and radical intellectuals, generally favorable to unions as the largest single force sustaining the redistribution of privilege to the larger society, have supported the unions' resistance to government intervention. But the fact remains that as in the case of serious violations of union democracy, often little can be done to reform unions from within to make them effective instruments of integration.

It must be admitted that the suggestion that the struggle to modify union exclusion policies should be carried on primarily on the level of government action is not one which offers much hope for effective reform in the immediate future. The Democratic Party is today the primary partisan political instrument for improving the lot of the Negro. But the two largest groups within the Democratic Party are the trade unions and the Southerners. While differing on most issues of social policy, these two groups unite in opposing legislation which would force unions not to discriminate. And Democratic administrations in the North as well as in the Federal government are reluctant to get involved in direct fights with union leaders on whom they must rely for strong support on Election Day. The Republicans, although not loathe to embarrass unions and desirous of winning Negro votes, also find themselves incapable of taking action in this field. It would be difficult for them to strongly support the rights of Negroes to union membership without also favoring Fair Employment legislation, policies opposed by their businessmen supporters and Dixiecrat Congressional allies.

All this would seem to imply no

alternate except the traditional remedies of organized pressure tactics and public exposes. Democratic Party and trade union leaders alike must be subjected to a barrage of criticism for their failings on the supreme domestic moral issue of the mid-twentieth century. Leaders, whether union or political, react to pressures. And at the moment the pressures to which they are subjected, both within unions and in the general polity, make inaction on this issue seem most appropriate. The labor movement and the Kennedy administration are basically led by men of good will with respect to civil rights issues. To embarrass them into acting is the best thing which those who want more effective trade union action or political realignment can do to foster these objectives. Picket lines should be at least as effective outside union halls or Congressmen's offices as they have been outside of Woolworth's.

William Gomberg:

MR. HILL'S ARTICLE leaves me with the question, what is he trying to achieve? I have no quarrel with his facts. I do with some of his implications and his implicit conclusion.

Articles on the Negro-White problem may be classified into two categories.

(1) Those that accelerate "gradualists" to move at a rate somewhat faster than that of a snail by offering counter shrillness to the fanatical racist.

(2) Those that advance a set of operational remedies that are workable.

Mr. Hill's article belongs to the former group. The querulous indignation of Hill's article does serve a useful purpose. Its shrill tones makes the trade unionist, who is indifferent to the problem, take a position. It is my own conviction that an indifferent, supine rank and file permits it-

self to be controlled too often in local situations by the fanatical racist. The racist is sick with his obsession and works at his hatred full time. He makes things so unpleasant for the rank and file that the racist's mores come to govern the group. The counter-querulousness of the Hill approach is necessary to make the man in the middle take a stand. George Meany, whose personal attitude on this question is above reproach is caught in between. When Philip Randolph pressed him, Randolph encountered a common psychological reaction. If you dare not get angry with the persecutor, then lash out at the persecuted for pricking your sense of frustration. Meany has more than made amends for this "bloopers." I do think it unfortunate that in a television appearance he expressed the opinion that a financially dishonest person presented more of a threat to the union movement's integrity than a racist. I don't know that he should expel the racist but he should recognize that the comparative threat to a movement's integrity is if anything the other way round. The financial depredations of an underworld crook are reversible. There is even a chance to get the money back.

A racist assault upon a minority leaves its victims much more deeply crippled and hurt than simple embezzlement or even simple assault. Unfortunately, expulsion from the movement has proven a remedy in neither case. It simply removes what little influence was previously exercised. That is the reason I thought the Teamsters expulsion was a mistake, and the reason I would oppose expelling the racist.

Mr. Hill's technique depends in large part on communicating facts, but not all of them. A distorted picture emerges that pseudo simplifies the problem at hand.

I have no quarrel with Mr. Hill's facts. There is no doubt that they are true. The implicit remedy is that

we must integrate all locals into single color-blind bodies. This means that in many cases a Negro bureaucracy must surrender its offices in a segregated local. It very often means that a fearful Negro rank and file is asked to integrate its job opportunities with the white local whom the Negroes don't trust, on a theoretical non-discriminatory basis. The Negro worker is for integration in the abstract, but in the concrete, he too often wants to maintain his own segregated local. He's all for integration for the other guy and his fears are quite understandable. The Chicago Negro musicians local is a case in point.

Some highly placed Negroes politically have humorously coined a new term, "worcmij" or Jim Crow spelled backwards, and tell you quite frankly that they would never occupy the posts that they do unless they were Negroes. The numerous clause is not without its morbid beneficence. The labor movement is not without its share of this perversion. Nevertheless, I think it significant that Hill continues to demand more of the labor movement than of any other organized group.

Much as he would deny it, he at least knows that he can embarrass them by playing upon their sense of guilt. What other organization has this implicit moral sense?

Tom Kahn:

Alfred Baker Lewis' letter in the last issue criticizes my article ("The New Negro and the New Moderation,") on three counts, which I should like, belatedly, to take up now.

1) Mr. Lewis feels that my criticism of Herbert Hill "for not strengthening the Negro community's identification with the labor movement" is undeserved; he goes on to cite instances of Mr. Hill's support of labor's efforts for social reform. These instances are not quite relevant. There are many people who support labor-backed so-

cial reforms and even the right of collective bargaining, and yet have no sense of identification with the labor movement itself.

My article contrasted Mr. Hill's position with that of Mr. Lewis, who had written in *Crisis* that "we support organized labor in general." Mr. Lewis objects to the contrast. Yet, 164 pages in front of this objection Mr. Hill writes that:

the militant Negro worker is confronted not with a trade union movement that is a force for social change but on the contrary, with a national labor organization that has become a very conservative and highly bureaucratized institution, closely allied in many cities and states to reactionary political forces and defending that status quo which is now directly attacked by the Negro in virtually every area of American life. (Italics are his own.)

I think this more than substantiates my complaint that "we look in vain through his reports for any indication of a 'natural alliance,' for any sign that the labor movement is, in his eyes, something more than just another instrument to discriminate against Negroes." Mr. Lewis had contended that it was "unnecessary for Hill . . . to emphasize his stand [favoring the labor movement]" because his reports were not intended for "wholly uninformed people." What a vindication of the ignorant, who assumed that Mr. Hill meant only what he said and no more!

I do not wish here to argue the validity or invalidity of Mr. Hill's position (a mixture of the valuable and the destructive), only to defend my statement that his position is not what Mr. Lewis' position has been. In the November, 1960, *Crisis* Mr. Lewis wrote that "usually employers are the ones guilty of job discrimination. The union, if there is one in the plant, simply goes along with the employer's policy." But Mr. Hill's piece in *New Politics* tells us that

"trade union discrimination is the decisive factor in determining whether Negro workers in a given industry shall have an opportunity to earn a living for themselves and their families."

Elsewhere in his letter Mr. Lewis makes reference to "the alliance that ought to be strengthened between the NAACP and organized labor," a reference with which I wholly concur. I guess Mr. Lewis, like me, is one of those sophomoric 'experts' on race relations . . . [who] lament the 'disruption' of the so-called 'Negro-labor alliance.' "

Was it Voltaire who asked God to save him from his friends, for he could take care of his enemies himself?

2) Mr. Lewis is correct in reminding me of the NAACP Youth Council sit-ins of 1958 and 1959, but wrong in suggesting that they began the sit-in movement. Antecedents of Greensboro can be cited at length (e.g., CORE's successful Washington sit-ins during the 50's), but these did not spark mass action. Moreover, they took place in border cities, whereas what developed in 1960 was a Southern based phenomenon. No, neither the NAACP Youth Councils nor any other organized group fathered the sit-ins.

3) I think Mr. Lewis' contention that it was the NAACP's Supreme Court Case and not the Bus Boycott that desegregated Montgomery's buses is rather formalistic. It's a bit like saying that the Interstate Commerce Commission integrated the bus terminals, without discussing the Freedom Rides.

Herbert Hill Comments:

I am generally in agreement with Professor Lipset's comments and it is to be hoped that he and other members of the academic community will continue to study the social characteristics of the American working class and their institutions. In

other articles I have indicated that I share Professor Lipset's concern with the authoritarian and the racist impulses of American workers.

I certainly agree with Professor Lipset that in fighting discriminatory racial practices within labor unions there is "no alternative except the traditional remedies of organized pressure tactics and public exposés . . . trade union leaders . . . must be subject to a barrage of criticism for their failings on the supreme domestic moral issue of the mid-Twentieth Century." And this is precisely what the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is doing.

Lipset's final comment that "picket lines should be at least as effective outside union halls or Congressman's offices as they have been outside Woolworth's" is particularly interesting. It was precisely the threat of a picket line in front of the headquarters of the Waiters Union in Philadelphia, after more than a year of futile negotiation, that forced for the first time the dispatching of an integrated work force to the Sheraton Hotel during the 1961 NAACP Convention.

Mr. Gomberg's comment suggests that he is most uncomfortable with the material contained in my article. On one hand, Mr. Gomberg says "I have no quarrel with Mr. Hill's facts. There is no dispute that they are true," but in the previous sentence he accuses me of giving a "distorted picture." I have given the facts without distortion and it is most unfortunate that persons like Bill Gomberg, who have functioned for many years on trade union staffs, should feel uncomfortable by the material I present.

In referring to Meany's vicious attack on Randolph, Mr. Gomberg says that "Meany has more than made amends for this blooper." I should

like to know what "amends" he is referring to. Certainly Mr. Gomberg cannot be referring to the subsequent action of the AFL-CIO Executive Council in publicly censuring Randolph because of his effective attacks upon the discriminatory practices of many important affiliated unions. This action can only be described as an incredible piece of stupidity, including the charge that Mr. Randolph and his colleagues are discriminating against white workers who wish to become Pullman car porters.

Mr. Gomberg regards other examples of Meany's comments on Negro issues as "unfortunate," but the fact of the matter is that these "bloopers" and "unfortunate" remarks are simply expressions of the tragic lack of insight and understanding on the part of the trade union leadership of the Negro's struggle for full equality and dignity in American society. For Meany, Dubinsky, Harrison, and all the other "labor statesmen," civil rights is something they will dispense to the poor deserving Negro in their own time and in their own way on the basis of their own superior wisdom because they know what is good and just. It is this pathetic attitude that is today the heart of the question.

Negro workers, especially those who belong to trade unions, are not going to permit Meany or anybody else, to determine what their proper and just demands should be or how they will be achieved. The Negro is now directly intervening in trade unions as well as in all other institutions in American society to radically alter his status as a member of an inferior caste and this is precisely what Mr. Meany and his colleagues are incapable of understanding.

The Chicago Negro Musicians' local cited by Mr. Gomberg to prove that Negro trade unionists are not for integration is completely atypical, as some unusual conditions exist in the

American Federation of Musicians. However, for every such case one can cite a hundred others where Negro workers who are forced to belong to "Jim Crow" locals have protested for many long years but to no avail against their segregated status with its separate racial seniority lines and wage discrimination in the Brotherhood of Railroad and Steamship Clerks, the Railway Car-men of America, the Carpenters Union, the Pulp and Sulphite Workers Union, the Papermakers and Paperworkers Union as well as many others. The attempt to blame Negro trade unionists for the existence of segregated local organizations is unworthy of Mr. Gomberg.

•

As for the comments made by Mr. Kahn, I can only say that the labor movement I deal with is the labor movement that exists in reality, not the labor movement that exists only in Mr. Kahn's fantasies. Although I must say that I, too, share the hope that someday there will be a trade union movement that will be an expression of democratic humanism and that it will use its power to secure social justice and dignity for all the workers of America.

GANDHI MARG

a quarterly journal of gandhian thought

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I have read Mr. Bottone's essay "Cuba: Socialist or Totalitarian?" published in *New Politics*. Many ideas, difficult to express, come into my mind. Twenty five days ago, I was in Cuba believing, until the last moment, that "something ought to happen." My hope was useless; all possibilities were closed. Today I am a Cuban refugee.

I am a poet, and as a poet I fought against Batista in the "26th of July" (underground division). It was easy to choose then; Batista was, at that moment, the expression of all the evil of our history. The conditions were good to sweep the past away and to begin with a new future. But we did not have a good ideology to fill the utopian space of our ideals, even if we did know something for sure; that the Communists were no good for us. Why? Because they broke with Cuban revolutionary ideals for good when they supported Batista in 1935-1944, after he had ordered the killing of proletarians in the General Strike of 1935 and the assassination of the revolutionary leaders Guiteras and Aponte among other things. Then, when Batista took power in 1952, the Communist Party opposed any strikes against him as they opposed any radical solutions to the situation. In January 1959, everything changed in Cuba but the Communist Party; the same old Stalinists came to light with the same old songs. Not a single young man joined them.

The "26th of July" arose with the power in its hands and with new things to propose. At least that was what we thought. But Fidel had made up his mind. First he ordered Raul to boycott any intention of organizing a political party under the leadership of the "26th of July" which be-

gan to have some ideas of its own. For export purposes (in that time we didn't realize that) Fidel spoke about "Humanism." But he stopped soon without any intention of going further. His "Humanist doctrine" fulfilled his purpose; to make confusion in the ideological order and to deceive some of the foreign spectators. It was a good moment for the initial activities of the Communist Party. They freely began their indoctrination with the aid of Fidel, Raul, and Guevara. They wrote pages and pages—using the patterns of the Stalinist dialectical system—"demonstrating" how the revolution and the Communists "coincided" in their different points of view. Meanwhile the "26th of July" said nothing and was allowed to say nothing. In those conditions, many young intellectuals thought that the best thing to do was to become Communists and change the structure of the Party from inside. To this day they have failed. Take for example, the ideological magazine *Cuba Socialista* and you will see that Stalinism (I believe now that Stalinism is the natural form of Communism) is the only way of thinking these people have.

We know, now, that Fidel mistrusted the "26th of July" all the time. He was right in a way. We would never have supported his dictatorship. That's why the "26 of July" doesn't exist now and instead the "United Party of the Revolution" (read the Communist Party) rules the nation.

Did the "26th of July" have some totalitarian ideas? I am afraid we did; though we were clear in our hatred of one man rule we let Fidel lead us toward the denial of free elections. It is true that we had very bad opinions about elections in Cuba, so it is easy to understand our position. But the

fact is that we didn't realize Fidel's real intentions.

As you see, the situation was confused. Confusion is a good road for the Communist car and they know how to ride it. Fidel and his comrades began to work, without being disturbed, in this direction. The people didn't have time to react, because of the speed of events. The Communists, meanwhile, taking advantage, won all the strategic positions. It is the old story, the story of a country that really needs a revolution and that thinks, rightly, that nothing can be done without a socialist touch.

We are now in tragic spot. Everybody has run too far. There are, nevertheless, some facts that still remain from 1959. First, no matter what Fidel says, he is not a Communist. Castro doesn't understand a word about Marxism-Leninism but he does about Hitler. Take any of Castro's speeches and you will see how close they are to Hitler's soul. This fact leads us to another. There was and there will always be (in case anything happens) conflict between the Communists and Fidel Castro. At this moment, the question of power (the only thing Castro cares about) is leading his forces into a deep crisis. Ché Guevara, for example (the only man who dares to make some criticism over TV) is in disgrace, because he is not a Stalinist, although he is a convinced Marxist-Leninist. Fidel himself is being used to amuse the mob, which needs his voice (as Germany needed Hitler's) to go on with his "socialism."

Mr. Sam Bottone's splendid essay together with Robert Alexander's and Samuel Shapiro's made me write this letter. My English prevents me from going as deeply as I want.

Each day I am more convinced of the Communist defeat but the Communist use of humanity's needs causes a lot of harm. Cuba is one of its victims. Our job is to rescue her and

sustain, at the same time, the principles of progress, which your publication seems to represent.

I also want to reply to some things said by Mr. Cedric Belfrage in your symposium.

Quotation from Mr. Belfrage: "Since the revolution was officially declared socialist Fidel's popularity has not diminished but grown."

Reply: False. The increasing of "guerilla" groups among the peasants and continuous exodus of thousands of Cubans from the country (despite all the government obstacles) demonstrate that the people are becoming more conscious of the true situation. Besides, the government is using terror as a way to restrain public discontent. The majority of people that are being shot or jailed today are workers and peasants.

Quotation: "The people like to listen to him (Fidel) for hours because they feel that there is a great man who is theirs and who is telling their truth."

Reply: False. In a totalitarian country you can not prove that the people's feelings toward the government are sincere. The Communists force you to a continuous performance through fear and terror. When Fidel appears in public many go to see him because they are afraid to lose their jobs or something worse. As to Fidel Castro's truths he has contradicted himself on so many occasions that it isn't worth going over his speeches from the beginning of his rule to his final declaration of his Marxist-Leninist faith in December 1961.

Quotation: "The formation of Revolutionary Defense Committees in every community seems to be an intermediate step toward this" (the single revolutionary party).

Reply: The so-called "Defense Committees" are organizations the government uses to watch over every step the people make. The rules are clear about their main job. Besides, they are organized in factories, farmers co-

operatives, etc. to watch precisely those forces that ought to sustain the revolutionary government. About the single party. This historical experience shows—no matter what kind of justification it has—that only one party means only one idea (the others are persecuted). And I don't believe that's progress. That's reaction.

Quotation: "PSP has learned to respect his (Fidel's) judgment."

Reply: In Cuba there is no other judgment than Fidel's. The PSP had "adapted" itself to the new situation, as it always does everywhere. But it is now caught in its own trap and both Fidel and the PSP are now each others prisoners.

Quotation: "A far smaller proportion has been thus affected in the Cuban than in the American and French Revolution."

Reply: True, economically, but seven million Cubans have been affected in their liberties. But there is the fact that 200,000 Cubans are now refugees. Discounting those affected, the rest belong to the middle or lower class. Can Mr. Belfrage explain why they have they chosen exile?

Quotation: "As for elections, Fidel has often insisted that the people don't want them at this stage."

Reply: False. Right now free elections in Cuba (after a period of a true exchange of ideas) means Fidel's defeat and his replacement by another government which would assure the revolutionary conquests.

About Mr. Belfrage ridiculing the "Russian invasion": Cuba has never been so dependent on any country as she is now on the Russian bloc. As for the "technicos" that the Russians are sending us, I can say this: they have better homes, automobiles, etc. They even have a private market for themselves (where no Cuban can go) which is located in the Blanquita Building, two blocks from 5th Avenue in Havana. This market has all kinds

of goods which Cubans don't have at all. Recently, the police evicted the tenants of two apartment buildings because the Chinese Embassy needed them (located in D between 15th and 13th St.). Read any of Castro's or Guevara's speeches from 1960 to this date and you will read of the promises of new factories that Communist governments give us. Where are they? On the contrary, we are sending all our goods to them. About ten months ago, a great scandal exploded in Havana. A magazine *Union Sovietica* published a photograph showing Czechoslovakian people receiving oranges sent them by the Cuban people. In Cuba there were no oranges, and hospitals, in fact, had great trouble getting their orange supplies. The government said that due to increased consumption they were having trouble maintaining supplies of many kinds of food. The magazine issue was immediately requisitioned by the government but not until it had been seen by many people who then knew that Castro lied. The problem is that Castro has to pay with food for the weapons the Communists are sending him for he has no money to pay with.

These are some of my replies to Mr. Belfrage. I am very far from having a good answer on every one of his remarks about Cuba. But I am sure of one thing: that he is very far also from seeing the true situation in my country. I want to believe that he is sincere. So are the truly revolutionary Cubans who do not want a worse imperialism in their country.

C. L.

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The above letter has been sent to Mr. Cedric Belfrage who resides in Havana for his comments. As of presstime we have not heard from Mr. Belfrage but any reply from him which might yet come in will appear in our Summer Issue.—Editor.

Notes From Abroad

World Congress Of Communist Controlled Unions

A. Giacometti

FOR MANY YEARS, there could hardly be a more predictable event to report than a Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Communist rump of the international trade union organization which reflected the "grand alliance" of the Western Allies with Russia up to 1947. The labor world was accustomed to WFTU congresses as rituals of allegiance to the Russian policy of the moment. The automatic expulsion of the Yugoslav trade unions after the break between Tito and Stalin was a fine example of the blind obedience which was expected—and always obtained—from this hapless organization. Today, the situation has changed somewhat. Recent undercurrents of dissension in the Communist camp are reflected in the "trade union arm" of the world Communist movement, and its debates are beginning to be relevant to problems of the wider labor movement.

The Peiping session of the WFTU General Council in June 1960 was dominated by the violent attack of the Chinese spokesmen on Russian international policy. As opposed to Khrushchev's "peaceful diplomacy," the Chinese demanded a more aggressive foreign policy for the Communist bloc, even at the risk of war. Like the Yugoslav split, this conflict did not arise from problems raised by trade union action, but only reflected a conflict of interests between the ruling classes of two Communist powers. This conflict was still present at the Fifth Congress of the WFTU, held in

Moscow last December, but in a milder form. The main themes of Russian "peaceful diplomacy," interspersed with justifications of the explosion of giant nuclear bombs at Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk, were restated by Khrushchev in person.

Far more important, and more relevant to the natural concerns of the labor movement, was the position of the Italian delegation, representing the Communist and left-Socialist membership of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL). For the first time in the history of the WFTU after the split, an opposition expressed itself on a platform derived from the real problems of an affiliated organization, rather than from the needs of the ruling class of a Communist state.

THE MAIN ISSUE IN DISPUTE was the new WFTU action program, prepared at headquarters (Prague), along the traditional lines of Communist trade union policy and dominated by the thinking of the Russians and of the French Communist-led unions, the CGT. The program had already come in for heavy criticism in the Socialist *Avanti!* In an article published last October, widely regarded as "courageous" in Italian socialist circles, the daily of the Italian Socialist Party had made the following points:

(1) In its analysis of the world situation, the draft program only distinguishes between a "socialist world" and a "capitalist world" and does not recognize that a policy based on taking sides for one military bloc against another is objectively a threat to peace. The role of "uncommitted nations" and of similar factors is hardly touched upon, except insofar as they are assigned various tasks in the "anti-imperialist" struggle. In this respect the general outlook of the draft pro-

gram is no different from the standard position of all Communist parties: in fact, it shows rather less self-critical insight than many recent CP statements, including statements by Khrushchev himself.

(2) Insofar as the "socialist world" is concerned, the document confines itself to "uncritical praise." It makes no allowances for differences in the specific national situations within the system, and it gives "no element of appreciation concerning the tasks and functions of trade unions and concerning the real problems of the workers in this large part of the world."

(3) Its analysis of the "capitalist world" also remains superficial, and "falls far below the level of similar analyses made by the various national centers and in particular by our own CGIL." The general attacks on monopoly power do not add much to our knowledge of the subject, and "we would have expected a more profound evaluation—if needed a critical evaluation—of the policies required to effectively fight the monopolies." Not enough is said about the tasks of trade unions in advanced capitalist countries; assertions about the "inevitable crisis of capitalism" may be correct in the long run, but the affiliated unions expect some indication as to what they are to do in the short run. For example, what must the workers do to strengthen their own unity against the growing international unity of their employers. Also nothing is said about the new relations between trade unions and the State which, as a result of trade union activity, is no longer the "exclusively" bourgeois State we knew.

(4) Much is said about the international unity of the workers, but only on the level of propaganda appeals. "We do not see how progress can be made here without freeing the trade unions in all countries of subordination to governments, whichever they may be."

(5) Nationalization in capitalist countries is defined as a maneuver of

the monopolies to strengthen their power. "In Italy, this does not adequately reflect the relations between the labor movement and the nationalized industries." Surprisingly enough, the document then goes on to say that the most urgent task of trade unions in capitalist countries is to call for more nationalization!

(6) The document calls on all workers and on their unions to "oppose by utmost resistance the resumption of nuclear testing and to see to it that the manufacture of nuclear weapons be discontinued." The *Avanti!* drily comments: "The original draft of the document goes back to the month of June. We have no knowledge of a similar position being taken by the WFTU after the resumption of nuclear testing by the USSR."

THE DEBATE ON THE DRAFT PROGRAM was then carried further by the intervention of some CGIL functionaries belonging to the Stalinist wing of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) who rallied to the defense of the draft, then by a rejoinder of a group belonging to the party's "autonomist" wing. Nor was the discussion restricted to the Socialist element in the CGIL. When the Italian delegation arrived in Moscow, it was armed with a counter-program elaborated in the research department of the CGIL, and with no less than 28 amendments to the draft.

The Italian position was stated by Antonio Novella, the Communist president of the CGIL and outgoing president of the WFTU. The proposed action program, he said, could only be a common platform for those already convinced. It does not sufficiently take into account the specific problems of each national and regional situation, particularly that prevailing in Western Europe, where the unions affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions exert a profound influence. Directives and slogans must be more flexible. The organization will have to talk about concrete and topical objectives, rather than continuing

the sterile polemic on the 1949 split.

Novella went on to say that "Attacks on the political morality of leaders of other trade union organizations are unnecessary and even damaging. Millions of workers still trust these leaders, and slogans on such themes remain without effect."

The Italian leader also insisted on the necessity for greater trade union independence from political control, and reserved the right not to participate in certain political campaigns: "In our opinion it is not useful that the trade unions should adopt political slogans or diplomatic positions which are not generally shared and which, as experience shows, are subject to revision."

Unusual as such a position may be in a WFTU congress, it was not nearly as unusual as the position of Bruno Di Pol, the Socialist Secretary of the Milan Chamber of Labor. When the Italian delegation finally voted for the action program out of "discipline," in spite of the fact that practically all their amendments were rejected, Di Pol voted against, because he found that "the discrepancy between this text and the positions expressed at the Congress by the Italian delegation was too great." His was the only dissenting voice among 918 delegates, guests and observers, and it caused a moment of panic among the Russian organizers of the Congress, who are in the habit of bringing delegations of workers from factories of the Moscow region to watch such Congresses, and who did not expect to be embarrassed by a living example of dignity and courage.

THE MOTIVES OF THE ITALIAN opposition are mixed: among the Communists, the need to be granted elbow-room for tactical adjustments prevails; among some of the Socialists, there is a genuine desire to restore a measure of rank-and-file control to their movement. But, whatever the motives may be, it is certain to engender far-reaching consequences. The CGIL has

always played a major role in the WFTU, and for good reasons. Theoretically, the membership of the WFTU amounts to 90 million (110 million according to their own estimate). But only 8 million of the total are members of voluntary organizations in countries where a measure of trade union freedom exists. That part of WFTU membership which is in a position to choose freely a union under Communist leadership therefore does not represent more than 9% of the total, and it is essentially confined to the leading trade union centers of France, Italy and Indonesia, and to the second-strongest national center in India. With its 3.5 million members, the Italian CGIL is by far the strongest of the four Communist centers based on voluntary membership, both in absolute numbers and in comparison with the competing centers in the same country. As such, it has always been held up as an example of Communist leadership in the trade union field.

However, since 1947, the workers who follow a Communist leadership in Western Europe do so for "reformist" reasons; that is, they expect their organization to improve their living conditions within the framework of existing society. They choose a Communist union because they trust it to pursue reformist aims more militantly and consistently than the other unions. The leaders of the CGIL know that, under the prevailing circumstances, their organization cannot maintain its position if it cannot give adequate service on "bread and butter" issues. They have been concerned for some time about the increasing isolation and stagnation of their center: most of the important recent agreements (metal and electrical trades, food, chemical industries) have been concluded without the CGIL or against its opposition. Since the leaders of the CGIL are not unintelligent, they fully realize that their problems derive from the obligation to apply mechanically tactics that have nothing to do with the real needs

of the workers concerned. For some time, they have sought to free themselves of this political handicap, and of the obedience symbolized and enforced on the international level by the WFTU.

The leaders of the CGIL are prisoners of revolutionary phraseology, while obliged to follow a reformist practice. On the international level, they have on their hands a cumbersome and useless machinery, which cannot effectively support economic demands within the framework of existing society, and which is incapable of achieving a fundamental transformation of society—in whatever direction—by revolutionary means. To recognize this fact openly, means admitting that the WFTU does not exist to serve the needs of militant trade unionism, but as an auxiliary arm of Russian diplomacy.



THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT only those of the CGIL: they are shared by every trade union organization in Western Europe under Communist leadership, and particularly by the French Communist-led General Confederation of Workers (CGT). The reasons which impel a French worker to adhere to a CGT union, are no different from those of a rank-and-file member of the CGIL in Italy. The difference lies in the tighter control of the French Communist Party over these unions which is partly due to the absence of

a substantial Socialist tendency, and partly to the continuous existence of a Stalinist apparatus in France for over twenty years. Consequently, the leadership of the CGT remains strongly attached to Stalinist orthodoxy, even at the expense of the immediate interests of the organization. It has so far succeeded in either isolating or crushing any independent tendencies in the organization. This contrast between the French and the Italian position was very much in evidence in Moscow. Certain remarks of the Italian delegates amounted to an indictment of the Thorezian leadership of the CGT which failed to organize any serious resistance to the Algerian war but did successfully organize, for some years, the passivity of the most militant elements of the French working class.

The rigidity of the CGT leadership fails to provide an answer to the crisis of the CGT, which is no less profound than that of the CGIL, and which stems from the same problems. The critical attitude, and the example of relative independence, of the Italian delegation in Moscow, will not fail to disturb the French organization. It might give new life to the officially-approved "loyal" opposition of Le Brun and Rouzaud, and it will probably strengthen the position of the real opposition of Pastre, one of the leaders of the "Movement for United Democratic Trade Unionism" (MS UD) and of other minority elements.

In the immediate future, however, Italians will remain isolated. Unsurprisingly, they met little response for their position in Moscow, and received only weak support from the Polish delegation, from the tiny Communist fraction of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, and from the delegates from Cyprus. The Cuban delegation was divided between a "revisionist" fraction which supported the Italians, and the supporters of Stalinist orthodoxy. Partial support on certain issues was given to the CGIL by the Indian delegation, led by S. A. Dange, one of

the leaders of the pro-Russian faction in the Indian C.P. However, Dange, who has to deal with a strong pro-Chinese faction in his own party, has a very small margin for independent maneuver. As it is, his election to the leading bodies of the WFTU was vetoed by the Chinese delegation.

Outside of the Poles, whose special position is determined by that of their own government, there was no reason to assume that the Italian position would be particularly popular with the leaders of the organizations that replace trade unions in the Communist countries; their main concern is certainly not to strengthen the independence of their organizations in order to raise demands on behalf of their membership. As far as the few voluntary organizations are concerned, most of them are solidly controlled by a political apparatus that does not allow for deviations. Novella and his comrades can only be thankful for the geographical accident allowing for their self-expression without fear of immediate retribution.

If the CGIL maintains its position, as it probably will, its isolation within the WFTU is likely to increase. Entirely dominated as it is by the "bloc-vote" of the State organizations of the Communist countries, the WFTU is not an organization that can be reformed or reorganized in such a way as to serve the interests of the mass of workers it claims to represent. Every effort of the CGIL to defend its new position will produce a hardening of the wall of hostility and distrust it already had to face in Moscow.

In the logical order of events, the CGIL would have to choose between two alternatives: either retreat and submission, or disaffiliation at the risk of a possible split. More probably, it will seek to maintain an intermediary position of supporting the WFTU formally while pursuing its own policies. This attitude will resolve nothing, and will generate future difficulties and heresies in the Communist trade union international.

THE ROLE OF the PSI socialists in this situation is interesting to watch. They are at the same time the shield and the alibi of the Communists in the CGIL: The main concern of the Communist Party is not to lose contact with the PSI—its last link with Italian politics. It is prepared to go to great lengths in order not to lose this contact: a recent declaration of the Communists even goes as far as to support the formation of a Christian-Democratic, Social-Democratic and Republican coalition government with PSI support. The necessity of not losing contact with the PSI provides a perfect justification for the Italian Communist Party's policy of relative independence—a necessary evil for some, but a welcome pretext for cutting loose from Moscow for others. On the other hand, the socialists of Nenni's party provide effective protection against reprisals from Moscow against the top leaders of the CGIL.

A Communist has no means of opposing such reprisals short of breaking with the party, but a PSI socialist need not have these compunctions, and Novella's former place on the WFTU Executive Committee is now occupied by Santi, the socialist Secretary-General of the CGIL. (In the presidency of the WFTU, Novella was replaced by Bitossi, a secondary personality in the CGIL.)



The significance of any opposition in the WFTU of course depends on the significance of the organization itself. Increasingly, the leaders of the WFTU have recognized the uselessness of this organization and have assigned it to purely propagandistic purposes. Serious organizing work has been left


to front organizations and to Communist factions in other trade union bodies: solidarity committees, regional organizations based on a pro-Russian or pro-Chinese brand of neutralism, or organizations confined to a single industry. In Africa, the former WFTU affiliates in the countries of former French West Africa have entered the "All-African Federation of Trade Unions" set up by the TUC's of Guinea and Ghana. In Latin America, the WFTU regional organization—CTAL—has been reduced to a paper organization, while the main effort of the Communist trade unionists is concentrated on creating professional organizations based on the Cuban trade unions.

But even on this level, the WFTU is now stagnating, after some initial success. The Cuban unions, which were for a brief period a pole of attraction for all progressive unions of the continent, and which had established a close alliance with the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers, are now isolated as a result of the obvious control of the Cuban CP over all their operations. In Western Asia, the Iraqi unions, a major conquest of the WFTU, have disaffiliated as a result of Kassim's break with the Iraqi Communist Party, and now seek to revive the International Confederation of Arab Labor Unions. In West Africa, the recent difficulties of the Guinean government with the Communist Party have proved the fragility of the alliance on which the "Pan-African" trade union international is based. In Eastern Asia, the recent decision of the SOHYO, by far the largest of the Japanese trade union centers, to support exclusively the Socialist Party in elections, is a

defeat for the "unity" policy of infiltration associated with the WFTU in that country.

The WFTU has proven itself to be a useless institution from the reformist or the revolutionary point of view, and even its usefulness from the point of view of Stalinist diplomacy is becoming very limited. Will the Italian CGIL, and particularly its socialist tendency, draw the obvious conclusions?

THE MAINSTREAM OF the international labor movement has developed, for some time, outside of the WFTU, and there has not been a single important workers' struggle in the last ten years where the Communist trade union movement has played a leading role. The ICFTU, in spite of obvious weaknesses, now represents 60 million workers which, except for a tiny minority have freely joined organizations of their choice. Independent organizations, without formal international ties, represent other millions. The International Trade Secretariats, who re-group the world's socialist and non-political unions on a "vertical" or industrial basis, are the main bodies actively organizing the unorganized. Affiliation to the WFTU represents an insurmountable handicap for all organizations who wish to establish closer ties with the real international labor movement. Recognition of this fact should lead to the dissolution of the WFTU. But we know that, like the Comintern, the WFTU will not dissolve as long as it has its uses for Russian diplomacy. However, for trade unionists who have a different conception of their role, disaffiliation is an inescapable conclusion.



The New Democratic Party of Canada

THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY of Canada is less than a year old. It had its formal birth last July in Canada's capital city of Ottawa.

Such a significant political event was of course not without its antecedents. Since the turn of the century socialist groups have been active in Canada. Indeed, in our western-most province of British Columbia a full-blown socialist party was developed in the 90's.

Labor, too, had dabbled politically. Sixty years ago a trade union MP was elected to the Canadian parliament and several provincial members of legislatures were elected from industrial areas.

The post World War I period saw a wave of agrarian radicalism sweep across the nation. In Alberta and in Ontario farmers' governments were elected, in the latter case with labor's participation. In the mid-twenties the Progressive Party won sixty seats and held the balance of power in Canada's 245 seat parliament.

The Progressive Party suffered from the lack of any coherent philosophy. Its members of parliament were gradually seduced by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, a wily politician who knew well the threat to his Liberal Party from a growing third force.

By the mid-thirties only a handful of Progressives were left. They were the genuine socialists and were among the true founders of Canada's first democratic socialist party, the Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF), born in 1932.

In the meantime, the trade union movement was divided in its political approach. The former Canadian Congress of Labor, counterpart of the American CIO, was politically radical from its inception. In 1942 it endorsed the CCF as labor's political arm. The former Trades and Labor Congress, counterpart of the American Federation of Labor, shunned political action in the tradition of Samuel Gompers. This ambivalence typified the contradictory influence in Canada of the British and American traditions.

Following the merger in 1956 into the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC), trade unionists debated for two years the question of labor's political approach. By 1958 those who favored direct political action had won. Among the key arguments was the very convincing one that the Gompers approach was really meaningless in a nation with a parliamentary system of government. Under cabinet government with rigorous party discipline, rewarding your friends and punishing your enemies makes little sense. For the friends and enemies are not individuals but political parties to the philosophies of which the individual party representative has to adhere.

At its convention in 1958 the CLC decided that the only political friend on which it could depend would be its own political party. Thus, that convention called for "the need of a broadly based people's political movement, which embraces the CCF, the labor movement, farm organizations, professional people and other liberal minded persons interested in basic social reform and reconstruction through our parliamentary system of government." At its convention four months later the CCF responded unanimously to the invitation.

THERE IS NO SPACE HERE to go into the details of the multitude of activities involved during the next three years. New Party Clubs developed across the country as a means of enlisting the participation of non-trade

union and non-CCF Canadians. They, together with the CCF'ers and unionists attended literally thousands of schools, meetings and seminars to thrash out drafts of the New Party's program and constitution.

Then, 1800 of them came to Ottawa in July, 1961, to Canada's largest and most colorful political convention. Out of this week-long session came three results which distinguish the New Party on the Canadian political scene.

First, there is the party's philosophy and program, the basics of which can only be sketched here. Most would say it is a democratic socialist philosophy, if one considers (as this writer does) that present day socialist philosophy is exemplified in the programs of such parties as the British Labor Party, the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties and the Israeli Mapai.

But there is no dogma in the New Democratic Party program and little of the revolutionary phraseology of earlier socialist documents.


For example, the program calls for full economic planning through government initiative. It points out that Canada's greatest domestic problem is unemployment (up to ten per cent during winter months of recent years) and lack of growth. Canada has, indeed, lost out to Sweden for second place with respect to standard of living among the world's nations.

The party program states clearly that unemployment and economic stagnation can only be rectified through planned investment, massive expansion of the public sector of the economy and the setting up of development funds and councils for depressed areas. Public ownership is given its due as an effective tool under certain circumstances, particularly where monopoly action is required, as in railways or other forms of transport or where private enterprise simply has not provided sufficient initiative, and in the development of electric power.

In the field of social security the New Democratic Party calls for the

immediate implementation of a medical care program and a contributory superannuation plan. Even more important, the party insists upon the need for an integrated welfare program that assures all citizens of an adequate income and security regardless of circumstances.

The New Democratic Party offers a solution to Canada's unique problem of being two nations in one. It calls for co-operation between the provincial and federal governments in planning balanced growth, while at the same time respecting the difference between Canada's two great cultures, English and French.



In the international field the party rejects neutralism and unilateralism and acknowledges the role Canada must play in Western defense. We believe, however, that Canada can make no contribution by accepting nuclear arms. While the party recognizes the value of the nuclear deterrent, it rejects the defense aspect implied by NORAD. Canada's great wealth may best serve the cause of peace in our opinion through a program of massive aid to the underdeveloped territories and through working for a United Nations police force at whose disposal our limited military strength might be put.

THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY's second distinctive feature is its democratic constitution which not only provides for, but encourages full participation in policy making. Our Liberal and Conservative parties, like your parties are largely financed by corporations, controlled by leaders and bosses, and thus discourage membership policy formulation.

The New Democratic Party sets a low fee for membership (\$2.50 for individuals and 60 cents for affiliates). It will hold regular conventions at which officers report, policy is discussed and constitutions are amendable.

Then, perhaps our greatest asset is our dynamic and colorful leader, former Premier T. C. Douglas of Sas-

katchewan, who led the CCF government in that province for seventeen years. Thus, he has a formidable record for a North American socialist leader of an unbroken series of successes. With this he combines wit, humility and contagious enthusiasm which contrasts with the dourness all too common in recent political leaders.

So the New Democratic Party has striking assets, but it has very substantial hurdles to overcome. Old party traditions and political apathy run deep in the Canadian political scene. Nonetheless, Canadians are aware, if vaguely, of the necessity for a new approach. The New Democratic Party offers that new approach. Its problem is to grasp the opportunity effectively and to make its answers appealing.

CARL HAMILTON is the Secretary of the New Democratic Party of Canada.



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Labor's Progress In Australian Elections

Leonard Lambourne

WHATEVER ONE MAY FEEL personally about the recent election campaign and the result, it would not be an understatement to say that it was truly an extraordinary election. The result held the Australian people in suspense for days afterwards. In fact, it was not until the tenth day after the poll that it was clear that the Menzies Government had been returned.

Until then, indications were that the House of Representatives would be deadlocked with each party holding an equal number of seats. Had this happened it would have been the first time in the history of Federation, and constitutional experts spent the week developing various theories about the consequences. As the voting fluctuated in various marginal electorates, public interest in the poll became even greater and the newspapers would have their afternoon placards describing the latest voting trend as they would a major sporting event.



When the campaign started, very few people gave the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) much hope for victory. While many were prepared to concede that the Government was unpopular because of its economic policies, they could not see the Labor Party as the alternative because the Party was divided and many independent voters thought that the Party was subject to Communist influence. Furthermore, this was the first campaign for Mr. Arthur A. Calwell, as Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. Previously he had been Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Party for nine years to Dr. H. V. Evatt, now Chief Justice of New South Wales. While Mr. Calwell was well known within the Party, it was Dr. Evatt who overshadowed him during those nine years because of the latter's rather controversial approach to politics and, in particular, foreign policy questions.

Despite these obstacles and doubts, Mr. Calwell campaigned vigorously and well, and his stature, both within the A.L.P. and the community, rose considerably. As the campaign drew to a close, it was clear that he had succeeded in persuading some of the swinging vote to cast their vote for the A.L.P. He had made the A.L.P. respectable. The result was that the Government lost 15 seats and was returned with a majority of two (one, after providing the Speaker) and after June 30th will lose control of the Senate, where two Senators from Tasmania will hold the balance of power (one is a member of the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.) and the other an Independent).

THE QUESTION COULD BE ASKED: how could Mr. Calwell starting from scratch almost defeat the Government? He fought the election almost exclusively on economic questions ignoring almost completely foreign policy and other controversial matters. He took the initiative from the very beginning of the campaign and held it right through until polling day.

Mr. Calwell emphasized that the major economic problem facing Australia is that of growth. Unemployment figures had reached their highest since before the war and while this naturally caused some alarm among the Trade Union leaders, it also caused concern among the business leaders who became openly hostile to the Menzies Government.

The full seriousness of unemployment was realized when production figures indicated that the economy had become stagnant. In August, 1961, the Department of Trade Industrial Survey stated: "In the first half of 1961, output of Australian manufacturing industries fell sharply. This was the first time since 1952 that the manufacturing output had shown an overall decline. The decline took place in all five manufacturing groups." And a survey by Department of Trade later in the year stated: "It is evident that capacity in use fell on an average by more than 13 per cent during the year and is now below the level prevailing in 1959."

It was against this background of unemployment and economic stagnation that the Labor Party went into the General Election promising the restoration of full employment, an extension of the Welfare State by increasing pensions and other benefits.

The vote was held on December 9th and the result (as compared with the previous election) was as follows:

	<i>Government</i>	<i>A.L.P.</i>	<i>D.L.P.</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Informal</i>
1958	2,002,704	1,912,222	408,830	53,332	122,311
1961	1,955,911	2,319,333	404,901	80,035	120,219

What are the conclusions that can be drawn from the above result? It is necessary to look at the question from the short term and long term advantage to the Party.

The Parliamentary Session which opens in Canberra on February 20th will become a battle of tactics with the Labor Party using every known tactic to defeat the Government. Mr. Menzies has already begun to fight back. Recently he announced a number of economic concessions, including a reduction in personal taxation which is designed to increase the spending power of the community but can only be described as an attempt to bribe the electors. Many of the proposals announced by the Government are exactly the same as those placed before the electors a few weeks before by the A.L.P. and attacked by Mr. Menzies as being impractical!

While the A.L.P. has reversed the trend of voting of other labor parties throughout the world, this was not done on the basis of building a socialist society; to the contrary, Mr. Calwell promised that during the term of the Parliament the question of nationalization would not be raised.

IN ATTEMPTING TO DESCRIBE this development within the A.L.P. it must be remembered that the Australian Labor Party was formed by the trade union movement in 1890 after the failure of the great Maritime Strike when the State and the employers combined to defeat the efforts of the ships' officers to form a union. The lesson of the defeat was the necessity for unions to have Parliamentary representation in order to fight anti-labor laws used against them. These laws have been changed and much of our industrial legislation serves as a guide to other countries. For example, in New South Wales we have the 40

hour week, three weeks annual leave, long service leave, sick leave, preference to unionists, workers, compensation, all as a result of legislation.

Although the A.L.P. was formed by the working class and it is compulsory for A.L.P. members to be members of their respective unions, its leaders quite often make contradictory statements about the class basis of the Party. Without any apparent sense of incongruity, they have asserted both that it is a working class Party and that it is a Party which oversteps class boundaries and serves the entire community. This ambiguity has remained in practically the same form throughout the Party's history.

At the 1921 Federal Conference of the A.L.P. the Socialization Objective was adopted which called for the socialization of industry, production, distribution and exchange. However, having in mind the complex situation regarding the class basis of the A.L.P. it is a matter of definition whether the A.L.P. really became a socialist party. For twenty-five years after the adoption of the Socialization Objective the Party's attention, to the extent that it paid any attention to socialization at all, was concentrated on the nationalization of banking. The Labor Government attempted to nationalize the banks in 1947 but was defeated in the Courts. After bank nationalization ceased to be practical politics, the Party was obliged at last to take a closer look at the Objective, and has been tinkering with it for the last 12 years.

This process has transformed the Objective from ambiguity to fatuity. The 1951 Federal Conference called for the production of a preamble to the Objective which, when it appeared, consisted of 750 words which did not include "socialism" or "socialization."

The 1957 Conference re-worded the Objective to read:

"The Democratic Socialization of Industry, Production, Distribution and Exchange—to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields—in accordance with the Principles of Action, Methods and Progressive Reforms set out below."

There follows an "Interpretation of Democratic Socialism" of which the first paragraph, typical of the whole, reads:

"Labor believes that Democratic Socialization is the utilization of the economic assets of the State in the interests of citizens and that man is greater than the machine he uses or the environment in which he lives."

Though the word "socialism" was used later in the "interpretation" it was not in a context which suggested any changes of policy in a radical direction. Thus the explicit exposition of any kind of class basis for the Party seems almost to have come to an end. Nevertheless, the A.L.P. can be said to remain a class party in two senses: first, the majority of the working class supports it and a majority of the middle class people opposes it; second, its structure continues to provide a special place for those trade unions whose membership is roughly contiguous with that of the working class.

The strengthening of the A.L.P. in the recent General Election, while it may not bring Australia closer to the establishment of a socialist society, does provide protection for the working class during this period of economic crisis. If the situation worsens then the Party may adopt radical propositions to deal with it.

13th February, 1962.

LEONARD LAMBOURNE is a young Australian writer on foreign affairs. In 1960 he was a member of an Australian Labor Party Youth Council goodwill mission to Asia.

Booknotes . . .

H. M. HYNDMAN AND BRITISH SOCIALISM, by Chushichi Tsuzuki. Oxford University Press, 1961. 304 pages, \$5.60 (35 s.)

This is a valuable addition to the studies on socialist history produced since the war, being the first critical biography of the man who, unfortunately, was the founder of the first Marxist socialist group in England. British Marxism has never entirely recovered from this disaster, considering that Hyndman was not only a thoroughgoing chauvinist, imperialist, anti-Semite and sectarian, but also, in the opinion of both Marx and Engels, a man who understood Marxism only minimally. Dr. Tsuzuki has done a careful, competent job in winnowing the materials, published and unpublished, casting light on Hyndman's political career, and organizing them into a clear account with considerable detail. The book is based on the author's doctoral dissertation at Oxford, with "some abridgment and alteration of style" by Henry Pelling.

A substantial amount of material that will be new to almost any reader is made available, and where the treatment of an interesting episode is sketchy, source references lead deeper. The emphasis is on presentation of a factual account, rather than on analysis. There are appendices on the Social Democratic Federation's finances and membership figures and on bibliographical sources, as well as a good index.

PROTESTS OF AN EX-ORGANIZATION MAN, by Kermit Eby, Beacon Press, Boston, 1961. 146 pages, \$3.50.

This small book is based on articles written by the author for various magazines, from the *Progressive* to the *Journal of Political Science* and including *Brethren Life and Thought*. Eby came from a Mennonite-Brethren

background (with which a number of the essays in this book are concerned), worked for the Teachers Union, was Director of Research and Education in the CIO for six years, and was finally "rescued," as he puts it, by Robert Hutchins, to become a professor of the social sciences at the University of Chicago.

Many of the essays deal, from one or another angle, with Eby's thoughts on the state of the labor movement. His approach is generally progressive, critical, even iconoclastic, and cast in personal-moralistic rather than theoretical terms. A persistent theme is the over-bureaucratization of the trade union movement and leadership, and its loss of idealism. Much of the material is in the form of "anecdotes, stories, vignettes and quotations," as the jacket blurb says. Among the chapters most directly dealing with these themes are: "Why Labor Leaders Are Lonesome," "On Workers' Education," "Organization, Bureaucracy, Loyalty," "Labor and Political Action," "Becoming an Organization Man."

MOSCOW JOURNAL. The End of Stalin. By Harrison E. Salisbury. The University of Chicago Press. \$6.95.

This book by the *New York Times* Moscow correspondent is a diary of nearly five years spent in Russia with added material which offers fascinating reading. Salisbury supplements his accounts noted at the time with dispatches sent to the *Times* indicating the kind of deletions and censorship imposed by the Soviet authorities. The difficulties and frustrations of covering the Soviet beat are clearly illuminated. But they are tempered by intelligent reporting which helps to present overall moods and developments that are most useful in unraveling the great changes that have occurred since Stalin died.

REBEL IN PARADISE. A Biography of Emma Goldman. By Richard Drinnon. The University of Chicago Press. \$5.95

This biography is written with deep affection for the noted anarchist and is based on a most thorough study of all available material scattered through the libraries and archives of many countries. Drinnon sets forth the life and labor of Emma Goldman as a model for all radicals. Above all he is impressed by her unrelenting fight for the freedom of the individual as the essence of the fight for social freedom. Drinnon often goes beyond the vivid lessons of his story to instruct the reader on its deeper meaning and the reader may consider his view of the Spanish civil war excessively pessimistic. For instance, he says of Emma Goldman: "She knew at the time, what others have only since learned, that even a victory over Franco with USSR help meant ultimate defeat."

ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA: A Book of Readings, edited by Gus Tyler.. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962.

Gus Tyler has tied together 51 fascinating excerpts on organized crime with a first rate running analysis of the broader social meaning of crime. Broadly stated, Tyler's thesis is that organized crime is a major political and economic force in the U.S.; a product and reflection of the national culture. In his words:

Organized crime is the nightmare lurking in the shadows of the American Dream!

What is the American dream? Riches and rights available to all! Someday, anybody may become somebody, such as president of U.S. Steel or the U.S.A.

And if you can't get it one way, you take it another way. Once you get it, you strive for "respectability." On one side is the gangster, racketeer and hoodlum; on the other the Robber Barons. They are not identical but parallel phenomena. "In time these

robber barons became the very models of modern major gentlemen, writing laws and appointing law-enforcers to establish legal dominion over their illegally won gains." This is what the Frank Costellos and Al Capones also tried to do, but with much less success.

The difference between the criminal and corporate crooks, such as the electrical industry price-fixers, is less their methods than the obeisance to official morality. "Arisen out of an antisocial milieu, this underworld has come to mimic, as well as mock, the society against which it warred."

THE PEACE RACE, by Seymour Melman. Ballantine Books, New York, 1962. 50 cents.

Ballantine Books has performed an important service in printing this paperback original. In it, the author offers a program of unilateral initiatives toward peace as an alternative to multilateral negotiations or unilateral disarmament with its lack of concern for the likely subsequent acts of the Soviet Union. Understanding the differences between England (where unilateral disarmament is quite another—and sounder—matter) and the United States, Melman offers a program for America that would put men and factories unemployed by automation and the processes of capitalism to work to industrialize the emerging nations. Moreover, Melman understands that the adoption of such a program would entail a considerable radicalization of American politics.

RACE AND SCIENCE by United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Columbia University Press, New York, 1961. 55 pp. \$5.00.

UNESCO has contributed much to the destruction of racist myths which have been the ugliest manifestations of the colonialism and slavery brought by capitalism. It gathers together the best scientific generalizations concerning the question of race. Readable and authoritative.

THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, by William Appleman Williams. The World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, 1961. 513 pp. \$8.00.

This most interesting single-volume interpretation of the entire course of American history is of particular importance to American socialists. The author wishes for democratic socialism—and yet seems to believe that the entire course of American history points in the direction of a neo-corporatist (see Hal Draper's article in *NEW POLITICS*, Vol. 1, No. 1) solution to the problem of the organization of industrial society in the United States. Because of what this book may tell us about the state of American socialism and for its intrinsic merit, I think it provides an excellent subject for extensive discussion in some future issue of *NEW POLITICS*.

THE AMERICAN ULTRAS: The Extreme Right and Military-Industrial Complex, by Irwin Suall. New America, New York, 1962. 75c.

In the past year a great number of pamphlets and reports on the radical right have appeared. However, this pamphlet by Irwin Suall, National Secretary of the Socialist Party, is not another documentation. In addition to a great amount of material, it presents a political analysis of the roots of this movement. Without adopting a fascism-is-around-the-corner approach, it views the radical right as a serious social movement with vast resources at its disposal through its connections with the military-industrial complex.

The basic dynamic for the "American Ultras" is in the international crisis and the inability of the present power structure to either contain or defeat Communism. Once in business the "ultra" groups tie up with other reactionary and racist groups. Irwin Suall ends with an attempt to get the reader to think of a political program because the "ultras" represent a social movement not a group of crackpots. What is needed is not a simple shout-

ing for democracy and a defense of the status quo, but a democratic foreign policy and a new political movement of the Democratic Left.

WHAT IS HISTORY? by Edward Hallett Carr. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962. 209 pp. \$3.50.

In this small volume the English historian, E. H. Carr, author of *A History of Soviet Russia*, the first five volumes of which have so far been published, makes more sense about the nature of the writing of history than any contemporary writer—and, at the same time, indicates why many have found his study of Russia to be at times an apologia for totalitarianism. The positive qualities of this book far outweigh any criticisms, however. Standing in the midst of a tradition in the philosophy of history that has as its significant poles the idealism of Croce and Collingwood and the dialectical materialism of Marx, Carr defends history as a science against the obscurantists, and history as the method of comprehending the world for the purpose of changing it as against the positivists. He brilliantly polemizes in behalf of a scientific history which maintains a real optimism in the capability of man making himself. However, despite being an excellent antidote to the current historical conservatism, the book does fail fully to support democratic processes as expressed through democratic struggle.

WHEN NATIONS DISAGREE; a handbook on peace through law, by Arthur Larson. Louisiana State University Press, 1961. 251 pages, \$3.95.

Mr. Larson, author of *A Republican Looks at His Party*, has been a director of the U. S. Information Agency, a Special Assistant to the President, and director of the World Rule of Law Center at Duke University. In this book he discusses, in non-technical terms, how in his opinion "world law" may be made to reign supreme over nations without abandonment of national sovereignty.

Books Received

AMERICAN COOPERATIVES, by Jerry Voorhis. Harpers and Brothers, New York, 1961. \$4.75.

AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM, by Winthrop S. Hudson. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961. \$3.95.

THE AMERICAN RIGHT WING, by Ralph E. Ellsworth and Sarah M. Harris. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1961. \$1.00 (paper).

AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, edited by Ray Ginger. Hill & Wang, New York, 1961. \$1.65 (paper).

AN ANATOMY FOR CONFORMITY, by Edward L. Walker and Roger W. Heyns. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962. \$1.95 (paper).

APPEASEMENT: A Study in Political Decline, 1933-1939, by A. L. Rowse. W. W. Norton, New York, 1961. \$3.00.

BERNARD SHAW: THE MATTER WITH IRELAND; Previously Uncollected Writings, edited by Dan H. Lawrence and David H. Greene. Hill & Wang, New York, 1962. \$5.00.

BERNARD SHAW: PLATFORM AND PULPIT; Previous Uncollected Speeches, edited by Dan H. Lawrence. Hill & Wang, New York, 1961. \$5.00.

BRITISH LABOR AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, by Herbert E. Weiner. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1960. \$3.25.

CASTRO'S CUBA: An American Dilemma, by Nicolas Rivero. Robert B. Luce, Washington, D.C., 1962. \$4.50.

CIA: The Inside Story, by Andrew Tully. William Morrow, New York, 1961. \$4.50.

CHICAGO AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT: Metropolitan Unionism in the 1930's, by Barbara W. Newell. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1961. \$6.00.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE, by Wilson Hart. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1961. \$6.50.

COMMUNISM AND THE GENERAL STRIKE, by Wilfred H. Crook. Shoe String Press, Hamden, Conn., 1960. \$8.75.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR ERA, by Alice Langley Hsieh. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962. \$2.25 (paper).

COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS, by David J. Saposs. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1961. \$5.00.

COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM: Keys to the Soviet System, by Bertram D. Wolfe. Beacon Press, Boston, 1961. \$4.95.

THE CONDUCT OF WARS 1789-1961, by J. F. C. Fuller. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1961. \$6.00.

THE CUBAN STORY, by Herbert L. Matthews. George Braziller, New York, 1961. \$4.50.

THE DESERT REVOLUTION: Baja California 1911, by Lowell L. Blaisdell. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1962. \$6.00.

DOCTORS, PATIENTS & HEALTH INSURANCE, by Herman A. Somers and Anne R. Somers, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1961. \$7.50.

EAST EUROPE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD, by Hubert Ripka. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. \$5.95.

FREEDOM RIDE, by James Peck. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1962. \$3.50.

THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY, edited by Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962. \$5.00.

THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Political Implications of Economic Development, by Eugene Staley. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961 (revised edition). \$2.50 (paper).

HAWTHORNE REVISITED: Management and the Worker, by Henry A. Landsberger. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1961 (second printing). \$3.00 (paper).

HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, by Hadley Cantril. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1961. \$3.00.

ILLINOIS POLITICS, by Austin Ranney. New York University Press, New York, 1960. \$1.25 (paper).

THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT, by Sumner H. Slichter, James J. Healy and E. Robert Livernash. Brooklings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1960. \$8.75.

THE KU KLUX KLAN IN AMERICAN POLITICS, by Arnold S. Rice. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1962. \$3.25.

LABOR'S GRASS ROOTS: A Study of the Local Union, by Jack Barbash. Harpers and Brothers, New York, 1961. \$4.95.

LABOR HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES: General Bibliography. Institute of Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1961. \$2.00.

THE LEVELERS AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, by H. N. Brailsford. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1961. \$10.00.

MODERN ORGANIZATION: A General Theory, by Victor A. Thompson. A. A. Knopf, New York, 1961.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM, by Robert V. Daniels. Random House, New York, 1962. \$6.00.

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THE NEW NEGRO, edited by Mather H. Ahmann, Fides Publishers, Notre Dame, Ind., 1961. \$3.50.

NEW YORK POLITICS, by Ralph A. Straetz and Frank J. Munger. New York University Press, New York, 1960. \$1.25 (paper).

THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by A. J. P. Taylor. Atheneum, New York, 1962. \$4.50.

PARLIAMENTARY SOCIALISM, by Ralph Miliband. Allen and Unwin, London, 1961. 35s.

PATTERNS IN ORGANIZATION ANALYSIS, by Sherman Krupp. Chilton Company, Philadelphia, 1961. \$5.00.

PHILOSOPHY AND MYTH IN KARL MARX, by Robert C. Tucker. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1961. \$1.75 (paper).

POLITICS IN AFRICA: Prospects South of the Sahara, by Herbert J. Spiro. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962. \$1.85 (paper).

PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (ADOPTED). Crosscurrents Press, New York, 1962. \$1.00.

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REVOLT ON THE CAMPUS, by M. Stanton Evans. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1961. \$4.50.

REVOLUTION, EVOLUTION, AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER, by Allen M. Sievers. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962. \$1.95 (paper).

SCIENCE AND THE NATION: Policy and Politics, by J. Stefan Dupré and Sanford A. Lakoff. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962. \$1.95 (paper).

THE SHARE OF TOP WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH, 1922-1956, by Robert J. Lampman. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962. \$6.50.

THE SHARK AND THE SARDINES, by Juan Jose Arevalo. Lyle Stuart, New York, 1961. \$4.95.

THE SOUTH IN THE NEW NATION, 1789-1819, by Thomas P. Abernethy. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1961. \$7.50.

THE SOVIET STAND ON GERMANY: A Collection of Documents. Crosscurrents Press, New York, 1962. \$1.00 (paper).

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STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL, by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin. Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961. \$2.50.

THE TYRANNY OF CONCEPTS, by Gordon Leff. Merlin Press, London, 1961. 21s.

THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS, by Howard P. Nash, Jr. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1959. \$6.00.

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In 1961, Stawar went to Paris, for medical treatment. There he contacted members of the Polish Socialist Party in exile and worked feverishly to assemble old essays together with a new major article for book publication. This task was completed — just before Stawar's illness proved fatal. In the coming issue of NEW POLITICS there will appear in English for the first time large selections from Stawar's latest essay. (Published in Paris by **Kultura** magazine.)

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